66 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Xiegreen2 sentences2019Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900 , ¶62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). {¶38} Upon a motion to withdraw a plea a court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a “‘reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.’” Shaffer at ¶16, quoting Xie at 527. {¶39} Further, “[a] trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to wit 2007Upon a motion to withdraw a plea a court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a "reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea." Xie , supra, at 527 . *Page 7 {¶ 24} A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accused is given a complete and impartial hearing on the motion, and (4) where the record reveals th | 2 | 22 |
Copley Township Board of Trustees v. W.J. Horvath Co.green2 sentences2020Horvath Co., 193 Ohio App.3d 286 , 2011-Ohio-1214 , 951 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). “[W]hile a common pleas court has a duty to follow the procedure for a contempt proceeding as outlined by R.C. 2705.05(A), e.g. the court must conduct a hearing, the common pleas court is not limited by the provisions of the statute which refer to the penalties which may be imposed. 2020Horvath Co., 193 Ohio App.3d 286 , 2011-Ohio-1214 , 951 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). “[W]hile a common pleas court has a duty to follow the procedure for a contempt proceeding as outlined by R.C. 2705.05(A), e.g. the court must conduct a hearing, the common pleas court is not limited by the provisions of the statute which refer to the penalties which may be imposed. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mangrumgreen2 sentences2004"Where a defendant pleads to multiple offenses of similar import, and the trial court accepts the plea, the court must conduct a hearing and make a determination, before entering judgment, as to whether the offenses were of similar or dissimilar import and whether or not there was a separate animus with regard to each crime committed." State v. Gregory (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 124 , 129 , 628 N.E.2d 86 ; see also, State v. Mangrum (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 156 , 158 , 620 N.E.2d 196 . 2004"Where a defendant pleads to multiple offenses of similar import, and the trial court accepts the plea, the court must conduct a hearing and make a determination, before entering judgment, as to whether the offenses were of similar or dissimilar import and whether or not there was a separate animus with regard to each crime committed." State v. Gregory (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 124 , 129 , 628 N.E.2d 86 ; see also, State v. Mangrum (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 156 , 158 , 620 N.E.2d 196 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lalaingreen2 sentences2021Morgan No. 20AP0005, 2021-Ohio-384, ¶ 37 , citing State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248 , 2013-Ohio-3093 , 994 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 3 (“Accordingly, the statute mandates that the court must conduct a hearing if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount.”). 2021Morgan No. 20AP0005, 2021-Ohio-384, ¶ 37 , citing State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248 , 2013-Ohio-3093 , 994 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 3 (“Accordingly, the statute mandates that the court must conduct a hearing if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount.”). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Peterseimgreen2 sentences2019Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900 , ¶62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). {¶38} Upon a motion to withdraw a plea a court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a “‘reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.’” Shaffer at ¶16, quoting Xie at 527. {¶39} Further, “[a] trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to wit 2019Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900 , ¶62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). {¶38} Upon a motion to withdraw a plea a court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a “‘reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.’” Shaffer at ¶16, quoting Xie at 527 . {¶39} Further, “[a] trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to wi | 1 | 3 |
State v. Andrewsgreen1 sentence2026Appellant Brief, p. 1. {¶20} R.C. 2929.18 provides procedures and authorizes a trial court to impose restitution as part of a sentence in order to compensate the victim for economic loss. {¶21} R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) states in part, “The court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, victim’s representative, or victim’s estate disputes the amount.” {¶22} This Court has determined, “[t]he statute mandates that the court must conduct a hearing if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount.” State v. Andrews, 2016-Ohio-7389, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.). {¶23} During the plea heari | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cebulagreen2 sentences2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by 2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by | 1 | 1 |
State v. Branchgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by 2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by | 1 | 1 |
