Engle progeny in Florida

2026The court also specifically addressed Ferguson’s objections and rejected them individually, finding that the alleged duplicative 2 See Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (affirming class- action judgment against tobacco company); see also Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jordan, 333 So. 3d 300 , 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (finding no abuse of discretion as to costs and fees awarded in Engle progeny case where court accepted expert’s recommendation that requested hourly rates were reasonable given “extraordinary” complexity of Engle litigation). 9 work was necessary for White & Case

2025The Estate argued these findings were relevant for comparative negligence and to prove design defect. 3 In Engle III, the Florida Supreme Court held that the following jury findings from the first phase in the Engle litigation have res judicata effect in Engle progeny cases: Questions 1 (general causation), 2 (addiction of cigarettes), 3 (strict liability), 4(a) (fraud by concealment), 5(a) (civil-conspiracy-concealment), 6 (breach of implied warranty), 7 (breach of express warranty), and 8 (negligence). 945 So. 2d at 1145-46 . 4 Reynolds objected, arguing that because the Estate had no claims

2022See Engle III; Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (clarifying how the approved Phase I findings were to be used in Engle progeny cases).

2021There, this Court, in addressing why “res judicata” was “the proper term” for applying the approved Engle Phase I findings in an Engle progeny wrongful death action, explained that “the claims in Engle and the claims in individual actions like this case are the same causes of action between the same parties.” Id. at 432 ; but see R.J.

2017This Court later held that the punitive damages award was both clearly excessive and premature because, although the Phase I jury decided the Engle defendants’ common liability to the class under certain claims, it did not decide the plaintiff-specific elements of those claims and, therefore, "did not determine whether the defendants were liable to anyone.” Engle III, 945 So.2d at 1263 (quoting Engle II, 853 So.2d at 450 ). 4 .

2017RJR also notes that we previously found the $145 billion award for the Engle class excessive in Engle, 853 So. 2d at 457 n.29, and that RJR’s share of that award was $36 billion, and asks this Court to consider that RJR is a defendant in most Engle progeny cases.

2020Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 53 So. 3d 1060, 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the First District addressed the argument that an Engle- progeny plaintiff “failed to prove the reliance element of her fraudulent concealment claim because she put on no direct evidence showing [the decedent] relied on information put out by the tobacco companies omitting scientific findings on the harmful effects of smoking.” In rejecting this argument, the Martin court explained that “the record contains abundant evidence from which the jury could infer [the decedent’s] reliance on pervasive misleading advertising cam

2020Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 53 So. 3d 1060, 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the First District addressed the argument that an Engle- progeny plaintiff “failed to prove the reliance element of her fraudulent concealment claim because she put on no direct evidence showing [the decedent] relied on information put out by the tobacco companies omitting scientific findings on the harmful effects of smoking.” In rejecting this argument, the Martin court explained that “the record contains abundant evidence from which the jury could infer [the decedent’s] reliance on pervasive misleading advertising cam

2018In that opinion, we held that the compensatory damages awarded to an Engle- progeny plaintiff could be reduced by the amount of comparative fault attributed to the plaintiff, concluding that an Engle-progeny suit “is a products liability suit based on conduct grounded in negligence.” Id. at 496 .

2018In that opinion, we held that the compensatory damages awarded to an Engle- progeny plaintiff could be reduced by the amount of comparative fault attributed to the plaintiff, concluding that an Engle-progeny suit “is a products liability suit based on conduct grounded in negligence.” Id. at 496 .

2017“Similarly, a plaintiff claiming conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment in an Engle progeny case need only prove that he or she detrimentally relied upon deceptive statements made by a member of the conspiracy.” Id. (emphasis added).

2016“Similarly, a plaintiff claiming conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment in an Engle progeny case need only prove that he or she detrimentally relied upon deceptive statements made by a member of the conspiracy.” Id. (emphasis added).

2016Reynolds Tobacco Co., 106 So.3d 456, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), quashed, 187 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 2016), “which held that Engle progeny plaintiffs may recover punitive damages only on claims for concealment or conspiracy.” Ciccone, 123 So.3d at 616 .

2016Reynolds Tobacco Co., 106 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), quashed, No. SC13-139, 2016 WL 1065605 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2016), “which held that Engle progeny plaintiffs may recover punitive damages only on claims for concealment or conspiracy.” Ciccone, 123 So. 3d at 616 .

2022The statements relied upon must have been capable of causing the plaintiff to form a false belief about the health effects or addictiveness of smoking cigarettes. 2 A. We said in Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So. 3d 687, 698 (Fla. 2015), that “Engle-progeny plaintiffs must certainly prove detrimental reliance in order to prevail on their fraudulent 2.

