party to raise claim in Connecticut

2013“The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dalzell, 282 Conn. 709, 720 , 924 A.2d 809 (2007).

2013“The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dalzell, 282 Conn. 709, 720 , 924 A.2d 809 (2007).

2025The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court . . . to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345 , 351-52, 999 A.2d 713 (2010).

2025The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court . . . to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345 , 351-52, 999 A.2d 713 (2010).

2025As our Supreme Court has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal the proper lens for analysis is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, not a freestanding constitutional claim. 20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 White v. Commissioner of Correction that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank Nation

2025As our Supreme Court has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal the proper lens for analysis is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, not a freestanding constitutional claim. 20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 White v. Commissioner of Correction that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank Nation

2021The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123 , 142, 84 A.3d 840 (2014); see also In re Skylar B., 204 Conn. App. 729 , 745, A.3d (2021) (only properly filed motion provides requisite notice to all int

2021The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123 , 142, 84 A.3d 840 (2014); see also In re Skylar B., 204 Conn. App. 729 , 745, A.3d (2021) (only properly filed motion provides requisite notice to all int

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2016The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party." State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39 , 55, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S.Ct. 1328 , 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007).

2022The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the

2019The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 686, 695 , 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583 , 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the

2026Thus, the requirement of . . . § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 164 Conn. App. 209 , 225 n.9, 137 A.3d 809 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 8 The defendant’s appellate brief contains paragraphs preceding and following these three sentences; however, those additional paragraphs do not provide any substantive legal analysis supporting the defendant’s claim that the maili

2026Thus, the requirement of . . . § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 164 Conn. App. 209 , 225 n.9, 137 A.3d 809 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 8 The defendant’s appellate brief contains paragraphs preceding and following these three sentences; however, those additional paragraphs do not provide any substantive legal analysis supporting the defendant’s claim that the maili

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 762 , 777 n.18, 354 A.3d 250 (2026); see also Practice 10 Article I of the lease describes the demised premises as “approximately 13,898 square feet of church space, attached parsonage, parking lot an

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 762 , 777 n.18, 354 A.3d 250 (2026); see also Practice 10 Article I of the lease describes the demised premises as “approximately 13,898 square feet of church space, attached parsonage, parking lot an

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 762 , 777 n.18, 354 A.3d 250 (2026); see also Practice 10 Article I of the lease describes the demised premises as “approximately 13,898 square feet of church space, attached parsonage, parking lot an

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 762 , 777 n.18, 354 A.3d 250 (2026); see also Practice 10 Article I of the lease describes the demised premises as “approximately 13,898 square feet of church space, attached parsonage, parking lot an

2026Thus, the requirement of . . . § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 164 Conn. App. 209 , 225 n.9, 137 A.3d 809 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 8 The defendant’s appellate brief contains paragraphs preceding and following these three sentences; however, those additional paragraphs do not provide any substantive legal analysis supporting the defendant’s claim that the maili

2022Our law is also ‘‘clear that [r]aising an issue for the first time in a motion to reargue will not preserve that issue for appellate review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 164 Conn. App. 209 , 227, 137 A.3d 809 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 284 (2016).

2026This court has recognized that “to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court . . . to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A., 225 Conn. App. 702, 715 , 317 A.3d 2 (2024).

2026This court has recognized that “to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court . . . to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A., 225 Conn. App. 702, 715 , 317 A.3d 2 (2024).

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 762 , 777 n.18, 354 A.3d 250 (2026); see also Practice 10 Article I of the lease describes the demised premises as “approximately 13,898 square feet of church space, attached parsonage, parking lot an

2026The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 762 , 777 n.18, 354 A.3d 250 (2026); see also Practice 10 Article I of the lease describes the demised premises as “approximately 13,898 square feet of church space, attached parsonage, parking lot an

2021For these reasons, we cannot address the merits of this claim. ‘‘The court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .’’ Practice Book § 60-5. ‘‘[T]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party. . . . [T]o permit the appellant first to raise posttrial an issue that ar

2021For these reasons, we cannot address the merits of this claim. ‘‘The court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .’’ Practice Book § 60-5. ‘‘[T]he reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party. . . . [T]o permit the appellant first to raise posttrial an issue that ar

2024The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 327 , 285 A.3d 59 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903 , 287 A.3d 601 (2023).

2024The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial— after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 327 , 285 A.3d 59 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903 , 287 A.3d 601 (2023).

2021The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726 , 749, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of

2021Golding strikes an appropriate balance between . . . competing interests: the defendant may raise . . . a [meritorious] constitutional claim on appeal, and the appellate tribunal will review it, but only if the trial court record is adequate for appellate review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726 , 749, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). ‘‘This court [however] previously has concluded that Golding review is not warranted [when] a defendant, on appeal, raises a challenge to the legality of his sentence that was not presented in his underlying motion to correct. . . .

2021The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726 , 749, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of

2021Golding strikes an appropriate balance between . . . competing interests: the defendant may raise . . . a [meritorious] constitutional claim on appeal, and the appellate tribunal will review it, but only if the trial court record is adequate for appellate review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726 , 749, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). ‘‘This court [however] previously has concluded that Golding review is not warranted [when] a defendant, on appeal, raises a challenge to the legality of his sentence that was not presented in his underlying motion to correct. . . .

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2018See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki , 326 Conn. 686 , 695, 167 A.3d 351 (2017) ("[t]o permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Hilton , 45 Conn. App. 207 , 222, 694 A.2d 830 ("[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial"), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 52

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2016Thus, the requirement of Practice Book § 60-5 that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [trial] court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373 , 379–80, 962 A.2d 860 , cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009); see also White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610 , 631, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘an issue must be distinctly raised before the trial court, not just briefly suggested’’ [internal qu

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 189 , 26 A.3d 657 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).

2012The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial — after it is too late for the trial court ... to address the claim — would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.” [Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946 , 30 A.3d 1 (2011).