protection of sovereign immunity in Connecticut

2003In Antinerella v. Rioux , supra , 229 Conn. 479 , a high sheriff who tried to CT Page 2052 fire a deputy sheriff to further his own financial gain through a statutorily prohibited fee-splitting agreement with various deputy sheriffs was held to have exceeded his authority and denied the protection of sovereign immunity.

2002In Antinerella v. Rioux , supra, 229 Conn. 479 , the court held that a high sheriff who tried to fire a deputy sheriff to further his own financial gain through a statutorily prohibited fee splitting agreement with various deputy sheriffs exceeded his authority and could not claim the protection of sovereign immunity.

2021Our analysis begins with § 6-38a (a), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘For the purposes of the general statutes, ‘state marshal’ means a qualified deputy sheriff incumbent on June 30, 2000, under section 6-38 or appointed pursuant to section 6-38b who shall have authority to provide legal execution and service of process in the counties in this state pursuant to section 6-38 as an independent contractor compensated on a fee for service basis, determined . . . by agreement with an attorney, court or public agency requiring execution or service of process.’’ (Emphasis added.) By its plain lang

2002The plaintiff cites the case of Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 (2000) which states that in that case employees who allegedly took actions which CT Page 677 were unwarranted and were taken for purposes of the employee's self protection could not claim the protection of sovereign immunity.

1996“Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, ‘the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant mies of procedural and substantive law.’ ” State v. Krijger, 33 Conn. App. 49, 55 , 633 A.2d 310 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917 , 636 A.2d 849 (1994), quoting Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 334-35 , 527 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1996“Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, ‘the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant mies of procedural and substantive law.’ ” State v. Krijger, 33 Conn. App. 49, 55 , 633 A.2d 310 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917 , 636 A.2d 849 (1994), quoting Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 334-35 , 527 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1996“Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, ‘the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant mies of procedural and substantive law.’ ” State v. Krijger, 33 Conn. App. 49, 55 , 633 A.2d 310 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917 , 636 A.2d 849 (1994), quoting Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 334-35 , 527 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1996“Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, ‘the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant mies of procedural and substantive law.’ ” State v. Krijger, 33 Conn. App. 49, 55 , 633 A.2d 310 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917 , 636 A.2d 849 (1994), quoting Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 334-35 , 527 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1996“Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, ‘the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant mies of procedural and substantive law.’ ” State v. Krijger, 33 Conn. App. 49, 55 , 633 A.2d 310 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917 , 636 A.2d 849 (1994), quoting Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 334-35 , 527 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1996“Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, ‘the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant mies of procedural and substantive law.’ ” State v. Krijger, 33 Conn. App. 49, 55 , 633 A.2d 310 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917 , 636 A.2d 849 (1994), quoting Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 334-35 , 527 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1995See Gauvin v. New Haven, supra, 187 Conn. 186 (whether town is entitled to limited governmental immunity is question of fact); Dolnack v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 33 Conn. App. 832, 836-37 , 639 A.2d 530 (1994) (listing several fact based factors that must be considered in determining whether given entity is entitled to immunity of state); see also 5 F. Harper, F. James & O.

1995See Gauvin v. New Haven, supra, 187 Conn. 186 (whether town is entitled to limited governmental immunity is question of fact); Dolnack v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 33 Conn. App. 832, 836-37 , 639 A.2d 530 (1994) (listing several fact based factors that must be considered in determining whether given entity is entitled to immunity of state); see also 5 F. Harper, F. James & O.

1992In the performance of a public duty, the municipality is generally immune from liability, for if "the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public and not an individual injury, and must be redressed if at all in some form of public prosecution." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 166 (1988) (citations omitted).

1992Although municipalities do not have the protection of sovereign immunity, they "do, in certain circumstances, have a governmental immunity from liability." Murphy v. Ives, 151 Conn. 259 , 264 (1963); see also White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307 , 312 (1990).