egregious error in Pennsylvania

2023(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 985 C.D. 2021, filed July 15, 2022), slip op. at 12.7 7 Unreported panel decisions of this Court may be cited for their persuasive value pursuant to Rule 126(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P 126(b)(1)-(2), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 (a). 11 DHS argues that the Court here should follow Aaron’s in which this Court held that an egregious violation can justify revocation without a provisional license. 541 A.2d at 65 .

2020See Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B)(1) (“Under extraordinary circumstances, when the interests of justice require, the trial judge may, before sentencing, hear an oral motion in arrest of judgment, for a judgment of acquittal, or for a new trial”) (emphasis added).2 ____________________________________________ 2 The comment to this rule provides that it: is intended to allow the trial judge the opportunity to address only those errors so manifest that immediate relief is essential. . . . [T]he basic purpose of the rule [is as follows:] when there has been an egregious error in the proceedings, the interes

2017We reject Appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth’s violation here rose to that level. - 10 - J-A21009-17 In Commonwealth v. Gordon, 528 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. 1987), the defense learned, during trial, that a police officer had prepared a report which had not been disclosed by the Commonwealth during pre-trial discovery.

2007Thus appellant’s confession, when studied in the light of the [Commonwealth v. ]Christmas[, 502 Pa. 218 , 465 A.2d 989 (1983)] standard, does not appear to have been an egregious violation of his rights.

2007Thus appellant’s confession, when studied in the light of the [Commonwealth v. ]Christmas[, 502 Pa. 218 , 465 A.2d 989 (1983)] standard, does not appear to have been an egregious violation of his rights.

2007We conclude that the confession was voluntarily made. 873 A.2d at 726 , quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 432 Pa.Super. 693 , 635 A.2d 209 (1993) (unpublished memorandum, No. 3312 PHL 1992, filed August 20, 1993, at p. 7), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 632 , 642 A.2d 485 (1994). 5 .

1987Justice Hutchinson reiterated the appropriate standard of appellate review in Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), 498 Pa. 263 , 445 A.2d 1212 (1982), wherein we state: Previous cases have set forth the scope of review where, as here, the fact finder’s decision is against the party having the burden of proof in terms such as “capricious disregard of competent evidence”, Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446 , 246 A.2d 668 (1968), “willful disbelief of otherwise credible evidence”, Bullock v. Building Maintenance Inc., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 539 , 297 A.2d 520 (1972) or int

1987Justice Hutchinson reiterated the appropriate standard of appellate review in Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), 498 Pa. 263 , 445 A.2d 1212 (1982), wherein we state: Previous cases have set forth the scope of review where, as here, the fact finder’s decision is against the party having the burden of proof in terms such as “capricious disregard of competent evidence”, Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446 , 246 A.2d 668 (1968), “willful disbelief of otherwise credible evidence”, Bullock v. Building Maintenance Inc., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 539 , 297 A.2d 520 (1972) or int

1987In dictum, however, he made an egregious error by stating: “. . . this court has held that such testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt and that ... in a proper case the jury should be so instructed.” Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476 (citing Edgington, supra) (emphasis added).

1987Justice Hutchinson reiterated the appropriate standard of appellate review in Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), 498 Pa. 263 , 445 A.2d 1212 (1982), wherein we state: Previous cases have set forth the scope of review where, as here, the fact finder’s decision is against the party having the burden of proof in terms such as “capricious disregard of competent evidence”, Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446 , 246 A.2d 668 (1968), “willful disbelief of otherwise credible evidence”, Bullock v. Building Maintenance Inc., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 539 , 297 A.2d 520 (1972) or int

1987Justice Hutchinson reiterated the appropriate standard of appellate review in Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), 498 Pa. 263 , 445 A.2d 1212 (1982), wherein we state: Previous cases have set forth the scope of review where, as here, the fact finder’s decision is against the party having the burden of proof in terms such as “capricious disregard of competent evidence”, Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446 , 246 A.2d 668 (1968), “willful disbelief of otherwise credible evidence”, Bullock v. Building Maintenance Inc., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 539 , 297 A.2d 520 (1972) or int

1987Justice Hutchinson reiterated the appropriate standard of appellate review in Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), 498 Pa. 263 , 445 A.2d 1212 (1982), wherein we state: Previous cases have set forth the scope of review where, as here, the fact finder’s decision is against the party having the burden of proof in terms such as “capricious disregard of competent evidence”, Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446 , 246 A.2d 668 (1968), “willful disbelief of otherwise credible evidence”, Bullock v. Building Maintenance Inc., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 539 , 297 A.2d 520 (1972) or int

1987Justice Hutchinson reiterated the appropriate standard of appellate review in Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), 498 Pa. 263 , 445 A.2d 1212 (1982), wherein we state: Previous cases have set forth the scope of review where, as here, the fact finder’s decision is against the party having the burden of proof in terms such as “capricious disregard of competent evidence”, Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446 , 246 A.2d 668 (1968), “willful disbelief of otherwise credible evidence”, Bullock v. Building Maintenance Inc., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 539 , 297 A.2d 520 (1972) or int

1980See also: Troiani Bros. v. Pa. P.U.C., 488 Pa. 386 , 412 A.2d 562 (1980) (to allow intervention at this stage would preclude the inferior tribunal from considering in the first instance an objection to its jurisdiction); Akron Borough v. Pa. P.U.C., 453 Pa. 554 , 310 A.2d 271 (1973) (the court did not find that the trouble and expense caused by participating in a commission proceeding and leading to a final appealable order makes the remedy of appeal less than adequate).

1980See also: Troiani Bros. v. Pa. P.U.C., 488 Pa. 386 , 412 A.2d 562 (1980) (to allow intervention at this stage would preclude the inferior tribunal from considering in the first instance an objection to its jurisdiction); Akron Borough v. Pa. P.U.C., 453 Pa. 554 , 310 A.2d 271 (1973) (the court did not find that the trouble and expense caused by participating in a commission proceeding and leading to a final appealable order makes the remedy of appeal less than adequate).

1980See also: Troiani Bros. v. Pa. P.U.C., 488 Pa. 386 , 412 A.2d 562 (1980) (to allow intervention at this stage would preclude the inferior tribunal from considering in the first instance an objection to its jurisdiction); Akron Borough v. Pa. P.U.C., 453 Pa. 554 , 310 A.2d 271 (1973) (the court did not find that the trouble and expense caused by participating in a commission proceeding and leading to a final appealable order makes the remedy of appeal less than adequate).

1980See also: Troiani Bros. v. Pa. P.U.C., 488 Pa. 386 , 412 A.2d 562 (1980) (to allow intervention at this stage would preclude the inferior tribunal from considering in the first instance an objection to its jurisdiction); Akron Borough v. Pa. P.U.C., 453 Pa. 554 , 310 A.2d 271 (1973) (the court did not find that the trouble and expense caused by participating in a commission proceeding and leading to a final appealable order makes the remedy of appeal less than adequate).