2017Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So. 3d 687, 698 (Fla. 2015).

2018Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen, 228 So. 3d 684, 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), the First District reasoned that, although a cause of action for wrongful death usually accrues upon the decedent’s death, “Engle-progeny cases are different.” The Allen court held that the pre-1999 version of section 768.73 applied to an Engle progeny personal injury suit that converted to a wrongful death action after the smoker died.

2018Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen, 228 So. 3d 684, 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), the First District reasoned that, although a cause of action for wrongful death usually accrues upon the decedent’s death, “Engle-progeny cases are different.” The Allen court held that the pre-1999 version of section 768.73 applied to an Engle progeny personal injury suit that converted to a wrongful death action after the smoker died.

2016Id. at 387-38 (footnotes omitted).

2016Id. at 337-38 (footnotes omitted).

2023Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 190 So. 3d 1028, 1042 (Fla. 2016) (Polson, J., dissenting) (“[T]o be in the Engle class and therefore get the benefit of the Engle class action jury’s findings, a plaintiff’s tobacco- related disease or condition must have manifested itself between the statute-of-limitations bar date of May 5, 1990, and the judicially imposed bar date of November 21, 1996.”); see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Russo, 175 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 2015); Fanali v. R.J.

2021Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 190 So. 3d 1028, 1046 (Fla. 2016) (Polston, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority’s decision there to distinguish “manifestation” and “accrual” was irreconcilable with Douglas’s “res judicata” holding).

2019See Wilson, 686 So. 2d at 648-49 .

2019See Wilson, 686 So. 2d at 648-49 .

2016While the Second District acknowledged that members of the Engle class benefit by the res judicata effect of the Phase I findings, the district court rejected the notion that “such benefit precludes an Engle progeny plaintiff from seeking a remedy barred as untimely by the Engle trial court for mere procedural deficiencies.” Id. at 3S4.' In fact, the Second District held that “the unique nature of Engle necessitates a finding that progeny plaintiffs are permitted to seek punitive damages on their claims for negligence and strict liability.” Id.

2016While the Second District acknowledged that members of the Engle class benefit by the res judicata effect of the Phase I findings, the district court rejected the notion that “such benefit precludes an Engle progeny plaintiff from seeking a remedy barred as untimely by the Engle trial court for mere procedural deficiencies.” Id. at 3S4.' In fact, the Second District held that “the unique nature of Engle necessitates a finding that progeny plaintiffs are permitted to seek punitive damages on their claims for negligence and strict liability.” Id.

2015Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Cohen, 102 So.3d 11, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

2015Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Cohen, 102 So. 3d 11, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

2013The crux of this appeal is whether the trial court erred in the application of the findings reached by a jury and affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in the class action case Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla.2006)[, where] the Florida Supreme Court affirmed [eight of] the [class] jury’s [Phase I] fíndings[, including] (1) that smoking cigarettes causes certain named diseases; (2) “that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive”; (3) that the [defendants] “placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous”; ... and (8) that all the [Engle defendants] “w

2013In Douglas , the supreme court answered in the negative the following question certified by the Second District Court of Appeal: "Does accepting as res judicata the eight Phase I findings approved in Engle[ ] violate the [Engle defendants'] due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?” See 110 So.3d at 422 (citing Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 83 So.3d 1002, 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)).

2013See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Putney, 117 So.3d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); -Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1150-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 103 So.3d 944, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess, 95 So.3d 254, 260-61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), review denied, 117 So.3d' 412 (Fla. 2013). 2 As we have previously held, while the conduct elements of the claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment were established by virtue of the Engle decision, an Engle progeny plaintiff still must prove detri

2013See Philip Morris USA Inc. u Putney, 117 So.3d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 103 So.3d 944, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1150-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess, 95 So.3d 254, 260-61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), review denied, 117 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2013). 2 As we have previously held, while the conduct elements of the claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment were established by virtue of the Engle decision, an Engle progeny plaintiff still must prove detrimen

2013See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Putney, 117 So.3d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); -Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1150-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 103 So.3d 944, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess, 95 So.3d 254, 260-61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), review denied, 117 So.3d' 412 (Fla. 2013). 2 As we have previously held, while the conduct elements of the claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment were established by virtue of the Engle decision, an Engle progeny plaintiff still must prove detri

2013See Philip Morris USA Inc. u Putney, 117 So.3d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 103 So.3d 944, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1150-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess, 95 So.3d 254, 260-61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), review denied, 117 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2013). 2 As we have previously held, while the conduct elements of the claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment were established by virtue of the Engle decision, an Engle progeny plaintiff still must prove detrimen

