Bearden hearing in Georgia

2020See also Hunt v. State, 222 Ga. App. 66, 70 (3) [( 473 SE2d 157 )] (1996) (where restitution is a condition of probation, Bearden hearing on ability to pay not required until probation is about to be revoked for failure to pay).

2020See also Hunt v. State, 222 Ga. App. 66, 70 (3) [( 473 SE2d 157 )] (1996) (where restitution is a condition of probation, Bearden hearing on ability to pay not required until probation is about to be revoked for failure to pay).

2012Cf.Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 60 (5) (a) ( 601 SE2d 434 ) (2004) (where evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions, counsel was not deficient for failing to move for directed verdict).

2012Cf.Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 60 (5) (a) ( 601 SE2d 434 ) (2004) (where evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions, counsel was not deficient for failing to move for directed verdict).

2011Applying Bearden in Massey v. Meadows, 253 Ga. 389, 390 ( 321 SE2d 703 ) (1984), our Supreme Court held that the Bearden requirements also applied to cases where the payment of a fine is a condition precedent to probation and that a defendant’s probation could not be withheld for failure to pay a fine absent a showing of wilfulness on his part or that alternative punishments are inadequate. 4 Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 692 SE2d 7 ) (2010). 5 Supra. 6 257 Ga. App. 190 ( 570 SE2d 634 ) (2002). 7 Supra. 8 Supra. 9 Id. at 190-191. 10 Id. at 191. 11 Id. at 191 (1). 12 Id. at 192 (1).

2011Applying Bearden in Massey v. Meadows, 253 Ga. 389, 390 ( 321 SE2d 703 ) (1984), our Supreme Court held that the Bearden requirements also applied to cases where the payment of a fine is a condition precedent to probation and that a defendant’s probation could not be withheld for failure to pay a fine absent a showing of wilfulness on his part or that alternative punishments are inadequate. 4 Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 692 SE2d 7 ) (2010). 5 Supra. 6 257 Ga. App. 190 ( 570 SE2d 634 ) (2002). 7 Supra. 8 Supra. 9 Id. at 190-191. 10 Id. at 191. 11 Id. at 191 (1). 12 Id. at 192 (1).

2011Applying Bearden in Massey v. Meadows, 253 Ga. 389, 390 ( 321 SE2d 703 ) (1984), our Supreme Court held that the Bearden requirements also applied to cases where the payment of a fine is a condition precedent to probation and that a defendant’s probation could not be withheld for failure to pay a fine absent a showing of wilfulness on his part or that alternative punishments are inadequate. 4 Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 692 SE2d 7 ) (2010). 5 Supra. 6 257 Ga. App. 190 ( 570 SE2d 634 ) (2002). 7 Supra. 8 Supra. 9 Id. at 190-191. 10 Id. at 191. 11 Id. at 191 (1). 12 Id. at 192 (1).

2011Applying Bearden in Massey v. Meadows, 253 Ga. 389, 390 ( 321 SE2d 703 ) (1984), our Supreme Court held that the Bearden requirements also applied to cases where the payment of a fine is a condition precedent to probation and that a defendant’s probation could not be withheld for failure to pay a fine absent a showing of wilfulness on his part or that alternative punishments are inadequate. 4 Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 692 SE2d 7 ) (2010). 5 Supra. 6 257 Ga. App. 190 ( 570 SE2d 634 ) (2002). 7 Supra. 8 Supra. 9 Id. at 190-191. 10 Id. at 191. 11 Id. at 191 (1). 12 Id. at 192 (1).

2020McMahon, 284 Ga. App. at 194 (2). 9 We note that at the time these cases were decided, future earning capacity was still a factor to be considered under the statute. 16 § 17-14-5 (b) expressly authorizes restitution as a condition or limitation of the probation of delinquent or unruly juveniles, and as the nature and amount of restitution was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we discern no error and affirm the juvenile court’s order of restitution.” W.

2012“Failing to make a meritless objection to admissible evidence does not constitute deficient performance, and thus, appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be sustained.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hammock v. State, 311 Ga. App. 344, 346 (2) (a) ( 715 SE2d 709 ) (2011). (d) Finally, in light of our holdings in Divisions 1 and 2 above, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and to establish venue, there is no merit to Bearden’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict of acquittal on these issues.