In re C.P.green2 sentences2021A parent’s natural rights are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child.” (Internal citations omitted.) In re C.P., 187 Ohio App.3d 246 , 2010-Ohio-346 , 931 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). {¶10} Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award permanent custody to the requesting agency, the court must conduct a hearing and apply a two- pronged analysis. 2021A parent’s natural rights are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child.” (Internal citations omitted.) In re C.P., 187 Ohio App.3d 246 , 2010-Ohio-346 , 931 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). {¶10} Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award permanent custody to the requesting agency, the court must conduct a hearing and apply a two- pronged analysis. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Warnergreen1 sentence2021State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 69 (1990). {¶37} R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) provides that, “[i]f the court decides to impose restitution, the court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount.” Accordingly, the statute mandates that the court must conduct a hearing if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Welchgreen1 sentence2019State v. Welch, 125 Ohio App.3d 49, 52 (11th Dist.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Lowe v. Judges of the Court of Appealsgreen1 sentence2000See, also, State v. Mangrum (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 156 , 158 , 620 N.E.2d 196 , 197 , appeal dismissed (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 1499 , 613 N.E.2d 645 . | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Maurer v. Shewardgreen1 sentence2000See, also, State v. Mangrum (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 156 , 158 , 620 N.E.2d 196 , 197 , appeal dismissed (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 1499 , 613 N.E.2d 645 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ruff
green
2 sentences2024When the conduct supports more than one offense, however, a court must conduct an analysis of allied offenses of similar import to determine whether the offenses merge or whether the defendant may be convicted of separate offenses.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , ¶ 24. 2023When the conduct supports more than one offense, however, a court must conduct an analysis of allied offenses of similar import to determine whether the offenses merge or whether the defendant may be convicted of separate offenses.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , ¶ 24. {¶ 22} “To determine whether two offenses are allied offenses that merge into a single conviction, a court must evaluate three separate factors: the conduct, the animus, and the import.” State v. Harris, 10th Dist. | 19 | 2015–2024 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2023No. 15AP-683, 2016-Ohio-3424, ¶ 42 , citing Ruff at paragraph one of the syllabus. 2021No. 15AP-683, 2016-Ohio-3424, ¶ 42 , citing Ruff at paragraph one of the syllabus. | 9 | 2018–2023 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2018When 12 the conduct supports more than one offense, however, a court must conduct an analysis of allied offenses of similar import to determine whether the offenses merge or whether the defendant may be convicted of separate offenses. {¶45} “In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining whether merger is apposite, holding that ‘[w]hen determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be considered.’ Id. at syllabus. 2018When 12 the conduct supports more than one offense, however, a court must conduct an analysis of allied offenses of similar import to determine whether the offenses merge or whether the defendant may be convicted of separate offenses. {¶45} “In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining whether merger is apposite, holding that ‘[w]hen determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be considered.’ Id. at syllabus. | 2 | 2015–2018 |
State v. Leisten
green
2 sentences2011Id. 2009Id. | 2 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Kent
green
2 sentences2006State v. Kent (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 151 , 428 N.E.2d 453 . 2006State v. Kent (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 151 , 428 N.E.2d 453 . | 2 | 1984–2006 |
State v. Gregory
green
2 sentences2004"Where a defendant pleads to multiple offenses of similar import, and the trial court accepts the plea, the court must conduct a hearing and make a determination, before entering judgment, as to whether the offenses were of similar or dissimilar import and whether or not there was a separate animus with regard to each crime committed." State v. Gregory (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 124 , 129 , 628 N.E.2d 86 ; see also, State v. Mangrum (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 156 , 158 , 620 N.E.2d 196 . 2004"Where a defendant pleads to multiple offenses of similar import, and the trial court accepts the plea, the court must conduct a hearing and make a determination, before entering judgment, as to whether the offenses were of similar or dissimilar import and whether or not there was a separate animus with regard to each crime committed." State v. Gregory (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 124 , 129 , 628 N.E.2d 86 ; see also, State v. Mangrum (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 156 , 158 , 620 N.E.2d 196 . | 2 | 2000–2004 |
State v. Dunihue
green
