9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Armstrong v. Cerestar USA, Inc.green2 sentences2015An OSHA standard cannot be used to expand an existing common law or statutory duty, or be used as evidence of an expanded duty of care, Armstrong v. Cerestar USA, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 360, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), but the question before us is whether a duty arose contractually. [16] A provision in an attachment to the contract, Carmel’s “Standard General Conditions for Construction Contractors 1997,” (App. at 107), states “CONTRACTOR shall give all notices and comply with all Laws and Regulations in effect during the furnishing and performance of the Work.” (Id. at 125.) Section 6.20.1 of that d 2015An OSHA standard cannot be used to expand an existing common law or statutory duty, or be used as evidence of an expanded duty of care, Armstrong v. Cerestar USA, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 360, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), but the question before us is whether a duty arose contractually. [16] A provision in an attachment to the contract, Carmel’s “Standard General Conditions for Construction Contractors 1997,” (App. at 107), states “CONTRACTOR shall give all notices and comply with all Laws and Regulations in effect during the furnishing and performance of the Work.” (Id. at 125.) Section 6.20.1 of that d | 2 | 2 |
Myers v. Marisgreen2 sentences1982See, Myers v. Maris (1975), 164 Ind.App. 34 , 326 N.E.2d 577 ; Smith v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co., supra .” Fresons and Hopkins allege the evidence is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation giving them title to the disputed property. 1982See, Myers v. Maris (1975), 164 Ind.App. 34 , 326 N.E.2d 577 ; Smith v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co., supra .” Fresons and Hopkins allege the evidence is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation giving them title to the disputed property. | 2 | 2 |
Ellis v. Chase Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2006See Ellis v. Chase Commc'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 473 , 478 (6th Cir.1995) (holding in a suit against the owner of premises where employee of independent contractor was killed that even had there been a violation of OSHA safety regulations, the owner must owe a duty independent of OSHA in order to create liability). 2006See Ellis v. Chase Commc'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 473 , 478 (6th Cir.1995) (holding in a suit against the owner of premises where employee of independent contractor was killed that even had there been a violation of OSHA safety regulations, the owner must owe a duty independent of OSHA in order to create liability). | 1 | 1 |
Roger Curtis Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, a Foreign Corporation Licensed to Do Business in the State of Indianagreen2 sentences2002Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). 2002Merritt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stumpf v. Hagerman Construction Corp.
green
2 sentences2013Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 876 , “an OSHA standard cannot be used to expand an existing common law or statutory duty, or be used as evidence of an expanded duty of care.” Here the question is whether a duty arose contractually. 2013Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 876 , “an OSHA standard cannot be used to expand an existing common law or statutory duty, or be used as evidence of an expanded duty of care.” Here the question is whether a duty arose contractually. | 2 | 2013–2016 |
Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001In deciding that such language prohibited the conversion of an OSHA standard into strict liability, the Hebel court cited favorably to Wendland v. Ridgefield Const. Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173 , 439 A.2d 954, 956-957 , which reasoned as follows: A negligence per se instruction transforms the character of the factfinder's inquiry. 2001In deciding that such language prohibited the conversion of an OSHA standard into strict liability, the Hebel court cited favorably to Wendland v. Ridgefield Const. Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173 , 439 A.2d 954, 956-957 , which reasoned as follows: A negligence per se instruction transforms the character of the factfinder's inquiry. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.