67 California opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2026 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Kenneth J.green2 sentences2016Thus, Minor‟s actions “were tantamount to a rejection of DEJ.” (In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 980 (Kenneth J.).) The juvenile court may not “start the DEJ process in the teeth of the minor‟s opposition[.]” (Id. at p. 979.) Minor was detained, and from the outset, his counsel sought a contested jurisdictional hearing. 2016Thus, Minor’s actions “were tantamount to a rejection of DEJ.” (In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 980 (Kenneth J.).) The juvenile court may not “start the DEJ process in the teeth of the minor’s opposition[.]” (Id. at p. 979.) Minor was detained, and from the outset, his counsel sought a contested jurisdictional hearing. | 4 | 7 |
Nino v. Gladys R.green2 sentences2024During the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court granted the district attorney’s request to amend count 1 to remove that victim, thereby conforming the allegation to the evidence presented. 5 In In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855 (Gladys R.), our Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the juvenile court should consider whether a child appreciates the wrongfulness of her conduct in determining whether the child should be declared a ward under section 602.” (Id. at p. 858.) 6 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 4 rendered “problematic” a conclusion that such a minor understood the 1976(People v. Harrington, 2 Cal.3d 991, 999 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 471 P.2d 961 ].) Undoubtedly, Ms. Hall’s belief was also based upon the rule articúlated in In re Gladys R., 1 Cal.3d 855, 859-861 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 464 P.2d 127 ], that it is prejudicial error for a court to review a probation officer’s social study report prior to a contested jurisdictional hearing. 4 We are satisfied that in the circumstances of the present case the' Miranda warnings did not overcome the presumption that the statements made to Ms. Hall were involuntary. | 2 | 4 |
In Re Monique T.green2 sentences2023(In re S.N., supra, at p. 672 [applying Chapman error standard]; In re Monique T., supra, at pp. 1377-1387 [applying Chapman, but declining to decide whether error should be analyzed under Chapman “or the more easily met reasonable probability test” of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)].) These precedents are rightly focused on the concerns created by a judicial officer accepting parent’s waiver of a right to a contested jurisdictional hearing without court advisement and oversight to make sure such a waiver is knowing and voluntary. 2016(In re Monique T (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1377 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 198 ]; see In re Patricia T (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 904 ].) Where such error occurred, we may affirm only if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Cole C.green2 sentences2010This was well in advance of Dr. Corbett being called to testify at trial." ( Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 912, fn. 4 .) In Cole C., we held that "the proper time for the guardian to invoke the privilege is at the time the disclosure of confidential discussions is attempted." ( Id. at p. 912.) Kent claims S.A. did not invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege until "several months into trial." The claim is nonsensical since the contested jurisdictional hearing was held over several days in March 2009. 2010This was well in advance of Dr. Corbett being called to testify at trial.” (Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 912, fn. 4 .) In Cole C., we held that “the proper time for the guardian to invoke the privilege is at the time the disclosure of confidential discussions is attempted.” (Id. at p. 912.) Kent claims S.A. did not invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege until “several months into trial.” The claim is nonsensical since the contested jurisdictional hearing was held over several days in March 2009. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Usef S.green2 sentences2020(See In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322-1323 [“it is clear that a minor must first admit a petition’s allegations in order to obtain” DEJ]; In re Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 286, fn. 3 [after minor “effectively rejected DEJ consideration when he denied the 11 allegations against him and insisted on a contested jurisdictional hearing[,] . . . any duty the juvenile court may have had to determine whether appellant was suitable for DEJ was excused”].) C. 2016(Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 285-286.) Usef S. explained that “where the minor declines to admit each allegation in the petition, as [section 791] subdivision (a) requires, no duty on behalf of the juvenile court arises under subdivision (b) to refer the 22 case to the probation department or to summarily grant DEJ[.]” (Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 285 .) Here, Minor did not admit the allegations of the petition and instead requested a contested jurisdictional hearing. | 1 | 5 |
People v. Spencer S.green2 sentences2020(See In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322-1323 [“it is clear that a minor must first admit a petition’s allegations in order to obtain” DEJ]; In re Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 286, fn. 3 [after minor “effectively rejected DEJ consideration when he denied the 11 allegations against him and insisted on a contested jurisdictional hearing[,] . . . any duty the juvenile court may have had to determine whether appellant was suitable for DEJ was excused”].) C. 2012(See In re Spencer S., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323 .) Here, the court did not follow the specified procedures in determining D.L.’s suitability for DEJ. | 1 | 3 |
Trinity County Health & Human Services v. C.N.green2 sentences2023(In re S.N., supra, at p. 672 [applying Chapman error standard]; In re Monique T., supra, at pp. 1377-1387 [applying Chapman, but declining to decide whether error should be analyzed under Chapman “or the more easily met reasonable probability test” of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)].) These precedents are rightly focused on the concerns created by a judicial officer accepting parent’s waiver of a right to a contested jurisdictional hearing without court advisement and oversight to make sure such a waiver is knowing and voluntary. 2021(Id. at pp. 671-672.)3 The court’s failure to obtain Mother’s personal waiver of a contested jurisdictional hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “[t]he evidence supporting a finding of jurisdiction was overwhelming.” (In re S.N., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 672 .) The evidence established that Mother’s substance abuse resulted in delivery of M.R. while Mother was positive for methamphetamine. | 1 | 2 |
