9 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gibbs v. Wickershamgreen1 sentence2008That rule allows “the [trial] court [to] direct a verdict where there is no evidence of probative value to support the opposite result.” Gibbs v. Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 496 (Ky.App.2004). | 1 | 1 |
Taitano v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.") (plurality opinion). [7] See, e.g., Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342 , 358 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1987) (specifically holding that prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges because, among other reasons, prospective jurors lived in "high crime" areas was race-neutral). [8] Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159 , 1171 n. 10 (9th Cir.2005). [9] Indeed, Gray's brief does not show how many total peremptory challenges the Commonwealth used to remove African-Americans or how ma 2006Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.") (plurality opinion). [7] See, e.g., Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342 , 358 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1987) (specifically holding that prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges because, among other reasons, prospective jurors lived in "high crime" areas was race-neutral). [8] Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159 , 1171 n. 10 (9th Cir.2005). [9] Indeed, Gray's brief does not show how many total peremptory challenges the Commonwealth used to remove African-Americans or how ma | 1 | 1 |
Fred Clements Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Janesgreen1 sentence2005Gray’s motion for discretionary review was at his peril.”); accord Fred Clements Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. lanes, 576 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky.App.1979) ("[Djamages under K.R.S. 26A.300 are properly awarded when a motion for discretionary review is denied.”); CR 76.20(9)(a) ("If the [discretionary review] motion is denied the decision shall stand affirmed, and if a supersedeas bond has been executed, damages for delay shall be recoverable pursuant to KRS Chapter 26A.”). 16 . | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Green, Sheriffgreen2 sentences1988The legislative policy underlying enactment of statutes imposing damages for delay is well-stated in Phillips v. Green, 288 Ky. 202 , 155 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1941), as follows: What is denominated “damages” on a supersedeas bond is not strictly so, for it is at the same time a penalty. 1988The legislative policy underlying enactment of statutes imposing damages for delay is well-stated in Phillips v. Green, 288 Ky. 202 , 155 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1941), as follows: What is denominated “damages” on a supersedeas bond is not strictly so, for it is at the same time a penalty. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2022Although Hazard Coal Corp. is not cited directly by either party, its discussion of Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Taylor, 637 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. App. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Louisville and Jefferson Cty. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Brown v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2021The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gray’s motion to strike Juror 253. 19 313 S.W.3d at 588 . 7 B. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gray v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2009In Gray , the Supreme Court held that in a joint trial, for a pre-trial statement to be admissible against a defendant/declarant under Richardson , the statement must be redacted so as to remove not just express reference to any other defendant, but also indirect references, such as omissions from the statement, which “obviously refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” 523 U.S. at 196 , 118 S.Ct. 1151 . 2009In Gray , the Supreme Court held that in a joint trial, for a pre-trial statement to be admissible against a defendant/declarant under Richardson , the statement must be redacted so as to remove not just express reference to any other defendant, but also indirect references, such as omissions from the statement, which “obviously refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” 523 U.S. at 196 , 118 S.Ct. 1151 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Richard Boyde v. Jill Brown, Warden of California State Prison at San Quentin
green
1 sentence2006Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.") (plurality opinion). [7] See, e.g., Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342 , 358 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1987) (specifically holding that prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges because, among other reasons, prospective jurors lived in "high crime" areas was race-neutral). [8] Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159 , 1171 n. 10 (9th Cir.2005). [9] Indeed, Gray's brief does not show how many total peremptory challenges the Commonwealth used to remove African-Americans or how ma | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Floyd v. Gray
green
2 sentences1986It is from the same cause [bodily injury to her husband].” 657 S.W.2d at 941 . 1986It is from the same cause [bodily injury to her husband]." 657 S.W.2d at 941 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fann v. McGuffey
green
2 sentences1983In Tucker the Court of Appeals analyzed the “limitations of actions” section of MYRA and the language of this Court in Fann v. McGuffey, supra, and concluded (as I have) “that KRS 304.39-230(6) was not another statute limiting commencement of actions brought for no-fault benefits, but rather was designed for a separate purpose. 1983In Tucker the Court of Appeals analyzed the "limitations of actions" section of MVRA and the language of this Court in Fann v. McGuffey, supra , and concluded (as I have) "that KRS 304.39-230(6) was not another statute limiting commencement of actions brought for no-fault benefits, but rather was designed for a separate purpose. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.