general point error in Texas

2023Accordingly, we express no opinion on the merits of their claims or arguments. 4 In presenting its issue on appeal, UpCurve cites to Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. 1970) (determining that a general point of error is sufficient to allow argument as to all possible grounds upon which summary judgment should have been denied). 10 (per curiam).

2015See Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681 ; see also Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970) (“The judgment must stand, since it may have been based on a ground not specifically challenged by the plaintiff and since there was no general assignment [of error on appeal] that 8 the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.”); Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898 (noting, in affirming summary judgment when appellant did not challenge on appeal both grounds presented to trial court, that appellant had not “asserted a general point of error that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgmen

2010Id.; see Plexchem, International, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 922 S.W.2d 930, 930-31 (Tex.l996)(a general point of error stating that “[t]he trial court erred by granting [the] motion for summary judgment” is sufficient to preserve all possible grounds on which summary judgment could have been denied).

2010See Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct MoHgage, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 497, 502-03 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)(a general Malooly issue statement only preserves a complaint if the ground challenged on appeal is supported by argument); Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1998, no pet,){Malooly allows the non-movant to argue broadly on appeal under a general point of error, but does not relieve an appellant of the burden to challenge the grounds for the summary judgment and to present argument for his case on appeal); see also Plexchem International,

2015See, e.g., Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (Malooly allows the non- movant to argue broadly on appeal under a general point of error, but does not relieve an appellant of the burden to challenge the grounds for the summary judgment and to present argument for his case on appeal). 12 judgment”), citing TEX.

2015See, e.g., Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (Malooly allows the non- movant to argue broadly on appeal under a general point of error, but does not relieve an appellant of the burden to challenge the grounds for the summary judgment and to present argument for his case on appeal). 12 judgment”), citing TEX.

2015In Cruikshank, the court held that raising a general point of error only preserves such errors if the errors are expressly and specifically addressed in the briefing. 138 S.W.3d at 502 .

2010See Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct MoHgage, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 497, 502-03 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)(a general Malooly issue statement only preserves a complaint if the ground challenged on appeal is supported by argument); Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1998, no pet,){Malooly allows the non-movant to argue broadly on appeal under a general point of error, but does not relieve an appellant of the burden to challenge the grounds for the summary judgment and to present argument for his case on appeal); see also Plexchem International,

2021This general point of error “authorizes the party against whom judgment was rendered to challenge all possible grounds on which the trial court might have relied in rendering judgment.” McCoy v. Rogers, 240 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

2010Raising a general point of error authorizes a party to challenge all possible grounds on which a trial court may have rendered summary judgment; however, the party must still present “arguments and supporting authority in order to merit reversal.” McCoy v. Rogers , 240 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); see also Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter.

2015Zapata v. ACF Indus., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

2013Zapata v. ACF Indus., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

2009See Stevens v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 929 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (asserting appellate court's "discretion to refuse to consider [appellant's] unargued bases for reversing the judgment" even when appellant presents general point of error).

2009See Stevens v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 929 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (asserting appellate court’s “discretion to refuse to consider [appellant’s] unargued bases for reversing the judgment” even when appellant presents general point of error).

1999Thus, they argue, the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity for this action. "[I]n the absence of a general point of error complaining of summary judgment, there must be a specific point on each possible basis for summary judgment to avoid a waiver of those grounds." Parrish v. Brooks, 856 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied).

1999Thus, they argue, the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity for this action. “[I]n the absence of a general point of error complaining of summary judgment, there must be a specific point on each possible basis for summary judgment to avoid a waiver of those grounds.” Parrish v. Brooks, 856 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1993, writ denied).

2023See Neurodiagnostic Tex, L.L.C., 506 S.W.3d at 177 ; Coleman, 510 S.W.3d at 20 Karen’s allegations in the motion appear to challenge the element of breach of a fiduciary duty—indeed, she states for the first time on appeal that “[Kelcey] could not possibly prove that [Karen] breached her duty as trustee under . . . the residuary trust,” but never made this allegation before the trial court.

2015See Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681 ; see also Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970) (“The judgment must stand, since it may have been based on a ground not specifically challenged by the plaintiff and since there was no general assignment [of error on appeal] that 8 the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.”); Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898 (noting, in affirming summary judgment when appellant did not challenge on appeal both grounds presented to trial court, that appellant had not “asserted a general point of error that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgmen

2015See Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681 ; see also Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970) (“The judgment must stand, since it may have been based on a ground not specifically challenged by the plaintiff and since there was no general assignment [of error on appeal] that 8 the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.”); Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898 (noting, in affirming summary judgment when appellant did not challenge on appeal both grounds presented to trial court, that appellant had not “asserted a general point of error that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgmen

2014However, “a party seeking an equitable remedy must do equity and come to court with clean hands.” Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1988).

2014Nowhere in their brief do the Pachecos advance any argument that the trial court would have erred by granting summary judgment on the ground of “unclean hands.” Freisenhahn argues that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed because the Pachecos have not directly challenged the unclean hands ground on appeal and have not raised a general point of error that the trial court erred by granting Freisenhahn’s motion for summary judgment. -2- 04-13-00602-CV “A party is entitled to equitable remedy of reformation upon proving the party had reached an agreement with the other party but the deed

2005Plexchem Int’l, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 922 S.W.2d 930, 930-31 (Tex.1996); Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970); see also Smith v. Tilton, 3 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Rogers v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

2005See id; Smith, 3 S.W.3d at 83 ; Rogers, 41 S.W.3d at 199 .

2005Plexchem Int’l, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 922 S.W.2d 930, 930-31 (Tex.1996); Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970); see also Smith v. Tilton, 3 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Rogers v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

2005See id; Smith, 3 S.W.3d at 83 ; Rogers, 41 S.W.3d at 199 .

2001Smith v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 7 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2000See Malooly Bros. v. Napier, 461 *717 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970); San Jacinto River Authority v. Duke, 788 S.W.2d 209, 209-10 (Tex.1990); Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1998, no pet .)(appellants arguing under a general point of error must challenge each of the grounds for the summary judgment and present at least some argument on appeal).

1998NOTES [1] Any fact issues about retaliation or discrimination are not material to the legal issue central to this appeal: whether the fire chief has discretion to terminate Montemayor's employment. [2] Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970) (recommending a general point of error stating "the trial court erred in granting summary judgment"). [3] Montemayor cites Smith v. City of Houston, 552 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ), as authority for her argument that the fire chief requires sufficient cause to terminate probationary employees.

1998Montemayor cites Smith v. City of Houston, 552 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ), as authority for her argument that the fire chief requires sufficient cause to terminate probationary employees.

1997See Malooly Bros., *378 Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970); Davis v. Fletcher, 727 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 13 .

1996Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Products Co., 893 S.W.2d 92, 106 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 68-69 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

1996See, e.g., Reese v. Beaumont Bank, N.A., 790 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, no writ); Inscore v. Karnes County Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 787 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); Dubow v. Dragon, 746 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ); King v. Texas Employers’ Ins.

1996Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Products Co., 893 S.W.2d 92, 106 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 68-69 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

1984Glover v. Texas General Indemnity Co., 619 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.1981), Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).