party to raise claim in Connecticut

2013“The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dalzell, 282 Conn. 709, 720 , 924 A.2d 809 (2007).

2013“The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dalzell, 282 Conn. 709, 720 , 924 A.2d 809 (2007).

2025The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court . . . to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345 , 351–52, 999 A.2d 713 (2010).

2025The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court . . . to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345 , 351–52, 999 A.2d 713 (2010).

2017The plaintiff failed to raise this claim in the trial court; we therefore decline to consider it. ‘‘As our Supreme Court has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Iaquessa, 132 Conn. App. 812, 815 , 34 A.3d 1005 (2012).

2017"As our Supreme Court has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Iaquessa , 132 Conn. App. 812 , 815, 34 A.3d 1005 (2012).

2017The plaintiff failed to raise this claim in the trial court; we therefore decline to consider it. ‘‘As our Supreme Court has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Iaquessa, 132 Conn. App. 812, 815 , 34 A.3d 1005 (2012).

2017"As our Supreme Court has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Iaquessa , 132 Conn. App. 812 , 815, 34 A.3d 1005 (2012).

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2022The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Roz- bicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L.

2019The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Roz- bicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L.

2022The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Roz- bicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L.

2019The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Roz- bicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L.

2020The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Guddo v. Guddo, 185 Conn. App. 283 , 286–87, 196 A.3d 1246 (2018).

2020The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Guddo v. Guddo, 185 Conn. App. 283 , 286–87, 196 A.3d 1246 (2018).

2024The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 327 , 285 A.3d 59 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903 , 287 A.3d 601 (2023).

2024The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 327 , 285 A.3d 59 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903 , 287 A.3d 601 (2023).

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” [Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2010It therefore follows that “[a] party cannot present a case to the trial court on one theory and then seek appellate relief on a different one . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 477, 498 , 944 A.2d 340 (2008).

2010It therefore follows that “[a] party cannot present a case to the trial court on one theory and then seek appellate relief on a different one . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 477, 498 , 944 A.2d 340 (2008).

2008The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeVivo, 106 Conn. App. 641, 647 , 942 A.2d 1066 (2008).

2008The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeVivo, 106 Conn. App. 641, 647 , 942 A.2d 1066 (2008).

2006E.g., State v. Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 556 , 821 A.2d 247 (2003).

2006E.g., State v. Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 556 , 821 A.2d 247 (2003).

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address Barone, 83 Conn. App. 365 , 371–72, 849 A.2d 902 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 908 , 859 A.2d 560 (2004).

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address Barone, 83 Conn. App. 365 , 371–72, 849 A.2d 902 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 908 , 859 A.2d 560 (2004).

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address Barone, 83 Conn. App. 365 , 371–72, 849 A.2d 902 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 908 , 859 A.2d 560 (2004).