Schmidt v. Retirement Boardgreen2 sentences1999(County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 488 P.2d 953 ]; Schmidt v. Retirement Board (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1209 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ]; Leoke v. County of San Bernardino (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 770-771 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 770 ].) A conflict currently exists in the case law concerning whether a parent has standing to appeal an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing. 1999(County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 488 P.2d 953 ]; Schmidt v. Retirement Board (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1209 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ]; Leoke v. County of San Bernardino (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 770-771 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 770 ].) A conflict currently exists in the case law concerning whether a parent has standing to appeal an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing. | 1 | 2 |
County of Alameda v. Carlesongreen2 sentences1999(County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 488 P.2d 953 ]; Schmidt v. Retirement Board (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1209 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ]; Leoke v. County of San Bernardino (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 770-771 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 770 ].) A conflict currently exists in the case law concerning whether a parent has standing to appeal an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing. 1999(County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 488 P.2d 953 ]; Schmidt v. Retirement Board (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1209 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ]; Leoke v. County of San Bernardino (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 770-771 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 770 ].) A conflict currently exists in the case law concerning whether a parent has standing to appeal an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing. | 1 | 2 |
Leoke v. County of San Bernardinogreen2 sentences1999(County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 488 P.2d 953 ]; Schmidt v. Retirement Board (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1209 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ]; Leoke v. County of San Bernardino (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 770-771 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 770 ].) A conflict currently exists in the case law concerning whether a parent has standing to appeal an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing. 1999(County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 488 P.2d 953 ]; Schmidt v. Retirement Board (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1209 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ]; Leoke v. County of San Bernardino (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 770-771 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 770 ].) A conflict currently exists in the case law concerning whether a parent has standing to appeal an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing. | 1 | 2 |
Contra Costa County Department of Children & Family Services v. Kim S.green1 sentence2025(In re Joann E. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 360 (Joann E.) [“We cannot speculate how the imposition of the guardian ad litem as an intermediary may have impeded the flow of information about beneficial witnesses between [the appellant] and her attorney, although we know for 13. certain that no witness aside from [the appellant] herself was ever presented on [the appellant’s] behalf.”].) In Joann E., the appellant’s attorney announced his intention to call an additional witness at the contested jurisdictional hearing prior to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. | 1 | 1 |
Sonoma County Human Services Department v. Y.M.green1 sentence2023(See In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 136 [“mother preserved her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s orders by requesting a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing after the parties were unable to reach a negotiated resolution”].) “ ‘Sufficiency of the evidence has always been viewed as a question necessarily and inherently raised in every contested trial of any issue of fact, and requiring no further steps by the aggrieved party to be preserved for appeal.’ ” (Ibid.) To require the parent to take additional steps to preserve t | 1 | 1 |
| Orange County Social Services Agency v. Remberto C.green | 1 | 1 |
| JOE Z. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Patriciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| GUADALUPE A. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re BDgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Chapman v. Californiared | 1 | 1 |
| Meehan v. Kenneth H.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Tjgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beckley v. Aaron N.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Robert S.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Ronald E.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harringtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2024During the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court granted the district attorney’s request to amend count 1 to remove that victim, thereby conforming the allegation to the evidence presented. 5 In In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855 (Gladys R.), our Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the juvenile court should consider whether a child appreciates the wrongfulness of her conduct in determining whether the child should be declared a ward under section 602.” (Id. at p. 858.) 6 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 4 rendered “problematic” a conclusion that such a minor understood the 2018Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition and found true the allegation that I.F. personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. *465 I.F. appeals, arguing the juvenile court erroneously admitted his pre-arrest statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( Miranda ). | 7 | 2017–2025 |
People v. Steven B.
