reasonable-hypothesis principle in Virginia

2025The reasonable-hypothesis principle, however, is “simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)).

2025“The reasonable-hypothesis principle . . . is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)). “[T]he fact[ ]finder determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn from the evidence, and whether to reject as unreasonable the hypotheses of innocence advanced by a defendant.” Id.

2025“The reasonable-hypothesis principle . . . is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)). “[T]he fact[ ]finder determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn from the evidence, and whether to reject as unreasonable the hypotheses of innocence advanced by a defendant.” Id.

2025“The reasonable-hypothesis principle . . . is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)). “[T]he fact[ ]finder determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn from the evidence, and whether to reject as unreasonable the hypotheses of innocence advanced by a defendant.” Id.

2026In determining whether the Commonwealth has proved identity beyond a reasonable doubt, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude -6- every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Sarka v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 56 , 67 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53 (1983)) “Properly understood, the reasonable-hypothesis principle is not a discrete rule unto itself.” Fary v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 331 , 343 (2023) (en banc) (quoting Vasquez v. Com

2026“Properly understood, the reasonable-hypothesis principle is not a discrete rule unto itself[,]” but rather, is an attempt to explain the uncontroversial ideas “that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence” and that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232 , 249- 50 (2016) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024The reasonable-hypothesis principle “is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513 ). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with [her] innocence has not been excluded.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) - 16 - (second alteration in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)).

2024The reasonable-hypothesis principle “is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513 ). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)).

2024The reasonable-hypothesis principle “is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513 ). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with [her] innocence has not been excluded.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) - 16 - (second alteration in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)).

2024The reasonable-hypothesis principle “is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513 ). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)).

2025Additionally, “the Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the -5- defendant.” Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277 (2004) (quoting Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755 (1993)).

2025And “[w]hether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Id. (quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277 (2004)).

2021Even so, “the reasonable-hypothesis principle is not a discrete rule unto itself.” James v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 671, 681 (2009) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 8 (2004)).

2019Even so, “the reasonable-hypothesis principle is not a discrete rule unto itself.” James v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 671, 681 (2009) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 8 (2004)).

2017“The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, __ Va. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 687 (first quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250 , 781 S.E.2d 920, 930 (2016); and then quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 , 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)). “[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. Ap

2017“The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, __ Va. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 687 (first quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250 , 781 S.E.2d 920, 930 (2016); and then quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 , 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)). “[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. Ap

2024The fact that a “defendant’s theory of the case differs from . . . the Commonwealth[’s theory] does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Clanton, 53 Va. App. at 573 (quoting Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462, 467 (1964)).

2021“Whether the hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is itself a ‘question of fact,’ subject to deferential appellate review.” Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 572-73 (2009) (en banc) (citation omitted).

2025“Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 666 (2011) (en banc) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13 (1997)). -7- In convicting Harris of conspiracy, the court rejected Bowling’s testimony that Harris had no knowledge about the attempted robbery.

2024“Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 666 (2011) (en banc) (quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277 (2004))).

2024“The reasonable-hypothesis principle . . . is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Rams v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 28 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017)).

2024“The reasonable-hypothesis principle . . . is ‘simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Rams v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 28 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 ).

2017“The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, __ Va. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 687 (first quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250 , 781 S.E.2d 920, 930 (2016); and then quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 , 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)). “[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. Ap

2017“The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, __ Va. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 687 (first quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250 , 781 S.E.2d 920, 930 (2016); and then quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 , 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)). “[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. Ap

2023“It is true that a factfinder cannot ‘arbitrarily’ choose, as between two equally plausible interpretations of a fact, one that incriminates the defendant.” Vasquez, 291 Va. at 250 (quoting Dixon v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 798, 803 (1934)).

2023“It is true that a factfinder cannot ‘arbitrarily’ choose, as between two equally plausible interpretations of a fact, one that incriminates the defendant.” Vasquez, 291 Va. at 250 (quoting Dixon v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 798, 803 (1934)).

2017The reasonable-hypothesis principle “merely echoes ‘the standard applicable to every criminal case.’” Vasquez, 291 Va. at 250 , 781 S.E.2d at 930 (quoting Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 433 , 309 S.E.2d 325, 329 (1983)).

