pre-sentence hearing in Georgia

1993Consequently, defendant cannot now be heard to complain about this aspect of the proceedings. “ ‘If no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing, a subsequent review by this court of that phase is eliminated.’ [Cits.]” Moss v. State, 159 Ga. App. 317, 319 ( 283 SE2d 275 ) (1981).

1992Although the defendant contends on appeal that the trial court improperly considered his prior conviction in imposing sentence for his convictions in this case, such objection was not raised at the sentencing hearing and thus need not be considered by this court. “ Tf no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing, a subsequent review by this court of that phase is eliminated.’ [Cits.]” Moss v. State, 159 Ga. App. 317, 319 ( 283 SE2d 275 ) (1981).

1980Objections such as the one before us now must be properly made in the trial court and a failure to do so at that time eliminates a subsequent review by this court. [Cits.]” Strozier v. State, 231 Ga. 140, 142 ( 200 SE2d 762 ) (1973). "[I]f no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing a subsequent review of that phase is eliminated. [Cits.]” Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1) ( 244 SE2d 600 ) (1978).

1980Objections such as the one before us now must be properly made in the trial court and a failure to do so at that time eliminates a subsequent review by this court. [Cits.]” Strozier v. State, 231 Ga. 140, 142 ( 200 SE2d 762 ) (1973). "[I]f no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing a subsequent review of that phase is eliminated. [Cits.]” Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1) ( 244 SE2d 600 ) (1978).

1981“If no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing, a subsequent review by this court of that phase is eliminated.” Adams v. State, 142 Ga. App. 252, 255 (7) ( 235 SE2d 667 ); Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 244 SE2d 600 ); Wilcox v. State, 153 Ga. App. 719 (3) ( 266 SE2d 356 ); Chapman v. State, 154 Ga. App. 532 (4) ( 268 SE2d 797 ).

1981“If no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing, a subsequent review by this court of that phase is eliminated.” Adams v. State, 142 Ga. App. 252, 255 (7) ( 235 SE2d 667 ); Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 244 SE2d 600 ); Wilcox v. State, 153 Ga. App. 719 (3) ( 266 SE2d 356 ); Chapman v. State, 154 Ga. App. 532 (4) ( 268 SE2d 797 ).

2003Accord Munsford v. State, 235 Ga. 38, 45 ( 218 SE2d 792 ) (1975) (“The information in these reports cannot be regarded as ‘evidence’ either in aggravation or in mitigation as such reports are not a part of the evidence introduced at the pre-sentence hearing.”). 10 Denny, supra. Accord Howard v. State, 172 Ga. App. 83, 84 (2) ( 321 SE2d 815 ) (1984).

2003Accord Munsford v. State, 235 Ga. 38, 45 ( 218 SE2d 792 ) (1975) (“The information in these reports cannot be regarded as ‘evidence’ either in aggravation or in mitigation as such reports are not a part of the evidence introduced at the pre-sentence hearing.”). 10 Denny, supra. Accord Howard v. State, 172 Ga. App. 83, 84 (2) ( 321 SE2d 815 ) (1984).

1983In one of the earliest cases decided under our 1973 law, we held: “The statute is clear that the pre-sentence hearing is for additional evidence and in no way excludes from consideration on sentence the matters heard on the issue of guilt or innocence.” Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247, 253-254 ( 206 SE2d 12 ) (1974).

1983In one of the earliest cases decided under our 1973 law, we held: “The statute is clear that the pre-sentence hearing is for additional evidence and in no way excludes from consideration on sentence the matters heard on the issue of guilt or innocence.” Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247, 253-254 ( 206 SE2d 12 ) (1974).

