continuous crime doctrine in Indiana

2026See Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (indicating that the continuous crime doctrine only applies in two scenarios: (1) when a defendant is twice charged with the same base offense; and (2) when one charged offense is inherently included in the other), cited with approval by Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.26; see also Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Ind. 2015).

2026In a footnote, the Court observed: The continuous-crime doctrine is “a rule of statutory construction and common law” applicable to “situations where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1539 | April 29, 2026 Page 25 of 27 offense,” rather than with “two distinct chargeable crimes.” Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1219 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

2020Under the continuous crime doctrine, “‘actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-713 | September 17, 2020 Page 6 of 12 and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Anderson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). “‘The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distin

2020Continuing Crime Doctrine [41] Nix argues that his offenses of domestic battery and battery with moderate bodily injury were essentially “a single transaction,” Appellant’s Br. p. 11, and concludes his conviction for domestic battery should be vacated under the continuing crime doctrine. [42] The continuing crime doctrine, also known as the continuous crime doctrine, “is a rule of statutory construction and common law limited to situations where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same offense.” Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015). “‘The continuous crime doctrine

2026See Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (indicating that the continuous crime doctrine only applies in two scenarios: (1) when a defendant is twice charged with the same base offense; and (2) when one charged offense is inherently included in the other), cited with approval by Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.26; see also Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219-20 (Ind. 2015).

2023Under the continuous-crime doctrine, “actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023 Page 6 of 10 terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied.

2026Flores v. State, 114 N.E.3d 522, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding two convictions for Level 4 felony child molesting violated the continuous crime doctrine when the defendant “put his penis between [a child’s] butt cheeks while he touched her vagina over her underwear”) (emphasis added); Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding a defendant’s actions “constitute[ed] a ‘single transaction’” when he “inserted his tongue into [a child’s] mouth” and “[w]hile kissing her, . . . placed his hand, over [her] clothes, on her vagina”) (quoting Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417,

2017He notes that the trial court found that the continuous crime doctrine applied to his offenses, meaning that the offenses were “compressed in terms of time and singleness of purpose and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36) (citing Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

2020Under the continuous crime doctrine, “‘actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-713 | September 17, 2020 Page 6 of 12 and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Anderson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). “‘The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distin

2017The continuous-crime doctrine provides that “actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. [11] Craig contends that both of his entries into Jackson’s apartment occurred during “a very short period of time” and that the events occurred “in the space between [the] two entry points of Jackson’s apartment.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8.

2020“The purpose [of the continuous crime doctrine] is to prevent the State from charging a defendant twice for the same continuous offense.” Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2019Heckard does not stand to benefit from the continuous crime doctrine for his conduct merely because the legislature has described both separate, distinct actions under the same statute. 8 [33] "The purpose [of the continuous crime doctrine] is to prevent the State from charging a defendant twice for the same continuous offense." Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468 , 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2020Therefore, even though committed very close in time, the two distinct battery offenses in the present case constitute separate and distinct crimes and do not violate the continuous crime doctrine. [16] In his argument that his adjudications violated the continuous crimes doctrine, D.L.B. relies on Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

2020Under these circumstances, I conclude that, as in Gomez, 56 N.E.3d at 704-05 , the continuous crime doctrine applies, and I would vacate D.L.B.’s adjudication of delinquency for an act that, if committed by an adult, would be battery, a Class B misdemeanor.

2019See Koch , 952 N.E.2d at 373 . *1284 [36] "The purpose [of the continuous crime doctrine] is to prevent the State from charging a defendant twice for the same continuous offense." Firestone v. State , 838 N.E.2d 468 , 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2016The doctrine “essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. (citation omitted).' The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeablé crimes; rather, it defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime.

2016Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind.2015) (citing Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (recognizing “a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson ”)). 10 The continuous crime doctrine requires a fact-sensitive analysis.

2015“The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes; rather, it defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime.” Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. not sought, see Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (recognizing “a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson ”).

2019Because both of Heckard's convictions were under the broad category of child molesting, however, we will address whether Heckard's convictions violate the continuous crime doctrine. [29] The continuous crime doctrine "establishes that actions that are sufficient to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction." Pugh v. State , 52 N.E.3d 955 , 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied .

2019See, e.g., Heckard, 2019 WL 510370 at *7-8 (holding that the defendant’s two convictions did not violate the continuous crime doctrine); Pugh, 52 N.E.3d at 971 (holding that the defendant’s crimes, which were Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A04-1711-CR-2608 | March 13, 2019 Page 13 of 16 “separate in time” from each other did not violate the continuous crime doctrine).12 3.

