Notes of Decisions
Cited in
1,308
cases (
94 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case:
Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008).
Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008).
· cites it 25× “Compare § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2004), with § 90.”
State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
· cites it 37× “Before the enactment of the child hearsay exception at issue in this case, section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), the hearsay testimony of a child was generally excluded in criminal trials.”
Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001).
· cites it 23× “Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.”
Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
· cites it 24× “On July 26, 1985, Glendening was charged by information with sexual battery upon a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of section 794.”
Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
· cites it 28× “The petitioner, Paul Perez, was charged with a lewd assault upon a three-and-one-half-year-old child, in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1985).”
Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007).
· cites it 14× “The exception for spontaneous statements in section 90.803(1) is limited to statements " describing or explaining an event or condition," but section 90.”
Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2008).
· cites it 13× “803(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the two pertinent exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence: (1) SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT.A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or…”
Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006).
· cites it 14× “The hearsay exceptions statute, section 90.803 provides that various types of evidence are not inadmissible, including spontaneous statements, defined as follows: (1) Spontaneous statement.”
Cabrera v. State, 206 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
· cites it 41× “, § 90.803(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter .”
Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
· cites it 20× “That testimony, offered under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1985), was relied on as substantive evidence.”
State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006).
· cites it 37× “[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”
Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992).
· cites it 11× “5th DCA 1991), and certified the following question of great public importance: [1] Where a child victim's hearsay statements satisfy subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1989), and the child is able to testify fully at trial, must the hearsay statements be excluded solely…”
90.803(1): 69 cases
Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006).
“The hearsay exceptions statute, section 90.803 provides that various types of evidence are not inadmissible, including spontaneous statements, defined as follows: (1) Spontaneous statement.”
90.803(1)(2): 3 cases
90.803(1)(b): 1 case
90.803(1)(c): 1 case
90.803(10): 5 cases
90.803(13): 1 case
90.803(13)(e): 1 case
Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001).
“Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.”
90.803(14): 2 cases
90.803(17): 2 cases
90.803(18): 103 cases
Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006).
“The hearsay exceptions statute, section 90.803 provides that various types of evidence are not inadmissible, including spontaneous statements, defined as follows: (1) Spontaneous statement.”
90.803(18)(a): 59 cases
Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007).
“The exception for spontaneous statements in section 90.803(1) is limited to statements " describing or explaining an event or condition," but section 90.”
90.803(18)(a)(c): 1 case
90.803(18)(b): 18 cases
90.803(18)(c): 7 cases
90.803(18)(d): 29 cases
90.803(18)(e): 65 cases
Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001).
“Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.”
90.803(18)(e)(1990): 1 case
90.803(2): 148 cases
Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007).
“The exception for spontaneous statements in section 90.803(1) is limited to statements " describing or explaining an event or condition," but section 90.”
Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2008).
“803(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the two pertinent exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence: (1) SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT.A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or…”
90.803(2)(e): 1 case
90.803(21): 6 cases
90.803(22): 24 cases
90.803(23): 286 cases
State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
“Before the enactment of the child hearsay exception at issue in this case, section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), the hearsay testimony of a child was generally excluded in criminal trials.”
Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
“On July 26, 1985, Glendening was charged by information with sexual battery upon a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of section 794.”
Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
“The petitioner, Paul Perez, was charged with a lewd assault upon a three-and-one-half-year-old child, in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1985).”
Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992).
“5th DCA 1991), and certified the following question of great public importance: [1] Where a child victim's hearsay statements satisfy subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1989), and the child is able to testify fully at trial, must the hearsay statements be excluded solely…”
90.803(23)(1): 2 cases
90.803(23)(1)(e): 1 case
90.803(23)(2)(a): 1 case
90.803(23)(2)(b): 1 case
90.803(23)(a): 76 cases
Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
“That testimony, offered under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1985), was relied on as substantive evidence.”
Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992).
“5th DCA 1991), and certified the following question of great public importance: [1] Where a child victim's hearsay statements satisfy subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1989), and the child is able to testify fully at trial, must the hearsay statements be excluded solely…”
Cabrera v. State, 206 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
“, § 90.803(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter .”
90.803(23)(a)(1): 26 cases
Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
“The petitioner, Paul Perez, was charged with a lewd assault upon a three-and-one-half-year-old child, in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1985).”
State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
“Before the enactment of the child hearsay exception at issue in this case, section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), the hearsay testimony of a child was generally excluded in criminal trials.”
90.803(23)(a)(2): 7 cases
State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
“Before the enactment of the child hearsay exception at issue in this case, section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), the hearsay testimony of a child was generally excluded in criminal trials.”
Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
“On July 26, 1985, Glendening was charged by information with sexual battery upon a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of section 794.”
Cabrera v. State, 206 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
“, § 90.803(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter .”
90.803(23)(a)(2)(a): 1 case
90.803(23)(a)(2)(b): 12 cases
Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988).
“The petitioner, Paul Perez, was charged with a lewd assault upon a three-and-one-half-year-old child, in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1985).”
90.803(23)(a)(2)(c): 1 case
90.803(23)(a)(c): 1 case
90.803(23)(a)(l): 6 cases
Cabrera v. State, 206 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
“, § 90.803(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter .”
90.803(23)(b): 21 cases
Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
“On July 26, 1985, Glendening was charged by information with sexual battery upon a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of section 794.”
Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
“That testimony, offered under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1985), was relied on as substantive evidence.”
90.803(23)(c): 43 cases
Cabrera v. State, 206 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
“, § 90.803(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter .”
90.803(24): 15 cases
State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006).
“[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”
90.803(24)(a): 6 cases
State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006).
“[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”
90.803(24)(a)(2)(b): 1 case
State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006).
“[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”
90.803(24)(b): 2 cases
90.803(24)(c): 1 case
90.803(28): 1 case
90.803(28)(a)(1): 1 case
90.803(3): 56 cases
Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001).
“Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.”
Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006).
“The hearsay exceptions statute, section 90.803 provides that various types of evidence are not inadmissible, including spontaneous statements, defined as follows: (1) Spontaneous statement.”
90.803(3)(a): 47 cases
90.803(3)(a)(1): 7 cases
Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001).
“Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.”
90.803(3)(a)(2): 8 cases
Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006).
“The hearsay exceptions statute, section 90.803 provides that various types of evidence are not inadmissible, including spontaneous statements, defined as follows: (1) Spontaneous statement.”
90.803(3)(a)(l): 1 case
90.803(3)(b): 9 cases
90.803(3)(b)(1): 1 case
90.803(3)(b)(2): 2 cases
90.803(4): 66 cases
90.803(5): 33 cases
90.803(6): 219 cases
90.803(6)(a): 131 cases
Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008).
“Compare § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2004), with § 90.”
90.803(6)(b): 6 cases
90.803(6)(c): 16 cases
90.803(7): 11 cases
90.803(8): 56 cases
Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008).
“Compare § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2004), with § 90.”
90.803(a): 1 case
90.803(b): 2 cases
90.803(l): 1 case
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.