6 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1994–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green2 sentences1999To the contrary there is a presumption against appointment of counsel where the litigant’s physical liberty is not at stake. “[A]n indigent litigant has a [Fourteenth Amendment due process] right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27 , 101 S.Ct. at 2159 (emphasis added). 1999To the contrary there is a presumption against appointment of counsel where the litigant’s physical liberty is not at stake. “[A]n indigent litigant has a [Fourteenth Amendment due process] right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27 , 101 S.Ct. at 2159 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Goudy v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686 (Ind.1997); Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317 (Ind.1996) (holding no fundamental error arose despite trial court’s failure to instruct on the specific intent element of attempted murder where the intent element was not the subject of a serious factual dispute at trial.) 4 Baxter has offered no evidence that the felonies relied upon by the state were not in the sequence required by the habitual offender statute. | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen1 sentence1996“One of the cornerstones of our litigation process has been the contemporaneous objection rule.” Stewart v. State, 567 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences1994In Arizona v. Youngblood (1988), 488 U.S. 51, 59 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 338 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , the United States Supreme Court indicated its unwillingness to read the fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause as imposing on police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. 1994In Arizona v. Youngblood (1988), 488 U.S. 51, 59 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 338 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 , the United States Supreme Court indicated its unwillingness to read the fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause as imposing on police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. | 2 | 1994–1996 |
Lacey v. State
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Swallows v. State
green
1 sentence1997See, e.g., Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686 (Ind.1997); Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317 (Ind.1996) (holding no fundamental error arose despite trial court’s failure to instruct on the specific intent element of attempted murder where the intent element was not the subject of a serious factual dispute at trial.) 4 Baxter has offered no evidence that the felonies relied upon by the state were not in the sequence required by the habitual offender statute. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.