public right doctrine in Massachusetts

2015Where the public right doctrine applies, the people are considered the real party in interest, and the individual plaintiff need not show that he has any legal interest in the result.” Perella 55 Mass.App.Ct. at 539-40 (emphasis in Perella), quoting Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708, 714 (1996).

2014The so-called public right doctrine allows citizens who otherwise would lack standing because they themselves have not suffered any legal injury to “seek relief in the nature of mandamus to compel the performance of a duly required by law.” Perella v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 55 Mass.App.Ct. 537, 539 (2002), quoting Tax Equity Alliance of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708, 714 (1996).

2025The public right doctrine must be “construed narrowly.” Perella, supra. It “cannot be invoked for broad purposes, such as to challenge [or defend] the substantive constitutionality of a statute” or legislative rule.

2015Where the public right doctrine applies, the people are considered the real party in interest, and the individual plaintiff need not show that he has any legal interest in the result.” Perella 55 Mass.App.Ct. at 539-40 (emphasis in Perella), quoting Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708, 714 (1996).

2015The obligation to obey the law “without more, is not a sufficient ground for action by persons who are not injured.” Kaplan v. Bowker, 333 Mass. 455, 460-61 (1956).

2002The public right doctrine cannot be invoked for broad purposes, such as to challenge the substantive constitutionality of a statute, Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Rev., 423 Mass. at 714 , and, although officials “are obligated to obey the law, . . . that obligation, without more, is not a sufficient ground for action by persons who are not injured.” Kaplan v. Bowker, 333 Mass. at 460-461 .

2015The public right doctrine is narrowly construed and “has always been limited to the enforcement of clear and unequivocal duties.” Perella 55 Mass.App.Ct. at 540 ; see, e.g., Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 93-94 (1926) (holding that Secretary of State owed public duty to omit proposed law from ballot where constitutional requirements were not met); Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 224-25 (1907) (finding that registrars of voters owe duly to count votes).

2002As the authority correctly points out, the public right doctrine has always been limited to the enforcement of clear and unequivocal duties, such as election officials’ duty to count ballots correctly, Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 225 (1907); the Secretary of the Commonwealth’s duty to omit from the ballot an initiative question where the petition failed to describe the proposed law accurately, Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 93-94 (1926); and the Boston building commissioner’s duty to deny a permit where the proposed building would plainly violate a statute, Banc

2025Id.; accord, e.g., Anzalone v. Administrative Office of the Trial Court, 457 Mass. 647, 649, 654-655 (2010); Tax Equity Alliance of Mass., 423 Mass. at 714–715.

2014This doctrine may only be invoked to compel “the enforcement of clear and unequivocal duties.” Perella at 540 ; accord, e.g., Anzalone v. Administrative Office of the Trial Court, 457 Mass. 647, 649, 654-55 (2010).

2015The public right doctrine is narrowly construed and “has always been limited to the enforcement of clear and unequivocal duties.” Perella 55 Mass.App.Ct. at 540 ; see, e.g., Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 93-94 (1926) (holding that Secretary of State owed public duty to omit proposed law from ballot where constitutional requirements were not met); Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 224-25 (1907) (finding that registrars of voters owe duly to count votes).

2002As the authority correctly points out, the public right doctrine has always been limited to the enforcement of clear and unequivocal duties, such as election officials’ duty to count ballots correctly, Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 225 (1907); the Secretary of the Commonwealth’s duty to omit from the ballot an initiative question where the petition failed to describe the proposed law accurately, Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 93-94 (1926); and the Boston building commissioner’s duty to deny a permit where the proposed building would plainly violate a statute, Banc

2004While the public right doctrine has frequently been used as a basis for standing in cases where the procedure used to enact a statute is constitutionally questionable, see Tax Equity Alliance for Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 401 Mass. 310, 313 (1987) (citizens have standing to raise a challenge to the use of the initiative process); Backman v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 549 , 554 n.4 (1982) (citizen and qualified voter has standing to challenge enactment procedures); it has not been used to grant standing to plaintiffs bringing substantive constitutional challenges.

1996While the public right doctrine has frequently been used as a basis for standing in cases where the procedure used to enact a statute is constitutionally questionable, see Tax Equity Alliance for Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 401 Mass. 310, 313 (1987) (citizens have standing to raise a challenge to the use of the initiative process); Backman v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 549 , 554 n.4 (1982) (citizen and qualified voter has standing to challenge enactment procedures), it has not been used to grant standing to plaintiffs bringing substantive constitutional challenges.

2004See Massachusetts Teachers Ass’n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 214-15 (1981) (citizens have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the enactment of a statute, but separate standing is required to challenge substantive provisions).

1996See Massachusetts Taxpayers Ass’n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 214-215 (1981) (citizens have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the enactment of a statute, but separate standing is required to challenge substantive provisions).

2015That is because courts must be “extremely waiy about entering into controversies where we would find ourselves telling a coequal branch of government how to conduct its business.” Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 427 Mass. 546, 548 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff unions had no standing to bring mandamus against Department of Public Health Commissioner).

2014Statewide Towing, 68 Mass.App.Ct. at 795 ; accord Town of Brookline v. Governor, 407 Mass. 377, 389 (1990) (Liacos, C.J., concurring).

2002As the authority correctly points out, the public right doctrine has always been limited to the enforcement of clear and unequivocal duties, such as election officials’ duty to count ballots correctly, Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 225 (1907); the Secretary of the Commonwealth’s duty to omit from the ballot an initiative question where the petition failed to describe the proposed law accurately, Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 93-94 (1926); and the Boston building commissioner’s duty to deny a permit where the proposed building would plainly violate a statute, Banc

2002As the authority correctly points out, the public right doctrine has always been limited to the enforcement of clear and unequivocal duties, such as election officials’ duty to count ballots correctly, Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 225 (1907); the Secretary of the Commonwealth’s duty to omit from the ballot an initiative question where the petition failed to describe the proposed law accurately, Brooks v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 93-94 (1926); and the Boston building commissioner’s duty to deny a permit where the proposed building would plainly violate a statute, Banc

2001L. c. 231 A, § 1, for abuse of discretion (Bates v. Superior Court, 432 Mass. 1021 , 1022 & n.3 [2000]); and his denial of relief under the public right doctrine (Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708, 714 [1996] [under public right doctrine, relief sought is in nature of mandamus]) for abuse of discretion (see Forte v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 1019, 1020 [1999] [single justice’s denial of writ of mandamus reviewed for abuse of discretion]), or other error of law (see Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222 [1907]).

1996See Kaplan v. Bowker, supra at 461 , citing Horton v. Attorney Gen., 269 Mass. 503, 508-509, 513-514 (1929).