9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253, 254 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994); Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 610 (2) ( 216 SE2d 855 ) (1975). 2010Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253, 254 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994); Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 610 (2) ( 216 SE2d 855 ) (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Lavender v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253, 254 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994); Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 610 (2) ( 216 SE2d 855 ) (1975). 2010Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253, 254 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994); Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 610 (2) ( 216 SE2d 855 ) (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Smaha v. Mooregreen2 sentences1991First, even giving the jury credit for ordinary intelligence, see Smaha v. Moore, 193 Ga. App. 23, 24 ( 387 SE2d 13 ) (1989), we cannot agree with appellee that the average juror could possibly have interpreted “higher standard of care” to mean the higher “level of performance” appellee expected appellant to provide because of his alleged expertise. 1991First, even giving the jury credit for ordinary intelligence, see Smaha v. Moore, 193 Ga. App. 23, 24 ( 387 SE2d 13 ) (1989), we cannot agree with appellee that the average juror could possibly have interpreted “higher standard of care” to mean the higher “level of performance” appellee expected appellant to provide because of his alleged expertise. | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Stategreen2 sentences1984In the case of Blount v. Moore, 159 Ga. App. 80, 83 ( 282 SE2d 720 ) (1981), this court held: “Absent a qualification as to the necessity that a doctor exercise the care and skill ordinarily employed by the profession generally, we are therefore compelled to conclude that the verbatim language of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Division 1 of [Hayes v. Brown, supra] is not adaptable as a jury instruction and should not be included in a charge in a malpractice case because it is argumentative, inappropriate and misleading.” (Emphasis supplied.) Blount v. Moore was a whole court ca 1984In the case of Blount v. Moore, 159 Ga. App. 80, 83 ( 282 SE2d 720 ) (1981), this court held: "Absent a qualification as to the necessity that a doctor exercise the care and skill ordinarily employed by the profession generally, we are therefore compelled to conclude that the verbatim language of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Division 1 of [ Hayes v. Brown, supra] is not adaptable as a jury instruction and should not be included in a charge in a malpractice case because it is argumentative, inappropriate and misleading." (Emphasis supplied.) Blount v. Moore was a whole court c | 1 | 1 |
Walburn v. Tauntongreen2 sentences1981“The trial judge’s refusal to charge a pertinent and correct request is reversible error. [Cit.]” Walburn v. Taunton, 107 Ga. App. 411, 412 ( 130 SE2d 279 ). 1981“The trial judge’s refusal to charge a pertinent and correct request is reversible error. [Cit.]” Walburn v. Taunton, 107 Ga. App. 411, 412 ( 130 SE2d 279 ). | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Stategreen2 sentences1976The trial court charged the jury, "An admission is a circumstance which requires the aid of testimony or other evidence to authorize or warrant a reasonable conclusion of guilt of the crime charged.” The appellant contends that this charge was reversible error because it allowed the jury to consider evidence that corroborated the "admissions” which was not independent, as is contended is required under Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 246 (1) ( 217 SE2d 476 ). 1976The trial court charged the jury, "An admission is a circumstance which requires the aid of testimony or other evidence to authorize or warrant a reasonable conclusion of guilt of the crime charged.” The appellant contends that this charge was reversible error because it allowed the jury to consider evidence that corroborated the "admissions” which was not independent, as is contended is required under Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 246 (1) ( 217 SE2d 476 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clay v. State
green
2 sentences1999Because the failure to give the charge was reversible error per se under Clay v. State, 236 Ga. 398 ( 224 SE2d 14 ) (1976), we reverse. 1999Because the failure to give the charge was reversible error per se under Clay v. State, 236 Ga. 398 ( 224 SE2d 14 ) (1976), we reverse. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Little v. State
green
2 sentences1995The charge requested is taken from Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. 130 ( 392 SE2d 896 ) (1990), a case involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in which we held that failure to give such a charge was reversible error. 1995The charge requested is taken from Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. 130 ( 392 SE2d 896 ) (1990), a case involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in which we held that failure to give such a charge was reversible error. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Blount v. Moore
green
2 sentences1984In the case of Blount v. Moore, 159 Ga. App. 80, 83 ( 282 SE2d 720 ) (1981), this court held: “Absent a qualification as to the necessity that a doctor exercise the care and skill ordinarily employed by the profession generally, we are therefore compelled to conclude that the verbatim language of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Division 1 of [Hayes v. Brown, supra] is not adaptable as a jury instruction and should not be included in a charge in a malpractice case because it is argumentative, inappropriate and misleading.” (Emphasis supplied.) Blount v. Moore was a whole court ca 1984In the case of Blount v. Moore, 159 Ga. App. 80, 83 ( 282 SE2d 720 ) (1981), this court held: "Absent a qualification as to the necessity that a doctor exercise the care and skill ordinarily employed by the profession generally, we are therefore compelled to conclude that the verbatim language of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Division 1 of [ Hayes v. Brown, supra] is not adaptable as a jury instruction and should not be included in a charge in a malpractice case because it is argumentative, inappropriate and misleading." (Emphasis supplied.) Blount v. Moore was a whole court c | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Moore v. State
green
1 sentence1976"Code § 38-401 provides: 'Admissions usually refer to civil cases; confessions to criminal.’ ” Moore v. State, 230 Ga. 839 , supra. Furthermore, the case sub judice involves the corroboration of the appellant’s statement, not the testimony of an accomplice. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Parham v. State
green
2 sentences1975That situation does not obtain here, however, and under the authority of Patterson, which cites with approval Parham v. State, 120 Ga. App. 723 ( 171 SE2d 911 ), which cited Young with disapproval, we hold the giving of this charge was reversible error requiring the grant of a new trial. 1975That situation does not obtain here, however, and under the authority of Patterson, which cites with approval Parham v. State, 120 Ga. App. 723 ( 171 SE2d 911 ), which cited Young with disapproval, we hold the giving of this charge was reversible error requiring the grant of a new trial. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
McKibbon v. Folds
green
1 sentence1943And while the jury should not set aside the return “because of a trifling excess of value on one side or the other” (McKibbon v. Folds, supra), we are satisfied that it was error for the court to instruct the jury that they should find in favor of the caveat if there “was a gross abuse of discretion on the part of the commissioners in their finding.” In short, we hold that the charge was reversible error because it strongly tended to “eliminate from [the] consideration of the jury any question of an honest mistake of law or fact on the part of the commissioners” in assigning dower, and because | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.