amelioration doctrine in Indiana

2015I.C. § 1-1-5.5-21 (“The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration ... to apply to any SEC TION of P.L. 158-2013 or P.L. 168-2014”); see also Marley v. State, 17 N.E.3d 335, 340 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (“It is abundantly clear ... that the General - Assetably intended the new criminal code to have no effect on criminal proceedings for offenses committed prior to thé enactment of the new code.”), trans. denied.

2015I.C. § 1-1-5.5-21 (“The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration ... to apply to any SECTION of P.L. 158-2013 or P.L. 168-2014”); see also Marley v. State, 17 N.E.3d 335, 340 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (“It is abundantly clear ... that the General Assembly intended the new criminal code to have no effect on criminal proceedings for offenses committed prior to the enactment of the new code.”), trans. denied.

2012However, the doctrine of amelioration provides that “a defendant who is sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for more lenient sentencing is entitled to be sentenced pursuant to that statute rather than the sentencing statute in effect at the time of the commission or conviction of the crime.” Richards v. State, 681 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Lunsford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

2007The doctrine of amelioration provides that “a defendant who is sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for more lenient sentencing is entitled to be sentenced pursuant to that statute rather than the sentencing statute in effect at the time of the commission or conviction of the crime.” Richards v. State, 681 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind.1997) (quoting Lunsford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ind.Ct.App.1994)).

2014The doctrine of amelioration provides that “a defendant who is sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for more lenient sentencing is entitled to be sentenced pursuant to that statute rather than the sentencing statute in effect at the time of the commission or conviction of the crime.” Richards v. State, 681 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. 1997).

2012Citing Richards v. State, 681 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. 1997), the State agrees that “the doctrine of amelioration permits [Yerden] to benefit from the later statute if it would otherwise apply to him.” Appellee’s Br. p. 8 n.2.

2015Lowery contends that he was entitled to good time credit for his time served on home detention under the doctrine of amelioration. [7] “The doctrine of amelioration is an exception to the general rule that the sentence in effect at the time a crime is committed is the proper penalty.” Cottingham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 82, 85 (Ind. 2012).

2015Lowery contends that he was entitled to good time credit for his time served on home detention under the doctrine of amelioration. [7] “The doctrine of amelioration is an exception to the general rule that the sentence in effect at the time a crime is committed is the proper penalty.” Cottingham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 82, 85 (Ind. 2012).

2017These sections affirmatively state: “The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration (see Vicory v. State [ 272 Ind. 683 ], 400 N.E.2d 1380 (1980)) to apply to any SECTION [of the new criminal code].” Id.

2017These sections affirmatively state: “The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration (see Vicory v. State [ 272 Ind. 683 ], 400 N.E.2d 1380 (1980)) to apply to any SECTION [of the new criminal code].” Id.

2019See, e.g., Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (identifying waiver of a claim under the doctrine of amelioration).

2017Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

2001Desantis cites Renfroe v. State, 743 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), as an example of a case where the doctrine of amelioration has been applied to a non-sentencing provision of a statute.

2001As we will explain later, however, under the law governing this case, the State was not required to prove that Desantis' license suspension was valid before he could be convicted of operating a motor vehicle after being adjudged an HTV. [4] 2000 Ind. Acts 120 (effective July 1, 2000). [5] Desantis cites Renfroe v. State, 743 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), as an example of a case where the doctrine of amelioration has been applied to a non-sentencing provision of a statute.

2015Hobbs’[s] arguments to the contrary are without merit. 26 N.E.3d at 985-86 . [11] Noting the plain meaning of the savings clause, and following the intent of the Legislature and our court’s reasoning in Hobbs , we conclude that the current version of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17, which became effective July 1, 2014, does not apply to Swallows’s petition to modify a sentence that he began serving in 1989.

2015See Hobbs, 26 N.E.3d at 985 (citing I.C. § 1–1–5.5–21 (“The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration . . . to apply to any SECTION of P.L. 158–2013 or P.L. 168–2014”)); Carr, Slip op. at 3-4. [34] For the reasons expressed in Moore and reaffirmed and expanded upon here, I respectfully disagree with my colleagues on these two theories.

2003See Bell v. State, 654 N.E.2d 856, 858 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). 8 .

2000This exception, termed the doctrine of amelioration, states that “a defendant who is sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for more lenient sentencing is entitled to be sentenced pursuant to that statute rather than the sentencing statute in effect at the time of the commission or conviction of the crime.” Id. (quoting Lunsford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ind.Ct.App.1994)).

2016See Cox v. State, 38 N.E.3d 702, 704 (Ind.Ct.App.2015).

2016See Cox v. State, 38 N.E.3d 702, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

1998Rowold v. State, 629 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

1996Rowold, 629 N.E.2d at 1288 .

2020Brown v. State, 947 N.E.2d 486 , 489 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 733-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)), trans. denied.