2 sentences2000"Where a defendant pleads to multiple offenses of similar import, and the trial court accepts the plea, the court must conduct a hearing and make a determination, before entering judgment, as to whether the offenses were of similar or dissimilar import and whether or not there was a separate animus with regard to each crime committed." State v. Gregory (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 124 , 129 , 628 N.E.2d 86 , 89 , jurisdictional motion overruled (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 624 N.E.2d 195 , citing State v. Dunihue (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 210 , 211 , 485 N.E.2d 764 , 766 . 2000"Where a defendant pleads to multiple offenses of similar import, and the trial court accepts the plea, the court must conduct a hearing and make a determination, before entering judgment, as to whether the offenses were of similar or dissimilar import and whether or not there was a separate animus with regard to each crime committed." State v. Gregory (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 124 , 129 , 628 N.E.2d 86 , 89 , jurisdictional motion overruled (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 624 N.E.2d 195 , citing State v. Dunihue (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 210 , 211 , 485 N.E.2d 764 , 766 . | 2 | 1993–2000 |
State v. Poff
green
1 sentence2021Morgan No. 20AP0005, 2021-Ohio-384, ¶ 37 , citing State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248 , 2013-Ohio-3093 , 994 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 3 (“Accordingly, the statute mandates that the court must conduct a hearing if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount.”). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Flood
green
1 sentence2021No. 18AP-206, 2019-Ohio-2524, ¶ 28 , quoting State v. Harris, 10th Dist. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Tucker
neutral
1 sentence2016Xie at id. {¶20} In State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 214 , 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), this court set forth the standard for determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a plea. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re H.F.
green
1 sentence2015Id. {¶15} R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) provides that on a motion for permanent custody, the court must conduct a hearing “to determine if it is in the best interest of the child to permanently terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency that filed the motion.” However, “[t]he adjudication that the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent child and any dispositional order that has been issued in the case under section 2151.353 of the Revised Code pursuant to the adjudication shall not be readjudicated at the hearing.” R.C. 2151.414(A)(1). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence2014In addition, "[i]f the court schedules a hearing, the court shall order an assessment of the offender for the purpose of determining the offender's eligibility for intervention in lieu of conviction and recommending an appropriate intervention plan." Id. {¶ 12} In the present case, the trial court scheduled a hearing to consider appellants' requests for ILC, but then denied appellants' motions at the outset of that hearing and without ordering an assessment of appellants as required under R.C. 2951.041(A)(1). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Shoaf
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Schaim
green
1 sentence2012Because it is dispositive of the appeal, we begin with the issue of whether the evidence of each of Samuels’ crimes was “simple and distinct.” Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 59 . 6 {¶13} Each of Samuels’ cases involved different dates, different locations, and different witnesses with the exception of Samuels, who testified in his own defense. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Spivey
green
2 sentences2007State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405 , 692 N.E.2d 151 , Thus, in ruling on a presentence withdrawal motion, the court must conduct a hearing and decide whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the *Page 9 plea. 2007State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405 , 692 N.E.2d 151 , Thus, in ruling on a presentence withdrawal motion, the court must conduct a hearing and decide whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the *Page 9 plea. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
McDaniel v. McDaniel
green
1 sentence2003McDaniel v. McDaniel (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 577 , 579 ; Olmsted Twp. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Wigginton v. Wigginton neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Ashley v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Miserak v. Terrill
green
2 sentences1982App. 329 , 295 A. 2d 889 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying order allowing plaintiff to waive filing fee where plaintiff refused an opportunity to explain why she was unable to pay the costs); Miserak v. Terrill (1971), 130 Vt. 7 , 285 A. 2d 753 (holding that where a divorce plaintiff files' a verified petition with the clerk stating the reasons why she cannot afford *228 mandated fees and service costs, the court must conduct a hearing on the petition of indigency to determine the truth of the facts alleged therein). 1982App. 329 , 295 A. 2d 889 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying order allowing plaintiff to waive filing fee where plaintiff refused an opportunity to explain why she was unable to pay the costs); Miserak v. Terrill (1971), 130 Vt. 7 , 285 A. 2d 753 (holding that where a divorce plaintiff files' a verified petition with the clerk stating the reasons why she cannot afford *228 mandated fees and service costs, the court must conduct a hearing on the petition of indigency to determine the truth of the facts alleged therein). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.