2024First, by its terms, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) does not even apply to Lovell, because the statute requires a presentence hearing only after a verdict “by the jury in any felony case.”6 Thus, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) “does not reach sentencing following guilty pleas.”7 Even if the statute did apply, it only requires “a presentence hearing.”8 “OCGA § 17-10-2 provides that a trial judge must conduct a pre-sentence hearing to determine punishment, and the record shows that such a hearing was held.”9 Nor has Lovell identified a due process right requiring the trial court to consider additional mitigatio

2024First, by its terms, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) does not even apply to Lovell, because the statute requires a presentence hearing only after a verdict “by the jury in any felony case.”6 Thus, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) “does not reach sentencing following guilty pleas.”7 Even if the statute did apply, it only requires “a presentence hearing.”8 “OCGA § 17-10-2 provides that a trial judge must conduct a pre-sentence hearing to determine punishment, and the record shows that such a hearing was held.”9 Nor has Lovell identified a due process right requiring the trial court to consider additional mitigatio

1981Hence, the rule is applicable: “if no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing a subsequent review of that phase is eliminated.” Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664 (1) ( 244 SE2d 600 ).

1981Hence, the rule is applicable: “if no objection is made at the pre-sentence hearing a subsequent review of that phase is eliminated.” Bradshaw v. State, 145 Ga. App. 664 (1) ( 244 SE2d 600 ).

1978"The nature of the pre-sentence hearing involves the 'general character’ (Code § 38-202) of the defendant, and where the State has notified the defendant that such evidence will be admitted (Code Ann. § 27-2534), evidence of general bad character may be admitted.” Dudley v. State, 228 Ga. 551 (9), 561 ( 186 SE2d 875 ).

1978"The nature of the pre-sentence hearing involves the 'general character’ (Code § 38-202) of the defendant, and where the State has notified the defendant that such evidence will be admitted (Code Ann. § 27-2534), evidence of general bad character may be admitted.” Dudley v. State, 228 Ga. 551 (9), 561 ( 186 SE2d 875 ).

2014See generally Johnson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 757 ( 191 SE2d 614 ) (1972).

2014See generally Johnson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 757 ( 191 SE2d 614 ) (1972).

2012See Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 297, 300 (6) ( 523 SE2d 103 ) (1999). 8.

2012See Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 297, 300 (6) ( 523 SE2d 103 ) (1999). 8.

2003There is no necessity to conduct a pre-sentence hearing on the issue of punishment as the trial court possesses no discretion in such an instance.” Brown v. State, 246 Ga. 251, 253 (6) ( 271 SE2d 163 ) (1980). 4.

2003There is no necessity to conduct a pre-sentence hearing on the issue of punishment as the trial court possesses no discretion in such an instance.” Brown v. State, 246 Ga. 251, 253 (6) ( 271 SE2d 163 ) (1980). 4.

1986Harrison v. State, 136 Ga. App. 71, 72 (2) ( 220 SE2d 77 ) (1975).

1986Harrison v. State, 136 Ga. App. 71, 72 (2) ( 220 SE2d 77 ) (1975).

1983However, in Sprouse v. State, 242 Ga. 831, 834 ( 252 SE2d 173 ) (1979), the Supreme Court held: “The trial court did not hold a pre-sentence hearing at which both sides are permitted to present evidence in aggravation, extenuation and mitigation as provided in [OCGA § 17-10-2 (Code Ann. § 27-2503)].

1983However, in Sprouse v. State, 242 Ga. 831, 834 ( 252 SE2d 173 ) (1979), the Supreme Court held: “The trial court did not hold a pre-sentence hearing at which both sides are permitted to present evidence in aggravation, extenuation and mitigation as provided in [OCGA § 17-10-2 (Code Ann. § 27-2503)].

1976Nothing in Clenney v. State, 229 Ga. 561 (4) ( 192 SE2d 907 ) indicates that proof of representation by counsel or waiver of counsel can be shown only by the face of the indictment, 3 as contended by Carter, and here, outside the presence of the jury, a witness for the state who was in the courtroom when Carter’s plea was entered testified that he was in fact represented by counsel at that time.