2011Id.

2015Hobbs’[s] arguments to the contrary are without merit.13 Id. at 985-86. [32] Subsequently, in Swallows v. State, 31 N.E.3d 544 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), another panel of this Court affirmed a trial court’s decision to apply the prior version of the statute to a petition for sentence modification filed on October 1, 2014. 31 N.E.3d at 545 .

2015Hobbs’[s] arguments to the contrary are without merit.13 Id. at 985-86. [32] Subsequently, in Swallows v. State, 31 N.E.3d 544 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), another panel of this Court affirmed a trial court’s decision to apply the prior version of the statute to a petition for sentence modification filed on October 1, 2014. 31 N.E.3d at 545 .

2001Id.

1997See, Tedlock v. State, 656 N.E.2d 273 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).

2020See Hellums v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1027, 1028-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“The doctrine of amelioration allows a defendant, who is sentenced after the effective date of a statute that provides for more lenient sentencing, to take advantage of the more lenient statute rather than be sentenced under the more harsh statute that was in effect when the defendant was charged or convicted.”) (citing Richards v. State, 681 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. 1997)).

2020Id.; see also Newson, 86 N.E.3d at 174 ; Manley v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Fulkrod, 753 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied. [8] Nor is Toney entitled to a revision of his sentence under the doctrine of amelioration, as he seems to argue.

2020Id.; see also Newson, 86 N.E.3d at 174 ; Manley v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Fulkrod, 753 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied. [8] Nor is Toney entitled to a revision of his sentence under the doctrine of amelioration, as he seems to argue.

2020As the State points out, by simultaneously expanding the trial court’s authority to order consecutive sentences and limiting the total length of a 2 In his reply brief, Hobbs cites Winbush v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1219, 1224-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (2003), wherein the court stated, “The doctrine of amelioration allows a defendant to be sentenced under the more lenient provisions of a statute which is in effect at the time of sentencing rather than be sentenced under a more harsh statute in effect at the time the offense was committed.” However, the case does not even address whether

2020As the State points out, by simultaneously expanding the trial court’s authority to order consecutive sentences and limiting the total length of a 2 In his reply brief, Hobbs cites Winbush v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1219, 1224-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (2003), wherein the court stated, “The doctrine of amelioration allows a defendant to be sentenced under the more lenient provisions of a statute which is in effect at the time of sentencing rather than be sentenced under a more harsh statute in effect at the time the offense was committed.” However, the case does not even address whether

2019Thus, the legislature did not intend for the doctrine of amelioration to apply. 1 1 Further, “statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme.” Sanders v. State, 466 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind. 1984).

2019Wall v. State, 573 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Henderson v. State, 489 N.E.2d 68, 71-72 (Ind. 1986)).

2019Waiver notwithstanding, the general rule is that a defendant “shall be sentenced under the statute in force at the time the offense was committed.” State v. Alcorn, 638 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ind. 1994).

2019Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016). “[T]he ‘best evidence’ of that intent is the statute’s language.” Id. (quoting Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2125 | February 26, 2019 Page 11 of 13 2012)).

2019Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016). “[T]he ‘best evidence’ of that intent is the statute’s language.” Id. (quoting Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2125 | February 26, 2019 Page 11 of 13 2012)).

2019This doctrine applies to resentencing; however, it does not apply if the court is “merely correcting or modifying an existing sentence rather than resentencing.” Id.; compare, e.g., Riffe v. State, 675 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the doctrine inapplicable where the court “merely corrected [an] existing sentence”), trans. denied, with Martin v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the doctrine where the defendant “stood convicted of different crimes”—it “was not merely a correction of [the] existing sentences.

2019Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016). “[T]he ‘best evidence’ of that intent is the statute’s language.” Id. (quoting Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2125 | February 26, 2019 Page 11 of 13 2012)).

2019“If that language is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply its plain and ordinary meaning, heeding both what it ‘does say’ and what it ‘does not say.’” Id. (quoting State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ind. 2003)). [22] The doctrine of amelioration is an exception to the general rule that the sentence in effect at the time a crime is committed is the proper penalty.

2019“If that language is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply its plain and ordinary meaning, heeding both what it ‘does say’ and what it ‘does not say.’” Id. (quoting State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ind. 2003)). [22] The doctrine of amelioration is an exception to the general rule that the sentence in effect at the time a crime is committed is the proper penalty.

2019Wall v. State, 573 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Henderson v. State, 489 N.E.2d 68, 71-72 (Ind. 1986)).

2019This doctrine applies to resentencing; however, it does not apply if the court is “merely correcting or modifying an existing sentence rather than resentencing.” Id.; compare, e.g., Riffe v. State, 675 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the doctrine inapplicable where the court “merely corrected [an] existing sentence”), trans. denied, with Martin v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the doctrine where the defendant “stood convicted of different crimes”—it “was not merely a correction of [the] existing sentences.