maintenance standard in Georgia

9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1847–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Department of Transportation v. Mikellgreen gactapp · 1997 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2011 2 sentences 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) ( 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (	2	2
Johnson v. Department of Transportationgreen gactapp · 2000 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) ( 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (	1	1
Department of Transportation v. Dupreegreen gactapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) ( 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (	1	1
Naraine v. City of Atlantagreen gactapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) ( 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (	1	1
Jones v. Board of Regents of the University Systemgreen gactapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 1 sentence 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (	1	1
Norris v. Emanuel Countygreen gactapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Cf. Norris v. Emanuel County, 254 Ga. App. 114, 116 (1) ( 561 SE2d 240 ) (2002) (“Because the defendants did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity in their motion for summary judgment, I the plaintiff] was not required to rebut this issue.” (footnote omitted)). 2011Cf. Norris v. Emanuel County, 254 Ga. App. 114, 116 (1) ( 561 SE2d 240 ) (2002) (“Because the defendants did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity in their motion for summary judgment, I the plaintiff] was not required to rebut this issue.” (footnote omitted)).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

Case	Cited	Years
Rowe v. Gaskins neutral ga · 1919 2 sentences 1942In Gleaton v. Wright, 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S. E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: “Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons.” In Rowe v. Gaskins, 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S. E. 493 ), may be found this statement: “It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is 1942In Gleaton v. Wright , 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S.E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: "Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons." In Rowe v. Gaskins , 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S.E. 493 ), may be found this statement: "It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is	2	1942–1942
Klopfer v. Taylor neutral ga · 1919 2 sentences 1942In Gleaton v. Wright, 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S. E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: “Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons.” In Rowe v. Gaskins, 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S. E. 493 ), may be found this statement: “It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is 1942In Gleaton v. Wright , 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S.E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: "Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons." In Rowe v. Gaskins , 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S.E. 493 ), may be found this statement: "It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is	2	1942–1942
Webb v. Deadwyler green ga · 1919 2 sentences 1942In Gleaton v. Wright, 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S. E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: “Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons.” In Rowe v. Gaskins, 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S. E. 493 ), may be found this statement: “It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is 1942In Gleaton v. Wright , 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S.E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: "Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons." In Rowe v. Gaskins , 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S.E. 493 ), may be found this statement: "It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is	2	1942–1942
Gleaton v. Wright green · 1919 2 sentences 1942In Gleaton v. Wright, 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S. E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: “Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons.” In Rowe v. Gaskins, 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S. E. 493 ), may be found this statement: “It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is 1942In Gleaton v. Wright , 149 Ga. 220 ( 100 S.E. 72 ), the pronouncement was: "Under the rule in equity, to constitute one a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, three conditions must concur; he must pay the purchase-money, or at least place himself in a position where he is in all events bound to pay the purchase-money; he must get title; and he must pay the purchase-money and get title before notice of the rights of third persons." In Rowe v. Gaskins , 148 Ga. 817 ( 98 S.E. 493 ), may be found this statement: "It is well settled that the actual payment, before notice, of the purchase-price is	2	1942–1942