1976Nothing in Clenney v. State, 229 Ga. 561 (4) ( 192 SE2d 907 ) indicates that proof of representation by counsel or waiver of counsel can be shown only by the face of the indictment, 3 as contended by Carter, and here, outside the presence of the jury, a witness for the state who was in the courtroom when Carter’s plea was entered testified that he was in fact represented by counsel at that time.

2025See Williams v. State, 254 Ga. App. 836 (1) ( 563 SE2d 914 ) (2002) (“Information in pre-sentence reports may not be regarded as evidence either in aggravation or mitigation of sentence since the reports are not part of the evidence introduced at a pre-sentence hearing.”). 5 permits the trial court in consideration of the evidence presented and in the exercise of its discretion to downward deviate if the statutory factors are absent.

2025See Williams v. State, 254 Ga. App. 836 (1) ( 563 SE2d 914 ) (2002) (“Information in pre-sentence reports may not be regarded as evidence either in aggravation or mitigation of sentence since the reports are not part of the evidence introduced at a pre-sentence hearing.”). 5 permits the trial court in consideration of the evidence presented and in the exercise of its discretion to downward deviate if the statutory factors are absent.

2024First, by its terms, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) does not even apply to Lovell, because the statute requires a presentence hearing only after a verdict “by the jury in any felony case.”6 Thus, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) “does not reach sentencing following guilty pleas.”7 Even if the statute did apply, it only requires “a presentence hearing.”8 “OCGA § 17-10-2 provides that a trial judge must conduct a pre-sentence hearing to determine punishment, and the record shows that such a hearing was held.”9 Nor has Lovell identified a due process right requiring the trial court to consider additional mitigatio

2024First, by its terms, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) does not even apply to Lovell, because the statute requires a presentence hearing only after a verdict “by the jury in any felony case.”6 Thus, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) “does not reach sentencing following guilty pleas.”7 Even if the statute did apply, it only requires “a presentence hearing.”8 “OCGA § 17-10-2 provides that a trial judge must conduct a pre-sentence hearing to determine punishment, and the record shows that such a hearing was held.”9 Nor has Lovell identified a due process right requiring the trial court to consider additional mitigatio

2024First, by its terms, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) does not even apply to Lovell, because the statute requires a presentence hearing only after a verdict “by the jury in any felony case.”6 Thus, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) “does not reach sentencing following guilty pleas.”7 Even if the statute did apply, it only requires “a presentence hearing.”8 “OCGA § 17-10-2 provides that a trial judge must conduct a pre-sentence hearing to determine punishment, and the record shows that such a hearing was held.”9 Nor has Lovell identified a due process right requiring the trial court to consider additional mitigatio

2024First, by its terms, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) does not even apply to Lovell, because the statute requires a presentence hearing only after a verdict “by the jury in any felony case.”6 Thus, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (1) “does not reach sentencing following guilty pleas.”7 Even if the statute did apply, it only requires “a presentence hearing.”8 “OCGA § 17-10-2 provides that a trial judge must conduct a pre-sentence hearing to determine punishment, and the record shows that such a hearing was held.”9 Nor has Lovell identified a due process right requiring the trial court to consider additional mitigatio

2021See von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 575 (2) ( 748 SE2d 446 ) (2013) (objections to the validity of prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence can be waived); see also Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1) ( 722 SE2d 133 ) (2012) (“We have held that when no objection to the form of the evidence of the prior conviction[s] was made at the pre-sentence hearing, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal.”); Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 33 (3) ( 596 SE2d 205 ) 15 (2004) (“The time to challenge the validity of a prior conviction is at sentencing when the [S]tate attempts to

2021See von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 575 (2) ( 748 SE2d 446 ) (2013) (objections to the validity of prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence can be waived); see also Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1) ( 722 SE2d 133 ) (2012) (“We have held that when no objection to the form of the evidence of the prior conviction[s] was made at the pre-sentence hearing, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal.”); Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 33 (3) ( 596 SE2d 205 ) 15 (2004) (“The time to challenge the validity of a prior conviction is at sentencing when the [S]tate attempts to