2017The reasonable-hypothesis principle “merely echoes ‘the standard applicable to every criminal case.’” Vasquez, 291 Va. at 250 , 781 S.E.2d at 930 (quoting Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 433 , 309 S.E.2d 325, 329 (1983)).

2024“The only requirement” in a circumstantial case is that the Commonwealth “put on enough circumstantial evidence such that a reasonable [fact finder] could have rejected [the] defendant’s [hypothesis] of innocence.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 485, 502 (2015). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Clark, 78 Va. App. at 752 (alterations in original) (quoting Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017)).

2024“The only requirement” in a circumstantial case is that the Commonwealth “put on enough circumstantial evidence such that a reasonable [fact finder] could have rejected [the] defendant’s [hypothesis] of innocence.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 485, 502 (2015). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) - 12 - (second alteration in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. Ap

2017“The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, __ Va. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 687 (first quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250 , 781 S.E.2d 920, 930 (2016); and then quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 , 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)). “[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. Ap

2017“The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, __ Va. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 687 (first quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250 , 781 S.E.2d 920, 930 (2016); and then quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 , 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)). “[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. Ap

2024The fact that a “defendant’s theory of the case differs from . . . the Commonwealth[’s theory] does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Clanton, 53 Va. App. at 573 (quoting Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462, 467 (1964)).

2020The fact that a “defendant’s theory of the case differs from . . . the Commonwealth[’s theory] does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 573 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462, 467 (1964)).

2024The reasonable-hypothesis principle is “simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 30 (2012) (quoting Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 258 ).

2020The reasonable-hypothesis principle is “simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 30 (2012) (quoting Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 258 (2003) (en banc)).

2017Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when the appellant took the debit card to the ATMs, her possession of the card was not authorized as part of her employment. -9- The appellant also argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that A.C. did not consent to the appellant’s possession of the card when she made the specific cash withdrawals.8 “The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 , 79

2017Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when the appellant took the debit card to the ATMs, her possession of the card was not authorized as part of her employment. -9- The appellant also argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that A.C. did not consent to the appellant’s possession of the card when she made the specific cash withdrawals.8 “The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 , 79

2022“The fact finder ‘determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn from the evidence[] and whether to reject as unreasonable the hypotheses of innocence advanced by a defendant.’” Young, 70 Va. App. at 654 (alteration in original) (quoting Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 ).

2021“The reasonable-hypothesis principle . . . is simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Young v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 646, 653-54 (2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017)).

2024The reasonable-hypothesis principle is “simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 30 (2012) (quoting Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 258 ).

2020The reasonable-hypothesis principle is “simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 30 (2012) (quoting Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 258 (2003) (en banc)).

2026In determining whether the Commonwealth has proved identity beyond a reasonable doubt, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude -6- every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Sarka v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 56 , 67 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53 (1983)) “Properly understood, the reasonable-hypothesis principle is not a discrete rule unto itself.” Fary v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 331 , 343 (2023) (en banc) (quoting Vasquez v. Com

2024Moreover, when considering a defendant’s testimony, the jury may conclude that he was “lying to conceal his guilt.” Cornell v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 17 , 30 (2022) (quoting Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011)).

2023“In order to convict a person of illegal drug possession, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was aware of the presence and character of the drug and that the accused consciously possessed it.” Yerling v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 527 , 532 (2020). “[P]roof of actual possession is not required; proof of constructive possession will suffice.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426 (1998)).

2022The Commonwealth is required to “exclude only reasonable hypotheses of innocence that ‘flow from the evidence itself, and not from the imagination’ of the defendant.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 629 (2019) (quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512 ). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)).

2017Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when the appellant took the debit card to the ATMs, her possession of the card was not authorized as part of her employment. -9- The appellant also argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that A.C. did not consent to the appellant’s possession of the card when she made the specific cash withdrawals.8 “The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 , 79

2017Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when the appellant took the debit card to the ATMs, her possession of the card was not authorized as part of her employment. -9- The appellant also argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that A.C. did not consent to the appellant’s possession of the card when she made the specific cash withdrawals.8 “The reasonable-hypothesis principle ‘merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case,”’” namely that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 , 79