fundamental fairness exception in Illinois

2002And although the “fundamental fairness” exception “ ‘escapes precise definition’ ” (Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d at 173 , quoting People v. Porter, 164 Ill. 2d 400, 408 (1995)), we have long defined the fundamental fairness exception in the context of an initial post-conviction petition in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test (see People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989)).

2002And although the "fundamental fairness" exception "`escapes precise definition'" ( Mahaffey, 194 Ill.2d at 173 , 252 Ill.Dec. 1 , 742 N.E.2d 251 , quoting People v. Porter, 164 Ill.2d 400, 408 , 207 Ill.Dec. 479 , 647 N.E.2d 972 (1995)), we have long defined the fundamental fairness exception in the context of an initial post-conviction petition in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test (see People v. Owens, 129 Ill.2d 303, 317 , 135 Ill.Dec. 780 , 544 N.E.2d 276 (1989)).

2025Analysis of the Pleadings - Generally - 12 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240640-U ¶ 39 In Pitsonbarger, the supreme court held that “the fundamental fairness exception applies to claims, not to petitions, and the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole.” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462 .

2024When applying the test, this court was clear that “the fundamental fairness exception applies to claims, not to petitions, and the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole.” Id. at 462 . ¶ 67 Earlier in Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 , in recognizing that there was “footing in the Illinois Constitution for asserting freestanding innocence claims based upon newly discovered evidence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,” we stated that “such claims should be resolved as any other brought under the Act.” Therefore, in Coleman, 2013 IL 113307,

1999As I noted above, this court in Flores stated that the inquiry into whether a procedural bar will be relaxed in the context of successive petitions turns upon considerations of "fundamental fairness." *250 This court's position on what constitutes "fundamental fairness" was thoroughly set forth in People v. Owens, 129 Ill.2d 303, 317-18 , 135 Ill.Dec. 780 , 544 N.E.2d 276 (1989) and bears repeating today: "Where fundamental fairness requires, the rule of waiver will not be applied in post-conviction proceedings. [Citations.] The Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes (1977), 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.C

1999Ed. 2d 594 , 97 S. Ct. 2497 , described when it would be necessary for a court to consider the fundamental fairness principle when the prosecutor relies on a claim of waiver.

2002And although the “fundamental fairness” exception “ ‘escapes precise definition’ ” (Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d at 173 , quoting People v. Porter, 164 Ill. 2d 400, 408 (1995)), we have long defined the fundamental fairness exception in the context of an initial post-conviction petition in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test (see People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989)).

2002And although the "fundamental fairness" exception "`escapes precise definition'" ( Mahaffey, 194 Ill.2d at 173 , 252 Ill.Dec. 1 , 742 N.E.2d 251 , quoting People v. Porter, 164 Ill.2d 400, 408 , 207 Ill.Dec. 479 , 647 N.E.2d 972 (1995)), we have long defined the fundamental fairness exception in the context of an initial post-conviction petition in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test (see People v. Owens, 129 Ill.2d 303, 317 , 135 Ill.Dec. 780 , 544 N.E.2d 276 (1989)).

2001People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1995); see also People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 173 (2000).

2001People v. Franklin, 167 Ill.2d 1, 20 , 212 Ill.Dec. 153 , 656 N.E.2d 750 (1995); see also People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill.2d 154, 173 , 252 Ill.Dec. 1 , 742 N.E.2d 251 (2000).

2016See People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443 (2005). ¶ 33 Finally, Sanders argues that we should apply the fundamental fairness exception to res judicata and permit the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel to proceed.

2016See People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443 (2005). ¶ 33 Finally, Sanders argues that we should apply the fundamental fairness exception to res judicata and permit the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel to proceed.

2014See People v. Jackson, 299 Ill.

2014See People v. Jackson, 299 Ill.