Rowe v. Sam Weichselbaum Co. green gactapp · 1908 2 sentences 1909This case is very similar to that of Rowe v. Weichselbaum Co., 3 Ga. App. 504 ( 60 S. E. 275 ), in which we held that the doctrine of estoppel did not enter into the case, but that “an election once made, with knowledge of the facts, between coexistent remedial rights which are inconsistent, is irrevocable and conclusive, irrespective of intent, and constitutes an absolute bar to the maintenance of a defense founded on such inconsistent rights.” It was also ruled in James v. Avery, 3 Ga. App. 357 ( 59 N. E. 1158 ), that “one who in the sale of personal property has reserved title thereto may, 1909This case is very similar to that of Rowe v. Weichselbaum Co., 3 Ga. App. 504 ( 60 S. E. 275 ), in which we held that the doctrine of estoppel did not enter into the case, but that “an election once made, with knowledge of the facts, between coexistent remedial rights which are inconsistent, is irrevocable and conclusive, irrespective of intent, and constitutes an absolute bar to the maintenance of a defense founded on such inconsistent rights.” It was also ruled in James v. Avery, 3 Ga. App. 357 ( 59 N. E. 1158 ), that “one who in the sale of personal property has reserved title thereto may,	2	1909–1913
State v. Scott green wva · 2003 1 sentence 2011Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 77 (1) ( 585 SE2d 1 .38) (2003) (“Summary judgment may be affirmed if it is right for any reason.” (footnote omitted)). 8 See Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., 245 Ga. App. 839, 839 ( 538 SE2d 879 ) (2000) (“With respect to alleged defects in maintenance of the roadway, I the plaintiffs] were required to present evidence of the proper maintenance standard, the deviation from that standard, and the causal connection between the deviation and the collision.” (citation omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. 54, 58 (1) (a), 59 (1) (c) ( 493 SE2d 219 ) (1997) (	1	2011–2011
Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon green ga · 1980 1 sentence 2001Id. at 623-624 .	1	2001–2001
James v. McMillan green gactapp · 1908 1 sentence 1909This case is very similar to that of Rowe v. Weichselbaum Co., 3 Ga. App. 504 ( 60 S. E. 275 ), in which we held that the doctrine of estoppel did not enter into the case, but that “an election once made, with knowledge of the facts, between coexistent remedial rights which are inconsistent, is irrevocable and conclusive, irrespective of intent, and constitutes an absolute bar to the maintenance of a defense founded on such inconsistent rights.” It was also ruled in James v. Avery, 3 Ga. App. 357 ( 59 N. E. 1158 ), that “one who in the sale of personal property has reserved title thereto may,	1	1909–1909
Minter & Radney v. Bush neutral gactapp · 1908 1 sentence 1909But where the personal property to which title has been reserved is sold under an order of a court, and the vendor who has reserved the title elects to claim a lien upon the fund, he is estopped thereafter from asserting Ms title as against the property, and is confined to the proceeds of the sale.” See also Mitchell v. Castlen, 5 Ga. App. 134 ( 62 S. E. 731 ).	1	1909–1909
Mitchell v. Castlen neutral gactapp · 1908 1 sentence 1909But where the personal property to which title has been reserved is sold under an order of a court, and the vendor who has reserved the title elects to claim a lien upon the fund, he is estopped thereafter from asserting Ms title as against the property, and is confined to the proceeds of the sale.” See also Mitchell v. Castlen, 5 Ga. App. 134 ( 62 S. E. 731 ).	1	1909–1909
Ellis v. Francis neutral ga · 1851 1 sentence 1902Ellis v. Francis, 9 Ga. 325 (2); Rogers v. Smith, 63 Ga. 172 ; Ray v. Anderson, 114 Ga. 795 .	1	1902–1902
Rogers v. Smith neutral ga · 1879 1 sentence 1902Ellis v. Francis, 9 Ga. 325 (2); Rogers v. Smith, 63 Ga. 172 ; Ray v. Anderson, 114 Ga. 795 .	1	1902–1902
Jackson ex dem. Ten Eyck v. Walker green · 1830 1 sentence 1847Ibid.	1	1847–1847

Where else courts name it

NY 36 (1846–2024) IL 21 (1905–2026) CA 20 (1892–2025) NJ 12 (1926–2025) MO 11 (1918–2023) TX 10 (1858–2019) MN 10 (1980–2006) MI 9 (1967–2018) GA 9 (1847–2011) MD 7 (1853–2009) AL 7 (1878–1981) LA 6 (1919–1969) KS 6 (1926–2022) MT 5 (1930–1987) WI 5 (1999–2025) PA 5 (1923–2021) WV 5 (1916–2011) WA 5 (1908–2018) CO 4 (1888–2026) WY 4 (1974–2021) FL 4 (1995–2014) DE 4 (1992–2025) TN 4 (1896–2016) CT 3 (1979–2015) IN 3 (1930–2000) OK 3 (1925–2019) KY 2 (1990–2006) OH 2 (1916–1987) MA 2 (1984–2000) VT 2 (2020–2025) MS 2 (1990–2010) OR 2 (1906–1999) AZ 2 (1952–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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