9 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Redford v. Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2022The VAB moved to dismiss the Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice asserting the VAB is a quasi-judicial entity immune from suit. 1 Value adjustment boards are quasi-judicial state entities created by Florida statute to allow taxpayers to administratively challenge their tax assessments. §§194.011 through 194.036, Fla. Stat. (2022); Redford v. Department of Revenue, 478 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1985). 2 The VAB argued that section 194.181, Florida Statutes, provides that the proper party to any case brought by a taxpayer to challenge property assessment is the county property appraiser, an | 1 | 1 |
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF STATE v. Markhamgreen1 sentence1999In North Broward Hospital District v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla.1985) (quoting Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981)), the supreme court reiterated the requirements of standing, commenting that [i]t has long been the rule in Florida that, in the absence of a constitutional challenge, a taxpayer may bring suit only upon a showing of special injury which is distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers in the taxing district. | 1 | 1 |
North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Fornesgreen1 sentence1999In North Broward Hospital District v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla.1985) (quoting Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981)), the supreme court reiterated the requirements of standing, commenting that [i]t has long been the rule in Florida that, in the absence of a constitutional challenge, a taxpayer may bring suit only upon a showing of special injury which is distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers in the taxing district. | 1 | 1 |
Boucher v. Novotnygreen1 sentence1999In Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So.2d 132, 135 (Fla.1958), the supreme court held that "one seeking redress, either preventive or corrective, against an alleged violation of a municipal zoning ordinance must allege and prove special damages peculiar to himself differing in kind as distinguished from damages differing in degree suffered by the community as a whole." The rule was applied to a taxpayer challenge to a claimed illegal expenditure of public funds. | 1 | 1 |
Muss v. Blakegreen1 sentence1990See, e.g., Blake v Oceancoast Corp., 417 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla 3d DCA), rev. denied, 424 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1982); Muss v Blake, 416 So.2d at 3; Equitable, 416 So.2d at 1145 . 12. | 1 | 1 |
Blake v. Oceancoast Corp.green1 sentence1990See, e.g., Blake v Oceancoast Corp., 417 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla 3d DCA), rev. denied, 424 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1982); Muss v Blake, 416 So.2d at 3; Equitable, 416 So.2d at 1145 . 12. | 1 | 1 |
Palm Corporation v. Homergreen1 sentence1985See Palm Corp. v. Homer, 261 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Henry L. Doherty Co., Inc. v. Joachim
green
2 sentences1996Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50 , 200 So. 238 (1941), we have consistently held that a mere increase in taxes does not confer standing upon a taxpayer to challenge a governmental expenditure. 1996Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50 , 200 So. 238 (1941), we have consistently held that a mere increase in taxes does not confer standing upon a taxpayer to challenge a governmental expenditure. | 2 | 1985–1996 |
Rickman v. Whitehurst
green
2 sentences1996In that case we stated: Both parties seem to recognize the rule announced in Rickman v. Whitehurst, et al., 73 Fla. 152 , 74 So. 205 , that in the event an official threatens an unlawful act, the public by its representatives must institute the proceedings to prevent it, unless a private person can show a damage peculiar to his individual interests in which case equity will grant him succor. 1996In that case we stated: Both parties seem to recognize the rule announced in Rickman v. Whitehurst, et al., 73 Fla. 152 , 74 So. 205 , that in the event an official threatens an unlawful act, the public by its representatives must institute the proceedings to prevent it, unless a private person can show a damage peculiar to his individual interests in which case equity will grant him succor. | 2 | 1985–1996 |
Bystrom v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC., ETC.
green
1 sentence1990See, e.g., Blake v Oceancoast Corp., 417 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla 3d DCA), rev. denied, 424 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1982); Muss v Blake, 416 So.2d at 3; Equitable, 416 So.2d at 1145 . 12. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Department of Educ. v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1985Department of Education v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1982); Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1953). *375 As to the trial court's implied holding that Higgs has standing as a taxpayer to challenge the statute, we note that the record contains not one scintilla of evidence to support the allegation that Higgs, as an individual, owns property in Monroe County, Florida (and is therefore presumably a taxpayer). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Barr v. Watts
green
1 sentence1985Department of Education v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1982); Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1953). *375 As to the trial court's implied holding that Higgs has standing as a taxpayer to challenge the statute, we note that the record contains not one scintilla of evidence to support the allegation that Higgs, as an individual, owns property in Monroe County, Florida (and is therefore presumably a taxpayer). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Straughn v. GAC Properties, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1983Again in 1978 in Straughn v. GAC Properties, Inc., 360 So.2d 385 (Fla.1978), the Court declined to hold, merely on the basis of an allegation that different values had been assigned to adjacent properties of like character in different counties, that a taxpayer could claim a violation of the “just valuation” requirement or that the Department could be compelled to equalize the values. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Haines v. Leonard L. Farber Company
neutral
1 sentence1970Farber Company, Inc., Fla.App.1967, 199 So.2d 311 , the court stated: “The land owner should be able to use the same method [of treating the separate parcels of property and improvements separately] in the contesting of an assessment, that is by contesting the basic appraisal and not the addition.” See also Metropolitan Dade County v. Tropical Park, Inc., supra. No error was committed in failing to dismiss the cause of action because the taxpayer did not challenge the entire assessment. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.