flexible common sense standard in Connecticut

2003Stated more succinctly, “[pjrobable cause for purposes of the [prejudgment remedy] statutes is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd., 34 Conn. App. 22, 24 , 640 A.2d 125 (1994).

2003Stated more succinctly, “[pjrobable cause for purposes of the [prejudgment remedy] statutes is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd., 34 Conn. App. 22, 24 , 640 A.2d 125 (1994).

2010Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 175 , 474 A.2d 795 (1984).

2010Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 175 , 474 A.2d 795 (1984).

2003Goodwin v. Pratt , 10 Conn. App. 618 , 621 , 524 A.2d 1168 (1987)." Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd. , 34 Conn. App. 22 , 24 , 640 A.2d 125 (1994). "`In acting on a prejudgment remedy motion, the trial court must evaluate the arguments and evidence produced by both parties to determine whether there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs' claim . . . [T]he trial court, vested with broad discretion, need determine only the likely success of the plaintiffs' claim by weighing probabilities.' CT Page 2799 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Haxhi v. Moss , 25 Conn. App

2003Goodwin v. Pratt , 10 Conn. App. 618 , 621 , 524 A.2d 1168 (1987)." Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd. , 34 Conn. App. 22 , 24 , 640 A.2d 125 (1994). "`In acting on a prejudgment remedy motion, the trial court must evaluate the arguments and evidence produced by both parties to determine whether there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs' claim . . . [T]he trial court, vested with broad discretion, need determine only the likely success of the plaintiffs' claim by weighing probabilities.' CT Page 2799 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Haxhi v. Moss , 25 Conn. App

1996"Probable cause for purposes of the PJR statutes is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true then false." Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd. , 34 Conn. App. 22 , 24 , 640 A.2d 125 (1994). "[T]he court must evaluate not only the plaintiffs' claim but also any defenses raised by the defendant." Haxhi v. Moss , 25 Conn. App. 16 , 20 , 591 A.2d 1275 (1991).

1996"Probable cause for purposes of the PJR statutes is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true then false." Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd. , 34 Conn. App. 22 , 24 , 640 A.2d 125 (1994). "[T]he court must evaluate not only the plaintiffs' claim but also any defenses raised by the defendant." Haxhi v. Moss , 25 Conn. App. 16 , 20 , 591 A.2d 1275 (1991).

1992CT Page 422 In New England Land Co., Ltd. v. DeMarkey, supra, at 620 , the Court stated that "[t]he legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a man of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in entertaining it:. . .Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard.

1992Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard under which one must have a bona fide belief that the facts essential to a cause of action exist whether or not "that belief be correct or more likely true than false." New England Land Co., Ltd. v. DeMarkey, 213 Conn. 612 , 620 .

2002It deals with probabilities, and the application of the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.'" (Emphasis in original.) Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 228 Conn. 545 , 549-50 , 636 A.2d 1360 (1994) (Adriani II).

2002It deals with probabilities, and the application of the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.'" (Emphasis in original.) Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 228 Conn. 545 , 549-50 , 636 A.2d 1360 (1994) (Adriani II).

1998"It is a flexible common sense standard that does not require the officer's belief to be either correct or more likely true than false." State v. Stevens , 26 Conn. App. 805 , 810 , aff'd 224 Conn. 730 (1993).

1998"It is a flexible common sense standard that does not require the police officer's belief to be either correct or more likely true or false." State v. Stevens, 26 Conn. App. 805 , 810 aff'd, 224 Conn. 730 (1992).

2024It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 31 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 33 Karen v. Loftus than false.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn. App. 414, 426 , 970 A.2d 743 (2009);17 see also Spilke v. Spilke, supra, 116 Conn. App. 594 n.6 ; Goree v. Goree, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FA- XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 26, 2022). 17 The Superior Court in Malave v. Ortiz, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 19, 2007) ( 43 Conn. L.

2024It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 31 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 33 Karen v. Loftus than false.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn. App. 414, 426 , 970 A.2d 743 (2009);17 see also Spilke v. Spilke, supra, 116 Conn. App. 594 n.6 ; Goree v. Goree, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FA- XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 26, 2022). 17 The Superior Court in Malave v. Ortiz, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 19, 2007) ( 43 Conn. L.

2001It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Village Linc Corp. v. Children's Store, Inc. , 31 Conn. App. 652 , 657-658 , 626 A.2d 813 (1993); Three S. Development Co. v. Santore , 193 Conn. 174 , 175 , 474 A.2d 795 (1984).

2001It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Village Linc Corp. v. Children's Store, Inc. , 31 Conn. App. 652 , 657-658 , 626 A.2d 813 (1993); Three S. Development Co. v. Santore , 193 Conn. 174 , 175 , 474 A.2d 795 (1984).

1998"It is a flexible common sense standard that does not require the officer's belief to be either correct or more likely true than false." State v. Stevens , 26 Conn. App. 805 , 810 , aff'd 224 Conn. 730 (1993).

1998"It is a flexible common sense standard that does not require the police officer's belief to be either correct or more likely true or false." State v. Stevens, 26 Conn. App. 805 , 810 aff'd, 224 Conn. 730 (1992).