2015Section 3—The continuous crime doctrine does not apply. [21] Although Seal concedes that he committed acts that comprise the offenses of class A felony child molesting of R.S. and class B felony sexual misconduct with R.S., he contends that the continuous crime doctrine applies to his convictions and requires that the latter be merged with the former. 3 Both Seal and the State assert that the continuous crime doctrine applies when “actions which are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, -place, singleness of purpose, and contin

2010As we noted in Richie, the continuous crime doctrine "does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes; rather, the doctrine defines those instances where a defendant's conduct amounts to only a single chargeable crime." Id.

2016Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1509-CR-1307 | March 11, 2016 Page 4 of 7 Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; Nevel v. State, 818 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). [8] The State does not challenge, and therefore concedes, that Schoonover’s two convictions were based upon one continuous act of resisting law enforcement in violation of the continuous crime doctrine.

2016Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.2d 689 , 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), disagreed with on other grounds, Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. 2011)).

2026Flores v. State, 114 N.E.3d 522, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding two convictions for Level 4 felony child molesting violated the continuous crime doctrine when the defendant “put his penis between [a child’s] butt cheeks while he touched her vagina over her underwear”) (emphasis added); Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding a defendant’s actions “constitute[ed] a ‘single transaction’” when he “inserted his tongue into [a child’s] mouth” and “[w]hile kissing her, . . . placed his hand, over [her] clothes, on her vagina”) (quoting Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417,

2016See Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (noting that the defendant’s convictions for insurance fraud stemmed from six false statements given in a single insurance investigation interview, that her three convictions for ob *705 struction of justice stemmed from a single crime scene clean-up in which she removed an alcohol bottle, medication container, and foam from the victim’s mouth, and that the defendant’s conduct was continuous so as to constitute one offense of insurance fraud and one offense of obstruction of justice), tram, denied; see also Chavez, 988 N.E.2d at 1229 (

2024Bailey, J. and Mathias, J., concur. 2 In Heckard v. State, 118 N.E.3d 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, we held that although the defendant was charged under the same statute and same broad classification of child molesting, his convictions were for two distinct, chargeable crimes, and thus the continuous crime doctrine did not preclude conviction on both despite the continuity of defendant’s actions.

2020We also examined the continuous crime doctrine in Heckard v. State, 118 N.E.3d 823, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, where Heckard was convicted of two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting by other sexual conduct involving D.K.

2019See Frazier v. State , 988 N.E.2d 1257 , 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that no double jeopardy violation existed under either the continuous crime doctrine or the actual evidence test where offenses charged involved different victims).

2019See Frazier v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that no double jeopardy violation existed under either the continuous crime doctrine or the actual evidence test where offenses charged involved different victims).

2026Flores v. State, 114 N.E.3d 522, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding two convictions for Level 4 felony child molesting violated the continuous crime doctrine when the defendant “put his penis between [a child’s] butt cheeks while he touched her vagina over her underwear”) (emphasis added); Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding a defendant’s actions “constitute[ed] a ‘single transaction’” when he “inserted his tongue into [a child’s] mouth” and “[w]hile kissing her, . . . placed his hand, over [her] clothes, on her vagina”) (quoting Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417,

2020Following Dilts and Heckard, we conclude that these offenses, as charged, were not three examples of the same offense but separate and distinct actions which were not barred by the continuous crime doctrine, even though they were all charged under the rape statute. [18] Salhab’s reliance on Flores v. State, 114 N.E.3d 522 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. not sought, does not persuade us otherwise.

2015See Williams v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the defendant perpetrated two separate offenses of resisting law enforcement and the trial court properly entered convictions for both counts where the defendant fled from officers after being commanded to stop and also forcibly resisted those officers when they caught up with him and inflicted bodily injury upon them); see also Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-9 | September 15, 2015 Page 18 of 19 App. 2005 ) (recognizing that “resisting

2015Rexroat v. State, 966 N.E.2d 165 , 168 .(Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied Thus, reviewing the specific facts of this case under that standard, we conclude that Dilts’s two child molesting convictions — one for sexual intercourse and one for deviate sexual cop-duct that occurred on different days — were “■two distinct chargeable crimes” to which the continuous crime doctrine-did not apply. 11 ' • See, e.g., Williams v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that the-defendant perpetrated two separate offenses of resisting law enforcement and that the trial court properly entered

2015The defendant urges that this Court should follow Buchanan v. State, 913 N.E.2d 712, 720-21 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied, where the Court of Appeals extended the continuous crime doctrine to vacate two distinct chargeable crimes.