2013See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Putney, 117 So.3d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); -Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1150-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 103 So.3d 944, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess, 95 So.3d 254, 260-61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), review denied, 117 So.3d' 412 (Fla. 2013). 2 As we have previously held, while the conduct elements of the claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment were established by virtue of the Engle decision, an Engle progeny plaintiff still must prove detri

2013See Philip Morris USA Inc. u Putney, 117 So.3d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 103 So.3d 944, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1150-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess, 95 So.3d 254, 260-61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), review denied, 117 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2013). 2 As we have previously held, while the conduct elements of the claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment were established by virtue of the Engle decision, an Engle progeny plaintiff still must prove detrimen

2022Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 5 Konzelman, 248 So. 3d 134, 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), agreed with other appellate courts in holding “that the pre-1999 version of section 768.73, Florida Statutes, applies in an Engle progeny personal injury suit that is converted into a wrongful death action upon the smoker’s death.” Acknowledging that this court had rejected the application of the amended statute in Engle cases, PM and RJR nevertheless filed notices in the trial court invoking the amended version of section 768.73(2) and alleging that each had paid millions of dollars in punitive damage awards already

2022Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Konzelman, 248 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), we concluded that the pre-1999 version of section 768.73, Florida Statutes, applies in an Engle progeny personal injury suit that is converted into a wrongful death action upon the smoker’s death.

2017Cf. id., at 1222 (involving Engle-progeny wrongful death action brought by widow many years after her husband's death wherein the court recognized widow's right to seek punitive damages); Schoeff, 178 So. 3d at 488-89 (involving an Engle- progeny wrongful death action brought by widow based on her husband's death from lung cancer caused by his addiction to cigarettes).

2016Reynolds Tobacco Co., 106 So.3d 456, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), quashed, 187 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 2016), “which held that Engle progeny plaintiffs may recover punitive damages only on claims for concealment or conspiracy.” Ciccone, 123 So.3d at 616 .

2015Merrill Crossings makes it clear that section 768.81 cartnot be avoided simply because the action includes an intentional tort — rather the “entire action” must be “founded on an'intentional tort." Stated another way, the entire action must have an intentional tort “at its core.” Considering the interplay between section 768.81 and an Engle progeny suit alleging causes of actions for negligence and intentional tort, the Sury court came to a decision in accord with the direction of Merrill Crossings. 118 So.3d at 862 .

2015Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sury, 118 So.3d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), the “core” of Engle progeny cases is intentional misconduct; The gravamen of the charge is that the tobacco company intentionally "designed its products in a defective manner and pursued a callous and intentional course of tortious conduct by fraudulent concealment.

2017See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Boatright, 217 So. 3d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), appeal filed, No. SC17-894 (Fla. May 12, 2017).

2017See Sury, 118 So. 3d at 852 ; Philip Morris USA v. Boatright, 217 So. 3d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

2016Reynolds Tobacco Co., 106 So.3d 456, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), quashed, 187 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 2016), “which held that Engle progeny plaintiffs may recover punitive damages only on claims for concealment or conspiracy.” Ciccone, 123 So.3d at 616 .

2016Reynolds Tobacco Co., 106 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), quashed, No. SC13-139, 2016 WL 1065605 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2016), “which held that Engle progeny plaintiffs may recover punitive damages only on claims for concealment or conspiracy.” Ciccone, 123 So. 3d at 616 .

2025As Engle III itself explains, the doctrine of res judicata means a judgment on the merits in a former suit is conclusive “between the same 7 parties or their privies, upon the same cause of action.” Id. at 1259 (emphasis added) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001)).

2024Walerowicz v. Armand-Hosang, 248 So. 3d 140, 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citing Aragon v. Issa, 103 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); see Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Holliman, 374 So. 3d 87 , 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (citing R.J.

2024Walerowicz v. Armand-Hosang, 248 So. 3d 140, 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citing Aragon v. Issa, 103 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); see Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Holliman, 374 So. 3d 87 , 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (citing R.J.

2023Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 190 So. 3d 1028, 1042 (Fla. 2016) (Polson, J., dissenting) (“[T]o be in the Engle class and therefore get the benefit of the Engle class action jury’s findings, a plaintiff’s tobacco- related disease or condition must have manifested itself between the statute-of-limitations bar date of May 5, 1990, and the judicially imposed bar date of November 21, 1996.”); see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Russo, 175 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 2015); Fanali v. R.J.