2002Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard" (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Dufraine v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 250 , 261 , 673 A.2d 101 (1996) "[A] probable cause hearing is not a trial on the merits, nor is it intended as such.

2002Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard" (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Dufraine v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 250 , 261 , 673 A.2d 101 (1996) "[A] probable cause hearing is not a trial on the merits, nor is it intended as such.

2001It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 220 Conn. 307 , 316 , 596 A.2d 426 (1991).

2001It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 220 Conn. 307 , 316 , 596 A.2d 426 (1991).

1991It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Anderson v. Nedovich, 19 Conn. App. 85, 88 , 561 A.2d 948 (1989).

1991It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Anderson v. Nedovich, 19 Conn. App. 85, 88 , 561 A.2d 948 (1989).

2025Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. than that required for conviction under the reasonable doubt standard.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781 , 790, 326 A.3d 251 , cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926 , 326 A.3d 248 (2024). ‘‘Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard . . . [that] does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 69

2025Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. than that required for conviction under the reasonable doubt standard.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781 , 790, 326 A.3d 251 , cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926 , 326 A.3d 248 (2024). ‘‘Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard . . . [that] does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 69

2025Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. than that required for conviction under the reasonable doubt standard.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781 , 790, 326 A.3d 251 , cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926 , 326 A.3d 248 (2024). ‘‘Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard . . . [that] does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 69

2025Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. than that required for conviction under the reasonable doubt standard.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781 , 790, 326 A.3d 251 , cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926 , 326 A.3d 248 (2024). ‘‘Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard . . . [that] does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 69

2025Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. than that required for conviction under the reasonable doubt standard.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781 , 790, 326 A.3d 251 , cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926 , 326 A.3d 248 (2024). ‘‘Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard . . . [that] does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 69

2022This court has stated that this ‘‘threshold showing of substance’’ requires that a party make a showing of ‘‘probable cause’’ to open the judgment.16 Veneziano v. Veneziano, 205 Conn. App. 718, 730 , 259 A.3d 28 (2021). ‘‘Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard.

2018The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Blackmore , 119 Conn. App. 218 , 221-22, 986 A.2d 356 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 903 , 991 A.2d 1104 (2010).

2018The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Blackmore , 119 Conn. App. 218 , 221-22, 986 A.2d 356 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 903 , 991 A.2d 1104 (2010).

2018The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Blackmore , 119 Conn. App. 218 , 221-22, 986 A.2d 356 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 903 , 991 A.2d 1104 (2010).

2018The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Blackmore , 119 Conn. App. 218 , 221-22, 986 A.2d 356 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 903 , 991 A.2d 1104 (2010).

2007It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. Gabel, 69 Conn. App. 279, 286-87 , 794 A.2d 1029 (2002).

2007It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. Gabel, 69 Conn. App. 279, 286-87 , 794 A.2d 1029 (2002).

2005It does not demand that a beUef be correct or more Ukely true than false.” *177 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Orsini v. Tarro, 80 Conn. App. 268, 272 , 834 A.2d 776 (2003).

2005It does not demand that a beUef be correct or more Ukely true than false.” *177 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Orsini v. Tarro, 80 Conn. App. 268, 272 , 834 A.2d 776 (2003).

2002In addition to bearing the burden of establishing the probability that CT Page 11579 a defendant is liable under one or more of the claims alleged, a plaintiff seeking a PJR must also establish the probable amount of his damages through testimony at the probable cause hearing or by documentary proof Essex Group, Inc. v. Ducci Electric Co. , 181 Conn. 524 (1980); Mullai v. Mullai , 1 Conn. App. 93 , 94 (1983).

2002In addition to bearing the burden of establishing the probability that CT Page 11579 a defendant is liable under one or more of the claims alleged, a plaintiff seeking a PJR must also establish the probable amount of his damages through testimony at the probable cause hearing or by documentary proof Essex Group, Inc. v. Ducci Electric Co. , 181 Conn. 524 (1980); Mullai v. Mullai , 1 Conn. App. 93 , 94 (1983).

2001Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).

2001Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).

2000For purposes of § 52-578d, probable cause is "a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a person of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in advancing the action," Tyler v. Schnabel , 34 Conn. App. 216 , 219 (1994), It "is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false," Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd , 34 Conn. App. 22 , 24 (1994).

1999Ierardi v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 15 Conn. App. 569 , 580-81 (1988).

1998"Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529 , 548 (1991); "It CT Page 3529 is a flexible common sense standard that does not require the police officer's belief to be either correct or more likely true or false." State v. Stephens, 231 Conn. 43 , 63 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038 (1995).

1998The court's role in such a hearing is to determine probable success by weighing probabilities. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Calfee v. Usman, 224 Conn. 29 , 37 , 616 A.2d 250 (1992) Probable cause for purposes of the PJR statutes is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.

1998The court's role in such a hearing is to determine probable success by weighing probabilities. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Calfee v. Usman, 224 Conn. 29 , 37 , 616 A.2d 250 (1992) Probable cause for purposes of the PJR statutes is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.