2021See von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 575 (2) ( 748 SE2d 446 ) (2013) (objections to the validity of prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence can be waived); see also Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1) ( 722 SE2d 133 ) (2012) (“We have held that when no objection to the form of the evidence of the prior conviction[s] was made at the pre-sentence hearing, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal.”); Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 33 (3) ( 596 SE2d 205 ) 15 (2004) (“The time to challenge the validity of a prior conviction is at sentencing when the [S]tate attempts to

2021See von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 575 (2) ( 748 SE2d 446 ) (2013) (objections to the validity of prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence can be waived); see also Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1) ( 722 SE2d 133 ) (2012) (“We have held that when no objection to the form of the evidence of the prior conviction[s] was made at the pre-sentence hearing, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal.”); Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 33 (3) ( 596 SE2d 205 ) 15 (2004) (“The time to challenge the validity of a prior conviction is at sentencing when the [S]tate attempts to

2021See von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 575 (2) ( 748 SE2d 446 ) (2013) (objections to the validity of prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence can be waived); see also Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1) ( 722 SE2d 133 ) (2012) (“We have held that when no objection to the form of the evidence of the prior conviction[s] was made at the pre-sentence hearing, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal.”); Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 33 (3) ( 596 SE2d 205 ) 15 (2004) (“The time to challenge the validity of a prior conviction is at sentencing when the [S]tate attempts to

2021See von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 575 (2) ( 748 SE2d 446 ) (2013) (objections to the validity of prior convictions used in aggravation of sentence can be waived); see also Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1) ( 722 SE2d 133 ) (2012) (“We have held that when no objection to the form of the evidence of the prior conviction[s] was made at the pre-sentence hearing, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal.”); Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 33 (3) ( 596 SE2d 205 ) 15 (2004) (“The time to challenge the validity of a prior conviction is at sentencing when the [S]tate attempts to

2003Accord Munsford v. State, 235 Ga. 38, 45 ( 218 SE2d 792 ) (1975) (“The information in these reports cannot be regarded as ‘evidence’ either in aggravation or in mitigation as such reports are not a part of the evidence introduced at the pre-sentence hearing.”). 10 Denny, supra. Accord Howard v. State, 172 Ga. App. 83, 84 (2) ( 321 SE2d 815 ) (1984).

2003Accord Munsford v. State, 235 Ga. 38, 45 ( 218 SE2d 792 ) (1975) (“The information in these reports cannot be regarded as ‘evidence’ either in aggravation or in mitigation as such reports are not a part of the evidence introduced at the pre-sentence hearing.”). 10 Denny, supra. Accord Howard v. State, 172 Ga. App. 83, 84 (2) ( 321 SE2d 815 ) (1984).

1999See also Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135 (13) ( 485 SE2d 783 ) (1997); McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7 (4) ( 463 SE2d 476 ) (1995); O’Toole v. State, 258 Ga. 614 (4) (n. 2) ( 373 SE2d 12 ) (1988); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749 (12) ( 312 SE2d 40 ) (1983); and Moret v. State, 246 Ga. 5 (3) ( 268 SE2d 635 ) (1980), where this Court applied waiver to uphold the trial court’s admission without objection at the defendant’s pre-sentence hearing of the oral testimony of the prosecuting attorney concerning the defendant’s prior conviction.

1999See also Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135 (13) ( 485 SE2d 783 ) (1997); McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7 (4) ( 463 SE2d 476 ) (1995); O’Toole v. State, 258 Ga. 614 (4) (n. 2) ( 373 SE2d 12 ) (1988); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749 (12) ( 312 SE2d 40 ) (1983); and Moret v. State, 246 Ga. 5 (3) ( 268 SE2d 635 ) (1980), where this Court applied waiver to uphold the trial court’s admission without objection at the defendant’s pre-sentence hearing of the oral testimony of the prosecuting attorney concerning the defendant’s prior conviction.