9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shirley v. Russellgreen2 sentences2009Id. "[Rule 413's] reference to `statements of charges' is in this sense." Id. [1] This practical reality finds additional confirmation from the defendant's assertion that "it's likely the jury's verdict of $70,000 was influenced by the level of medical expenses it erroneously believed Walker had incurred." Br. of Appellant at 8. [2] There is unfortunate language in Shirley v. Russell, in which this Court unanimously but gratuitously commented that the collateral source statute "abrogated the common law collateral source rule." 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. 1996). 2009There is unfortunate language in Shirley v. Russell, in which this Court unanimously but gratuitously commented that the collateral source statute "abrogated the common law collateral source rule." 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.1996). | 4 | 4 |
Pendleton v. Aguilargreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Pendleton, 827 N.E.2d at 620 . 2008See Aguilar, 827 N.E.2d at 620 (“the new statute abrogated both the substance and the procedure of the common law collateral source rule”); Shirley v. Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.1996) (“[0]ur legislature abrogated the common law collateral source rule when, in 1986, it enacted the statute implicated by this case”). | 3 | 3 |
Brice v. National RR Passenger Corp.green1 sentence2007Passenger Corp., 664 F.Supp. 220, 222 (D.Md.1987) (“[W]hether the issue is application of the common law collateral source rule or the propriety of a set off under 45 U.S.C. § 55 , the question remains: Is [the policy] a fringe benefit or a policy of indemnity against liability for on-duty injuries?”). | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Minnesota Transfer Railway Companygreen2 sentences2007As the court in Hall explained, [T]he congress which passed [section 55] apparently contemplated that the common law collateral source rule would apply in FELA cases as before that Section’s enactment, subject to the directive of [the proviso] that “any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought” may be setoff regardless of its status under the common law rule. 322 F.Supp. at 95 . 2007Rail Corp, 671 F.Supp. 1068, 1069 (N.D.Ill.1987) (discussing the “traditional” collateral source rule); fail to mention section 55 and base their holding on the common law collateral source rule, e.g., Green, 59 F.3d at 1032 , analyze payments under both the traditional collateral source rule and section 55, e.g., Hall, 322 F.Supp. at 97 (finding first that the collateral source rule prohibits setoff, and then that section 55 prohibits setoff), or recognize that the analysis in that particular case is the same under either section 55 or the common law, e.g. | 1 | 1 |
Kendig v. Consolidated Rail Corp.green1 sentence2007Rail Corp, 671 F.Supp. 1068, 1069 (N.D.Ill.1987) (discussing the “traditional” collateral source rule); fail to mention section 55 and base their holding on the common law collateral source rule, e.g., Green, 59 F.3d at 1032 , analyze payments under both the traditional collateral source rule and section 55, e.g., Hall, 322 F.Supp. at 97 (finding first that the collateral source rule prohibits setoff, and then that section 55 prohibits setoff), or recognize that the analysis in that particular case is the same under either section 55 or the common law, e.g. | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. Barnesgreen2 sentences1995See Barnes v. Barnes (1992), Ind., 603 N.E.2d 1337, 1346 . 1995See Barnes v. Barnes (1992), Ind., 603 N.E.2d 1337, 1346 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman
green
2 sentences2009Id. "[Rule 413's] reference to `statements of charges' is in this sense." Id. [1] This practical reality finds additional confirmation from the defendant's assertion that "it's likely the jury's verdict of $70,000 was influenced by the level of medical expenses it erroneously believed Walker had incurred." Br. of Appellant at 8. [2] There is unfortunate language in Shirley v. Russell, in which this Court unanimously but gratuitously commented that the collateral source statute "abrogated the common law collateral source rule." 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. 1996). 2009Id. "[Rule 413's] reference to `statements of charges' is in this sense." Id. [1] This practical reality finds additional confirmation from the defendant's assertion that "it's likely the jury's verdict of $70,000 was influenced by the level of medical expenses it erroneously believed Walker had incurred." Br. of Appellant at 8. [2] There is unfortunate language in Shirley v. Russell, in which this Court unanimously but gratuitously commented that the collateral source statute "abrogated the common law collateral source rule." 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. 1996). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Acuar v. Letourneau
green
2 sentences2009This dominant view comports with the fundamental purpose of the common law collateral source rule: "to prevent a tortfeasor from deriving any benefit from compensation or indemnity that an injured party has received from a collateral source." Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322 . "[T]he focal point of the collateral source rule is not whether an injured party has `incurred' certain medical expenses. 2009This dominant view comports with the fundamental purpose of the common law collateral source rule: "to prevent a tortfeasor from deriving any benefit from compensation or indemnity that an injured party has received from a collateral source." Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322 . "[The focal point of the collateral source rule is not whether an injured party has 'incurred' certain medical expenses. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Karl Green v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company
green
1 sentence2007Rail Corp, 671 F.Supp. 1068, 1069 (N.D.Ill.1987) (discussing the “traditional” collateral source rule); fail to mention section 55 and base their holding on the common law collateral source rule, e.g., Green, 59 F.3d at 1032 , analyze payments under both the traditional collateral source rule and section 55, e.g., Hall, 322 F.Supp. at 97 (finding first that the collateral source rule prohibits setoff, and then that section 55 prohibits setoff), or recognize that the analysis in that particular case is the same under either section 55 or the common law, e.g. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Shirley v. Russell
green
1 sentence1996Substantively, instead of tortfeasors being "held ... fully accountable for the consequences of their conduct," Shirley, 69 F.3d at 842 ; now vie-tims may not recover more than once for each item of loss sustained, Ind.Code § 34-4-36-1(2). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Aldridge v. Abram & Hawkins Excavating Co.
green
1 sentence1992Aldridge v. Abram & Hawkins Excavating Co., Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 107, 108 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.