2015In Hines v. State, the Court disagreed with Buchanan v. State, 913 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, to the extent it stood for the proposition that the continuous crime doctrine may be judicially extended to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-9 | September 15, 2015 Page 14 of 19 two distinct criminal offenses. 30 N.E.3d at 1220 .

2019"The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes; rather, it defines those instances where a defendant's conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime." Hines , 30 N.E.3d at 1219 . " 'Where the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo.' " Id. (quoting State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109 , 110 (Ind. 1997) ). [30] We disagree with Heckard that he was convicted of the same offense twice, but we do recognize that he was charged under the same statute and same broad classificatio

2015Moreover, “ ‘[w]here the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo.”’ Id. at 1219 (quoting State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109,110 (Ind.1997)).

2019Id.; see also Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015) (“The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes; rather, it defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime.”) (quoting Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). [20] In Collins v. State, 717 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme Court was confronted with a situation in which different sex acts comprised multiple charges.

2015Citing Chavez and Firestone, and other cases, Miske argues that all of his convictions, except for that of Resisting Law Enforcement, were for actions that were part of a continuing crime and that, as a result, “his actions should be considered as one continuous crime, with only one sentence.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) [44] Addressing a similar case to this one, involving charges of oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the resolution of claims under the continuous crime doctrine “is extremely fact-sensitive and is properly resolved by determining whethe

2016Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.2d 689 , 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), disagreed with on other grounds, Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. 2011)).

2015See Williams v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the defendant perpetrated two separate offenses of resisting law enforcement and the trial court properly entered convictions for both counts where the defendant fled from officers after being commanded to stop and also forcibly resisted those officers when they caught up with him and inflicted bodily injury upon them); see also Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1501-CR-9 | September 15, 2015 Page 18 of 19 App. 2005 ) (recognizing that “resisting

2016Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.3d 689, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); 1 Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” We have discerned no difference between the analysis of the continuous crime doctrine under Indiana or federal law.

2016Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.3d 689 , 691 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2020Evans asserts in the alternative that double jeopardy occurred because his alleged acts constituted only one offense under the continuous crime doctrine. [21] Our Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the notion that “a primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to preserve the finality of judgments.” Wadle v. State, No. 19S-CR-340, slip op. at 9 (Ind. Aug. 18, 2020) (quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978)).

2020By ensuring finality, this constitutional guarantee “shields against governmental harassment in that it bars the state from making repeated attempts to convict an accused for the same offense.” Id.

2020Under the continuous crime doctrine, “‘actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-713 | September 17, 2020 Page 6 of 12 and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Anderson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). “‘The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distin

2020I conclude that D.L.B.’s actions that resulted in the two battery adjudications were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Anderson, 15 N.E.3d at 149 . [19] The majority concludes that D.L.B.’s actions were “not sufficiently compressed in terms of singleness of purpose and continuity of action so as to constitute a single transaction for purposes of the continuous crime doctrine.” Slip op. p.

2019See Flores v. State, 114 N.E.3d 522 , 523-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (considering whether Flores' two convictions for Level 4 felony child molesting violate the continuous crime doctrine); see also Norris v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1245 , 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (considering whether Norris' two resisting law enforcement convictions violate the continuous crime doctrine); see also Dilts v. State, 49 N.E.3d 617 , 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that Dilts' "two child molesting convictions-one for sexual intercourse and one for deviate sexual conduct that occurred on different days-were 'two distinct

2019See Flores v. State, 114 N.E.3d 522 , 523-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (considering whether Flores' two convictions for Level 4 felony child molesting violate the continuous crime doctrine); see also Norris v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1245 , 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (considering whether Norris' two resisting law enforcement convictions violate the continuous crime doctrine); see also Dilts v. State, 49 N.E.3d 617 , 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that Dilts' "two child molesting convictions-one for sexual intercourse and one for deviate sexual conduct that occurred on different days-were 'two distinct

2016“Where that has not occurred, multiple convictions are inappropriate even when there are variations in the way the counts are charged.” Id. (citing Curry v. State, 643 N.E.2d 963, 980-981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), reh’g denied, trans. denied). [25] The record reveals that B.N.’s confinement began when the defendants entered the bedroom and that, from that moment until the men left the house over three hours later, B.N. did not feel free, and in fact was not free, from detention.

2016See Penrod, 810 N.E.2d at 346 (observing that the charging instrument alleged that kidnapping occurred when the defendant confined the victim in the course of hijacking her vehicle, that one of the confinement counts alleged that the defendant confined the victim by transporting her to the scene where he assaulted her, and that the other confinement count alleged that he confined her by placing her in the trunk of a vehicle, and concluding that the events constituted one continuous confinement and that “[t]he confinements as charged here occurred during the greater course of the kidnapping and