traffic code violation in Pennsylvania

2026However, “Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

2025“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if it is a minor offense.”) (citing Chase, 960 A.2d at 113 ). “[A]ny violation of the Motor Vehicle Code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext for an investigation of some other crime.” Harris

2025“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if it is a minor offense.”) (citing Chase, 960 A.2d at 113 ). “[A]ny violation of the Motor Vehicle Code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext for an investigation of some other crime.” Harris

2025“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008)).

2024In addition, the law is clear that an “officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Calabrese, 184 A.3d 164, 167 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, [] and to attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (internal citations omitted). -8- J-S29014-24 To ensure officers’ safety

2023See Commonwealth v. Calabrese, 184 A.3d 164, 167 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating that “Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2026This Court has explained: Where a traffic stop is “based on the observed violation of the [MVC] or [an] otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Gurung, 239 A.3d at 191 (citations omitted).

2025Notably, this standard “does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference.” Salter, 121 A.3d at 994 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005)). “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 191 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

2024A “police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Id. (citation omitted).

2020Where a traffic stop is “based on the observed violation of the Vehicle Code or [an] otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc)). “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008)).

2025See Commonwealth v. Bush, 166 A.3d 1278, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

2024Id. at 7 n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Bush, 166 A.3d 1278, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Pennsylvania law makes clear … that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is -8- J-A21041-23 a minor offense.”)).

2025Notably, this standard “does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference.” Salter, 121 A.3d at 994 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005)). “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 191 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

2022“We are mindful that ‘[p]robable cause does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference.’” Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005). “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 191 (Pa. Super. -9- J-A25032-21 2020).

2024“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth -7- J-S08024-24 v. Luv, 735 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2023“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth v. Luv, 735 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2025See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 300-01 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (application of the wrong legal standard did not compel reversal of order denying motion to suppress because "the law is well settled that if the record supports the result reached by the suppression court, we may affirm on any ground"); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The suppression court erroneously applied the probable cause standard rather than that of reasonable suspicion, but the result is the same.”).

2021Brown, 64 A.3d at 1105 . “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the [police] officer observes a traffic code violation[.]” Gurung, 239 A.3d at 191 . [W]hile an actual violation of the [Motor Vehicle Code] need not ultimately be established to validate a vehicle stop, a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable belief that a vehicle or driver is in violation of the [Motor Vehicle Code] in order to lawfully stop the vehicle.

2025Notably, this standard “does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference.” Salter, 121 A.3d at 994 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005)). “[A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 191 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

2020Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (authorizing police stop a vehicle when there is reasonable suspicion that a Traffic Code violation has occurred).

2025See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 300-01 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (application of the wrong legal standard did not compel reversal of order denying motion to suppress because "the law is well settled that if the record supports the result reached by the suppression court, we may affirm on any ground"); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The suppression court erroneously applied the probable cause standard rather than that of reasonable suspicion, but the result is the same.”).

2025“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017) 10 “When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citations omitted).

2025Nevertheless, Marberger’s citation to Clark is inapposite because therein, this Court found there to be reasonable (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 17 - J-S21041-25 As to the second part of his third claim, Marberger suggests that “there was not sufficient cause to arrest [him] and transport him for chemical testing.” Id. (capitalization altered).

2024“Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances.” Newsome, 170 A.3d at 1154 (citation omitted).

2024The court further noted that, “[a]s a matter of precaution, a police officer has an absolute right to ask occupants of a vehicle to step from the vehicle during the traffic stop in order to ensure his own safety.” Id. at 7 (citing the Interest of M.W., 194 A.3d 1094, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2018)).

2024In addition, the law is clear that an “officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Calabrese, 184 A.3d 164, 167 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, [] and to attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (internal citations omitted). -8- J-S29014-24 To ensure officers’ safety

2023See Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (among factors providing reasonable suspicion during a car stop for a traffic code violation where a state trooper detected an odor of raw marijuana included the fact that the vehicle used by passenger Kemp and his associate driver was a vehicle owned by a third-party and Kemp did not provide the correct name of the car’s owner); Commonwealth v. Benitez, 218 A.3d 460, 477-78 (Pa. Super. 2019) (among factors for reasonable suspicion was the fact that Benitez could not identify the owner of the car he was using whom he

2023See Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (among factors providing reasonable suspicion during a car stop for a traffic code violation where a state trooper detected an odor of raw marijuana included the fact that the vehicle used by passenger Kemp and his associate driver was a vehicle owned by a third-party and Kemp did not provide the correct name of the car’s owner); Commonwealth v. Benitez, 218 A.3d 460, 477-78 (Pa. Super. 2019) (among factors for reasonable suspicion was the fact that Benitez could not identify the owner of the car he was using whom he