green
2 sentences2026(Id. at p. 836.) We observed that in Steven B., supra, 25 Cal.3d 1 , our Supreme Court “[w]riting in the rather limited context of a contested jurisdictional hearing and an appeal challenging sufficiency of the evidence, … concluded that in juvenile cases ‘there is no adequate substitute for a complete record’ 8. and that a new jurisdictional hearing was required.” (Ian J., at p. 837.) But we noted “the Supreme Court went to some length in its opinion to show that the minor suffered actual prejudice on the facts before it.” (Id. at p. 838.) We concluded “Steven B. does not set forth a special 2026(Id. at p. 836.) We observed that in Steven B., supra, 25 Cal.3d 1 , our Supreme Court “[w]riting in the rather limited context of a contested jurisdictional hearing and an appeal challenging sufficiency of the evidence, … concluded that in juvenile cases ‘there is no adequate substitute for a complete record’ 8. and that a new jurisdictional hearing was required.” (Ian J., at p. 837.) But we noted “the Supreme Court went to some length in its opinion to show that the minor suffered actual prejudice on the facts before it.” (Id. at p. 838.) We concluded “Steven B. does not set forth a special | 2 | 1994–2026 |
People v. Manzy W.
green
2 sentences2023First, it provides “a record from which the maximum term of physical confinement for an offense can be determined, particularly in the event of future adjudications.” (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1205 .) Second, it “serves the purpose of ensuring that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually exercises, its [statutory] discretion.” (Id. at p. 1207.) The juvenile court may make the declaration at the contested jurisdictional hearing or at the dispositional hearing. 2014These determinations may be deferred until the disposition hearing.” (Italics added.) The same express declaration is required by rule 5.780(5) after a contested jurisdictional hearing and at the disposition hearing “[u]nless determined previously … .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.795(a); cf. rule 5.790(a)(1).) In In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199 (Manzy W.), the California Supreme Court observed that the express declaration requirement of section 702 serves at least two 10 purposes. | 2 | 2014–2023 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Wilford J.
green
2 sentences2022I concur: HULL , J. 4 Unlike the father in In re Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pages 746 through 747 and 754, mother did not waive this objection by participating in this case after the jurisdictional hearing. 2022I concur: HULL , J. 4 Unlike the father in In re Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pages 746 through 747 and 754, mother did not waive this objection by participating in this case after the jurisdictional hearing. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Arcenio
green
2 sentences2021To justify an act of self-defense the belief in the need to commit the act “must both subjectively exist and be objectively reasonable.” (People v. Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014 .) On appeal from the juvenile court’s adjudications after a contested jurisdictional hearing, “ ‘[t]he test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard 2020Section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1) provides in relevant part: “Any person who [1] touches an intimate part of another person, if the touching is [2] against the will of the person touched, and is [3] for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, is guilty of misdemeanor sexual battery . . . .” “[T]he sexual battery statute’s use of the phrase touching ‘for the specific purpose of . . . sexual abuse’ encompasses a purpose of insulting, humiliating, intimidating, or physically harming a person sexually by touching an ‘intimate part’ of the person . . . .” (In | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Rios
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Rios (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 542, 568 .) A trial court’s credibility determinations “are subject to extremely deferential review.” (See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570 , 582.) Here, the juvenile court sustained the allegation of battery on a peace officer after finding not credible A.M.’s testimony that she feared her mother was in imminent danger of choking to death at the officer’s hands. 2020Section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1) provides in relevant part: “Any person who [1] touches an intimate part of another person, if the touching is [2] against the will of the person touched, and is [3] for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, is guilty of misdemeanor sexual battery . . . .” “[T]he sexual battery statute’s use of the phrase touching ‘for the specific purpose of . . . sexual abuse’ encompasses a purpose of insulting, humiliating, intimidating, or physically harming a person sexually by touching an ‘intimate part’ of the person . . . .” (In | 2 | 2020–2021 |
In Re Gladys L.
green
2 sentences2014(See In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 .) 6 At a contested jurisdictional hearing, the court must determine whether the allegations of the petition are true. 2014(See In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 .) 6 At a contested jurisdictional hearing, the court must determine whether the allegations of the petition are true. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Malinda S.