2012“Failing to make a meritless objection to admissible evidence does not constitute deficient performance, and thus, appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be sustained.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hammock v. State, 311 Ga. App. 344, 346 (2) (a) ( 715 SE2d 709 ) (2011). (d) Finally, in light of our holdings in Divisions 1 and 2 above, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and to establish venue, there is no merit to Bearden’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict of acquittal on these issues.

2011Applying Bearden in Massey v. Meadows, 253 Ga. 389, 390 ( 321 SE2d 703 ) (1984), our Supreme Court held that the Bearden requirements also applied to cases where the payment of a fine is a condition precedent to probation and that a defendant’s probation could not be withheld for failure to pay a fine absent a showing of wilfulness on his part or that alternative punishments are inadequate. 4 Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 692 SE2d 7 ) (2010). 5 Supra. 6 257 Ga. App. 190 ( 570 SE2d 634 ) (2002). 7 Supra. 8 Supra. 9 Id. at 190-191. 10 Id. at 191. 11 Id. at 191 (1). 12 Id. at 192 (1).

2011Applying Bearden in Massey v. Meadows, 253 Ga. 389, 390 ( 321 SE2d 703 ) (1984), our Supreme Court held that the Bearden requirements also applied to cases where the payment of a fine is a condition precedent to probation and that a defendant’s probation could not be withheld for failure to pay a fine absent a showing of wilfulness on his part or that alternative punishments are inadequate. 4 Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 692 SE2d 7 ) (2010). 5 Supra. 6 257 Ga. App. 190 ( 570 SE2d 634 ) (2002). 7 Supra. 8 Supra. 9 Id. at 190-191. 10 Id. at 191. 11 Id. at 191 (1). 12 Id. at 192 (1).

2011Compare Cannon v. State, 260 Ga. App. 15, 16-17 ( 579 SE2d 60 ) (2003) (no inquiry as to wilfulness required where the defendant admitted that he violated the restitution condition but promised to pay the next month, which necessarily admitted wilfulness).

2011Compare Cannon v. State, 260 Ga. App. 15, 16-17 ( 579 SE2d 60 ) (2003) (no inquiry as to wilfulness required where the defendant admitted that he violated the restitution condition but promised to pay the next month, which necessarily admitted wilfulness).

1998See Harris, supra; Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791, 793, n. 1 , 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997) (where the relevant facts were not in dispute, whether official immunity was applicable was a question of law for the court); compare Trotter v. Ashbaugh, 156 Ga.App. 130, 133 , 274 S.E.2d 127 (1980) (controverted facts remained for jury resolution before court could determine whether interspousal tort immunity barred the action). [1] Because undisputed evidence showed that, at the time of the accident, the married parties, though separated for a lengthy period of time, continued to see each other frequently a

1998See Harris, supra; Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791, 793, n. 1 , 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997) (where the relevant facts were not in dispute, whether official immunity was applicable was a question of law for the court); compare Trotter v. Ashbaugh, 156 Ga.App. 130, 133 , 274 S.E.2d 127 (1980) (controverted facts remained for jury resolution before court could determine whether interspousal tort immunity barred the action). [1] Because undisputed evidence showed that, at the time of the accident, the married parties, though separated for a lengthy period of time, continued to see each other frequently a

1998See Harris, supra; Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791, 793, n. 1 , 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997) (where the relevant facts were not in dispute, whether official immunity was applicable was a question of law for the court); compare Trotter v. Ashbaugh, 156 Ga.App. 130, 133 , 274 S.E.2d 127 (1980) (controverted facts remained for jury resolution before court could determine whether interspousal tort immunity barred the action). [1] Because undisputed evidence showed that, at the time of the accident, the married parties, though separated for a lengthy period of time, continued to see each other frequently a

1998See Harris, supra; Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791, 793, n. 1 , 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997) (where the relevant facts were not in dispute, whether official immunity was applicable was a question of law for the court); compare Trotter v. Ashbaugh, 156 Ga.App. 130, 133 , 274 S.E.2d 127 (1980) (controverted facts remained for jury resolution before court could determine whether interspousal tort immunity barred the action). [1] Because undisputed evidence showed that, at the time of the accident, the married parties, though separated for a lengthy period of time, continued to see each other frequently a