egregious violation (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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egregious violation in Indiana

14 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Hanson v. Spolnikgreen
indctapp · 1997 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2005–2017
2 sentences

2012However, this court has held that a parent’s egregious violation of a custody order or behavior towards another parent, which places a child’s welfare at stake, can support a trial court’s modification of its custody order.” Id. at 78 .

2005"However, this court has held that a parent's egregious violation of a custody order or behavior towards another parent, which places a child's welfare at stake, can support a trial court's modification of its custody order." Id.

24
Bruce Ryan v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2014 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019E.g., Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014).

11
State v. Mooregreen
ind · 1997 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See Moore, 678 N.E.2d at 1261 (providing that while egregious error may amount to grounds for a reversal, we will not second-guess strategic tactical decisions made by counsel at trial).

11
Buck v. P. J. T.green
indctapp · 1979 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004T., 182 Ind.App. 71, 75 , 394 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1979), "[when the warrant lacks legal purpose, its existence serves only as an impermissible barrier to due process." We are not holding that every seizure, based on an arrest prompted by a computer mistake, warrants suppression of evidence, but the facts here clearly constitute an egregious violation of due process.

2004T., 182 Ind.App. 71, 75 , 394 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1979), "[when the warrant lacks legal purpose, its existence serves only as an impermissible barrier to due process." We are not holding that every seizure, based on an arrest prompted by a computer mistake, warrants suppression of evidence, but the facts here clearly constitute an egregious violation of due process.

11
Marriage of Needham v. Needhamgreen
indctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997Pierce v. Pierce, 620 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993), trans. denied; see also Needham v. Needham, 408 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) (antagonism between parents and mother’s attempts to “poison” father in mind of children supported modification of custody).

1997Pierce v. Pierce, 620 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993), trans. denied; see also Needham v. Needham, 408 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) (antagonism between parents and mother's attempts to "poison" father in mind of children supported modification of custody).

11
Pierce v. Piercegreen
indctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997Pierce v. Pierce, 620 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993), trans. denied; see also Needham v. Needham, 408 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) (antagonism between parents and mother’s attempts to “poison” father in mind of children supported modification of custody).

1997Pierce v. Pierce, 620 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993), trans. denied; see also Needham v. Needham, 408 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) (antagonism between parents and mother's attempts to "poison" father in mind of children supported modification of custody).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Leon-Roche v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division neutral
indctapp · 1981
2 sentences

1981The Fourth District, on the other hand, takes the view that the failure to advise is such an egregious error that it can never be harmless, Leon-Roche, supra, relying on Doe v. Hampton, (D.C. Cir.1977) 566 F.2d 265 .

1981The Fourth District, on the other hand, takes the view that the failure to advise is such an egregious error that it can never be harmless, Leon-Roche, supra, relying on Doe v. Hampton, (D.C.Cir.1977) 566 F.2d 265 .

21981–1981
Jane Doe v. Robert E. Hampton, Individually and as Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission green
cadc · 1977
2 sentences

1981The Fourth District, on the other hand, takes the view that the failure to advise is such an egregious error that it can never be harmless, Leon-Roche, supra, relying on Doe v. Hampton, (D.C. Cir.1977) 566 F.2d 265 .

1981The Fourth District, on the other hand, takes the view that the failure to advise is such an egregious error that it can never be harmless, Leon-Roche, supra, relying on Doe v. Hampton, (D.C.Cir.1977) 566 F.2d 265 .

21981–1981
State v. Peña Fuentes green
wash · 2014
1 sentence

2015Id. (citing State v. Cory, 62 Wash.2d 371 , 882 P.2d 1019 (1963)). 8 The Fuentes Court went on to determine the presumption of prejudice was, however, rebuttable: “[w]hile eavesdropping on attorney-client conversations is an egregious violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights and cannot be permitted, there are rare circumstances where there is no possibility of prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

12015–2015
Cardwell v. State green
ind · 2008
1 sentence

2015In some of the calls, Trahan asked Cindy to contact his lawyer in order to help him with his charges in Case No. 92. [11] Trahan concedes that his character, as reflected by his criminal history, “indicates some difficulty in abiding by the law.” Id.

12015–2015
State v. Cory green
wash · 1963
2 sentences

2015Id. (citing State v. Cory, 62 Wash.2d 371 , 882 P.2d 1019 (1963)). 8 The Fuentes Court went on to determine the presumption of prejudice was, however, rebuttable: “[w]hile eavesdropping on attorney-client conversations is an egregious violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights and cannot be permitted, there are rare circumstances where there is no possibility of prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

2015Id. (citing State v. Cory, 382 P.2d 1019 (Wash. 1963)).8 [53] The Fuentes Court went on to determine the presumption of prejudice was, however, rebuttable: “[w]hile eavesdropping on attorney-client conversations is an egregious violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights and cannot be permitted, there are rare circumstances where there is no possibility of prejudice to the defendant.” Id. [54] When there is such police eavesdropping, the Fuentes Court determined, the State has the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced: The constitutional right to p

12015–2015
Doyle v. Ohio green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

2014With respect to the court’s admonition, Shewmaker argued that no admonition could cure the State’s egregious violation of the rule articulated in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), and that the State’s use of his post-Miranda silence went to the heart of the case. 13 The State maintains that the court properly denied the motion for mistrial, and that the prosecutor limited his impeachment of Shewmaker’s silence to his pre-Miranda silence by questioning him only as to his failure to make a self-defense claim to House and Officer Gilley.

2014With respect to the court’s admonition, Shewmaker argued that no admonition could cure the State’s egregious violation of the rule articulated in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), and that the State’s use of his post-Miranda silence went to the heart of the case. 13 The State maintains that the court properly denied the motion for mistrial, and that the prosecutor limited his impeachment of Shewmaker’s silence to his pre-Miranda silence by questioning him only as to his failure to make a self-defense claim to House and Officer Gilley.

12014–2014
Ross v. Schubert neutral
indctapp · 1979
2 sentences

1981The petition for rehearing was 30 pages long, contained a lengthy discussion using hypotheticals and argumentative allegations, brashly characterized the court’s ear-, lier opinion as “ ‘faulty, erroneous and pure balderdash’ . . .,” and was not accompanied by a brief. 396 N.E.2d at 148 .

1981Ross v. Schubert, (1979) Ind.App., 396 N.E.2d 147 , trans. denied, involved an egregious violation of A.R. 11(A).

11981–1981

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 229 (1985–2026) IL 25 (1979–2026) OR 23 (1978–2023) NY 20 (1967–2024) WA 14 (1985–2024) IN 14 (1981–2019) MD 11 (1977–2022) TN 10 (1988–2016) PA 10 (1980–2026) CA 9 (1968–2020) CT 9 (1997–2025) FL 8 (1982–2018) WI 7 (1978–2024) NC 6 (2007–2023) OH 5 (1992–2023) NV 5 (1998–2021) MI 5 (1973–2020) MO 4 (1891–2019) LA 4 (1987–2004) GA 4 (1996–2008) AR 4 (1994–2021) WV 3 (1995–2026) MS 3 (1990–2007) KY 3 (1990–2026) AZ 3 (1994–2025) NJ 3 (1989–2023) ID 2 (1995–1995) IA 2 (2008–2008) CO 2 (1989–2026) DC 2 (1989–2003) HI 2 (2005–2023) MA 2 (1981–2008) AK 2 (1985–2002)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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