2011See People v. Santiago, 409 Ill.App.3d 927 , 930 n. 1, 350 Ill.Dec. 802 , 949 N.E.2d 290 (2011) (plain error claim is forfeited when the defendant does not "argue[] that the evidence was closely balanced " (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Carrero, 345 Ill.App.3d 1 , 12 n. 3, 280 Ill.Dec. 139 , 801 N.E.2d 1084 (2003) ("There is a real question whether the defendant's claim that the evidence against him was `not overwhelming' is equivalent to the `factually close' standard" under prong one of plain error.).

2011See People v. Santiago, 409 Ill.App.3d 927 , 930 n. 1, 350 Ill.Dec. 802 , 949 N.E.2d 290 (2011) (plain error claim is forfeited when the defendant does not "argue[] that the evidence was closely balanced " (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Carrero, 345 Ill.App.3d 1 , 12 n. 3, 280 Ill.Dec. 139 , 801 N.E.2d 1084 (2003) ("There is a real question whether the defendant's claim that the evidence against him was `not overwhelming' is equivalent to the `factually close' standard" under prong one of plain error.).

2007See Dominguez, 366 Ill.App.3d at 475 , 303 Ill.

2007See Dominguez, 366 Ill.App.3d at 475 , 303 Ill.

2004See also People v. Britt-El, 206 Ill.2d 331, 338-39 , 276 Ill.Dec. 309 , 794 N.E.2d 204 (2002) (where defendant provided no reason why certain claims raised in his second postconviction petition could not have been included in his first petition, the additional claims were waived).

2004See also People v. Britt-El, 206 Ill.2d 331, 338-39 , 276 Ill.Dec. 309 , 794 N.E.2d 204 (2002) (where defendant provided no reason why certain claims raised in his second postconviction petition could not have been included in his first petition, the additional claims were waived).

2002And although the “fundamental fairness” exception “ ‘escapes precise definition’ ” (Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d at 173 , quoting People v. Porter, 164 Ill. 2d 400, 408 (1995)), we have long defined the fundamental fairness exception in the context of an initial post-conviction petition in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test (see People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989)).

2002And although the "fundamental fairness" exception "`escapes precise definition'" ( Mahaffey, 194 Ill.2d at 173 , 252 Ill.Dec. 1 , 742 N.E.2d 251 , quoting People v. Porter, 164 Ill.2d 400, 408 , 207 Ill.Dec. 479 , 647 N.E.2d 972 (1995)), we have long defined the fundamental fairness exception in the context of an initial post-conviction petition in terms of the cause-and-prejudice test (see People v. Owens, 129 Ill.2d 303, 317 , 135 Ill.Dec. 780 , 544 N.E.2d 276 (1989)).

2002See Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 36 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (noting that each claim in a successive petition must be reviewed individually to ascertain whether the claim is barred by section 122 — 3; if it is barred, the court must then determine whether an exception applies to that claim).

2002See Wright, 189 Ill.2d at 36 , 243 Ill.Dec. 198 , 723 N.E.2d 230 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (noting that each claim in a successive petition must be reviewed individually to ascertain whether the claim is barred by section 122-3; if it is barred, the court must then determine whether an exception applies to that claim).

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2011Only the supreme court has authority to disregard forfeiture to maintain "a sound and uniform body of precedent which may sometimes `"override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system."'" People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 145 , 284 Ill.Dec. 287 , 809 N.E.2d 1233 (2004) (quoting People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432-33 , 274 Ill.Dec. 397 , 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)). "[T]he appellate court [does] not possess [the supreme] court's supervisory authority to recognize procedurally defaulted clai

2026Thus, “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process.” Id.; see Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 (2004) (per curiam) (“[T]he substance destroyed here was, at best, ‘potentially useful’ evidence, and therefore Youngblood’s bad-faith requirement applies.”).

2024See People v. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 67 (holding that reversing and remanding for second-stage proceedings on the defendant’s actual innocence claim did not obviate the need to evaluate the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the fundamental fairness exception and cause-and-prejudice test both apply to individual claims, not petitions, and “[a]ny claim in a successive petition should not be advanced without a determination that the claim has met the appropriate standard”). ¶ 11 The Act contemplates only one postconviction proceeding.