2022See Commonwealth v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805 , 811 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“official business” exception did not apply when police officer was driving back to jurisdiction after a DUI blood draw and the defendant’s failure to yield did not pose an immediate clear and present danger); Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242 , 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (no MPJA violation where police officer heard call of driver passed out in McDonald’s drive-thru a quarter mile beyond his primary jurisdiction); Henry, 943 A.2d at 971 (finding technical MPJA violation where arresting officer followed driver into nei

2022See Commonwealth v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805, 811 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“official business” exception did not apply when police officer was driving back to jurisdiction after a DUI blood draw and the defendant’s failure to yield did not pose an immediate clear and present danger); Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (no MPJA violation where police officer heard call of driver passed out in McDonald’s drive-thru a quarter mile beyond his primary jurisdiction); Henry, 943 A.2d at 971 (finding technical MPJA violation where arresting officer followed driver into neigh

2022See Commonwealth v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805 , 811 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“official business” exception did not apply when police officer was driving back to jurisdiction after a DUI blood draw and the defendant’s failure to yield did not pose an immediate clear and present danger); Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242 , 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (no MPJA violation where police officer heard call of driver passed out in McDonald’s drive-thru a quarter mile beyond his primary jurisdiction); Henry, 943 A.2d at 971 (finding technical MPJA violation where arresting officer followed driver into nei

2022See Commonwealth v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805, 811 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“official business” exception did not apply when police officer was driving back to jurisdiction after a DUI blood draw and the defendant’s failure to yield did not pose an immediate clear and present danger); Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (no MPJA violation where police officer heard call of driver passed out in McDonald’s drive-thru a quarter mile beyond his primary jurisdiction); Henry, 943 A.2d at 971 (finding technical MPJA violation where arresting officer followed driver into neigh

2022See Commonwealth v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805 , 811 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“official business” exception did not apply when police officer was driving back to jurisdiction after a DUI blood draw and the defendant’s failure to yield did not pose an immediate clear and present danger); Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242 , 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (no MPJA violation where police officer heard call of driver passed out in McDonald’s drive-thru a quarter mile beyond his primary jurisdiction); Henry, 943 A.2d at 971 (finding technical MPJA violation where arresting officer followed driver into nei

2022See Commonwealth v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805, 811 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“official business” exception did not apply when police officer was driving back to jurisdiction after a DUI blood draw and the defendant’s failure to yield did not pose an immediate clear and present danger); Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (no MPJA violation where police officer heard call of driver passed out in McDonald’s drive-thru a quarter mile beyond his primary jurisdiction); Henry, 943 A.2d at 971 (finding technical MPJA violation where arresting officer followed driver into neigh

2020On October 28, 2019, the court granted counsel’s request and appointed counsel for appeal, Joseph Todd Schultz, Esquire. -7- J-A26028-20 Where a traffic stop is “based on the observed violation of the Vehicle Code or [an] otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop. [A] police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Gurung, -- A.3d --, 2020 PA Super 226 at *6 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted).

2020See Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017 (“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.”); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 A.3d 399, 403 (Pa.Super. 2011) (holding there is no “dispute[] that the vehicle in question was subject to a valid stop as a result of a [] violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.”), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011) (parallel citation omitted).

2020An officer has “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity or a violation of the Vehicle Code where she can articulate “specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations led [her] reasonably to conclude, in light of [her] experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person [s]he stopped was involved in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2006)). -5- J-S29033-20 Although Lialko correctly points out that she was never seen violati

2020An officer has “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity or a violation of the Vehicle Code where she can articulate “specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations led [her] reasonably to conclude, in light of [her] experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person [s]he stopped was involved in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2006)). -5- J-S29033-20 Although Lialko correctly points out that she was never seen violati

2020An officer has “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity or a violation of the Vehicle Code where she can articulate “specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations led [her] reasonably to conclude, in light of [her] experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person [s]he stopped was involved in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2006)). -5- J-S29033-20 Although Lialko correctly points out that she was never seen violati

2020An officer has “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity or a violation of the Vehicle Code where she can articulate “specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations led [her] reasonably to conclude, in light of [her] experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person [s]he stopped was involved in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2006)). -5- J-S29033-20 Although Lialko correctly points out that she was never seen violati

2019Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80, 89 , 960 A.2d 108, 113 (2008). “[W]hen a police officer lawfully stops a motorist for a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, the officer is permitted to ask the driver to step out of the vehicle ‘as a matter of right.’” Commonwealth v. Boyd, 17 A.3d 1274, 1277 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 677 , 29 A.3d 370 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2019The potential violation was doubtlessly minor, but “Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017).4 Appellant’s next five claims all concern challenges to the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion, which Appellant discusses together. ____________________________________________ 3 The video does not display the speed of the police cruiser. 4 But see Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 848 (Pa.Super