red
2 sentences2014Due Process Confers a Right to “Trial” on Issues Raised by the Section 300 Petition “[O]nce it has been concluded that a due process right exists we … decide what process is due. [Citation.]” (In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 383 , superseded by statute on another point as stated in People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200 , fn. omitted.) Identifying the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of several factors, including “the private interest that will be affected by the official action [and] … the [dignity] interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and cons 2014Due Process Confers a Right to “Trial” on Issues Raised by the Section 300 Petition “[O]nce it has been concluded that a due process right exists we … decide what process is due. [Citation.]” (In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 383 , superseded by statute on another point as stated in People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200 , fn. omitted.) Identifying the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of several factors, including “the private interest that will be affected by the official action [and] … the [dignity] interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and cons | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Tomi C.
green
2 sentences1999In In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 ], a social services agency filed a petition alleging a father had sexually molested his children. 1999In In re Tomi C. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 694 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 210 ], a social services agency filed a petition alleging a father had sexually molested his children. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1997Following a hearing that primarily addressed whether the doctrine set out in People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 360 P.2d 39 ] allowed aggregation under these facts, the court overruled the demurrer, noting “Bailey still is good law.” At a contested jurisdictional hearing the court found David had committed all five counts. 1997Following a hearing that primarily addressed whether the doctrine set out in People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 360 P.2d 39 ] allowed aggregation under these facts, the court overruled the demurrer, noting “Bailey still is good law.” At a contested jurisdictional hearing the court found David had committed all five counts. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
In Re Michelle M.
green
2 sentences1994(In re Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 .) The appellant in Michelle M. had ample opportunity to challenge the basis of the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction prior to termination. 1994In that case, the contested jurisdictional hearing occurred two years before the dependency action was terminated. ( In re Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal. App.4th at p. 328 .) The appellant in Michelle M. had ample opportunity to challenge the basis of the juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction prior to termination. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
In Re Tahl
green
2 sentences1992“The Court: I’m satisfied that the mother understands her rights and is voluntarily waiving them." Relying on In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], the mother contends that the failure of the court to advise and obtain personal waivers to these fundamental rights voids any waiver of a contested jurisdictional hearing, and requires the jurisdictional order to be set aside. 1992“The Court: I’m satisfied that the mother understands her rights and is voluntarily waiving them." Relying on In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], the mother contends that the failure of the court to advise and obtain personal waivers to these fundamental rights voids any waiver of a contested jurisdictional hearing, and requires the jurisdictional order to be set aside. | 2 | 1992–1992 |
In Re EH
green
1 sentence2023When making this finding, the court stated as follows: “As to the specific allegations in this case, the Court has reviewed, prior to today, the case of Robert C., 219 Cal.App.4th 1241 ; the case of In re E.H., 108 Cal.App.4th 659 ; and the case of In re A.S., 202 Cal.App.4th 237 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Mary M.
green
1 sentence2023When making this finding, the court stated as follows: “As to the specific allegations in this case, the Court has reviewed, prior to today, the case of Robert C., 219 Cal.App.4th 1241 ; the case of In re E.H., 108 Cal.App.4th 659 ; and the case of In re A.S., 202 Cal.App.4th 237 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2023(In re S.N., supra, at p. 672 [applying Chapman error standard]; In re Monique T., supra, at pp. 1377-1387 [applying Chapman, but declining to decide whether error should be analyzed under Chapman “or the more easily met reasonable probability test” of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)].) These precedents are rightly focused on the concerns created by a judicial officer accepting parent’s waiver of a right to a contested jurisdictional hearing without court advisement and oversight to make sure such a waiver is knowing and voluntary. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Marsden
green
1 sentence2022The contested jurisdictional hearing was continued to the next available date of August 10, 2020. 5 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 9 3. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
J.E. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2021(J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1335 , citing Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 806, fn. 5 .) We review a Brady claim de novo but give great weight to the trial court’s factual findings when supported by substantial evidence. ( Erickson, supra, at p. 1163 .) To support his Brady claim, C.G. cites a letter submitted to the juvenile court after the contested jurisdictional hearing by someone named Isabel V., who apparently observed the trial. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re AR
green
1 sentence2021(A.R., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 736, 739.) The agency requested that the court find father’s appeal moot due to the court’s subsequent order awarding custody of the minor to the mother and terminating dependency jurisdiction. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In Re JT green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Brady green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Ghobrial green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Shannon T. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In Re Carissa G. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Martinez green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Wende green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Daniel Z. v. Charles Z. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Christopher T. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Kevin M. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Lucero L. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Jacob J. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Adrianna P. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Steven A. v. Rickie M. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Vf green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Isayah C. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Riverside County Department of Public Social Services v. Kimberly S. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Julian R. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Otto green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Joseph M. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.