8 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lusk Corporation v. Burgessgreen2 sentences2026See Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 93 (1958) (recognizing well-settled principle “that a party can not free himself from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract”); Vaughey v. Thompson, 95 Ariz. 139, 142 (1963) (noting the “rule of merger has several important exceptions,” including fraud); Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 480 (1976) (emphasizing that the presence of a merger provision in a contract does not bar proof of fraud in the inducement); see also Soli v. Soli, 534 N.W.2d 21, 23 (N.D. 1995) (holding that the doctrine of merger does not bar reopening a proper 1987Further, it is well-settled that a party “can not free himself from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract.” Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. at 93 , 332 P.2d at 495 . | 1 | 2 |
Vaughey v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2026See Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 93 (1958) (recognizing well-settled principle “that a party can not free himself from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract”); Vaughey v. Thompson, 95 Ariz. 139, 142 (1963) (noting the “rule of merger has several important exceptions,” including fraud); Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 480 (1976) (emphasizing that the presence of a merger provision in a contract does not bar proof of fraud in the inducement); see also Soli v. Soli, 534 N.W.2d 21, 23 (N.D. 1995) (holding that the doctrine of merger does not bar reopening a proper | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2026See Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 93 (1958) (recognizing well-settled principle “that a party can not free himself from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract”); Vaughey v. Thompson, 95 Ariz. 139, 142 (1963) (noting the “rule of merger has several important exceptions,” including fraud); Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 480 (1976) (emphasizing that the presence of a merger provision in a contract does not bar proof of fraud in the inducement); see also Soli v. Soli, 534 N.W.2d 21, 23 (N.D. 1995) (holding that the doctrine of merger does not bar reopening a proper | 1 | 1 |
Soli v. Soligreen1 sentence2026See Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 93 (1958) (recognizing well-settled principle “that a party can not free himself from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract”); Vaughey v. Thompson, 95 Ariz. 139, 142 (1963) (noting the “rule of merger has several important exceptions,” including fraud); Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 480 (1976) (emphasizing that the presence of a merger provision in a contract does not bar proof of fraud in the inducement); see also Soli v. Soli, 534 N.W.2d 21, 23 (N.D. 1995) (holding that the doctrine of merger does not bar reopening a proper | 1 | 1 |
SICIGNANO, III, HENRY v. DIXEY, LARAMIE N.green1 sentence2026See Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 93 (1958) (recognizing well-settled principle “that a party can not free himself from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract”); Vaughey v. Thompson, 95 Ariz. 139, 142 (1963) (noting the “rule of merger has several important exceptions,” including fraud); Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 480 (1976) (emphasizing that the presence of a merger provision in a contract does not bar proof of fraud in the inducement); see also Soli v. Soli, 534 N.W.2d 21, 23 (N.D. 1995) (holding that the doctrine of merger does not bar reopening a proper | 1 | 1 |
United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2023Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 261 (App. 1983). ¶17 Though the promissory note did not include an integration clause, an integration clause is simply one factor that may indicate whether full integration was intended. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Preferred Stock Food Markets, Inc.green1 sentence2023See Anderson, 175 Ariz. at 210–11. | 1 | 1 |
Republic Insurance v. Feidlergreen1 sentence2021Co. v. Feilder, 178 Ariz. 528, 534 (App. 1993) also is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
McNeil v. Attawaygreen1 sentence2018See McNeil v. Attaway, 87 Ariz. 103, 110 (1959) (“Proof of [a pre-existing] agreement is essential in a reformation action, since the purpose of such action is to conform the instrument to the actual contract negotiated by the parties); see also Hackin v. Pioneer Plumbing Supply Co., 10 Ariz. App. 150, 158 (1969) (trial court did not err in denying reformation when substantial evidence supported trial court’s finding that agreement executed included all terms mutually agreed upon). ¶30 If we were to adopt Gateway’s interpretation of reformation, after a court found by clear and convincing evid | 1 | 1 |
Hackin v. Pioneer Plumbing Supply Co.green1 sentence2018See McNeil v. Attaway, 87 Ariz. 103, 110 (1959) (“Proof of [a pre-existing] agreement is essential in a reformation action, since the purpose of such action is to conform the instrument to the actual contract negotiated by the parties); see also Hackin v. Pioneer Plumbing Supply Co., 10 Ariz. App. 150, 158 (1969) (trial court did not err in denying reformation when substantial evidence supported trial court’s finding that agreement executed included all terms mutually agreed upon). ¶30 If we were to adopt Gateway’s interpretation of reformation, after a court found by clear and convincing evid | 1 | 1 |
Strategic Development & Construction, Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLCgreen2 sentences2018Ctr., LP v. Callaway , 226 Ariz. 287 , 289, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d 938 , 940 (App. 2010) (holding that "even if a document is not attached to the complaint, if it is central to the claim, the court may consider it without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment"); see also Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLC , 224 Ariz. 60 , 64, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 1046 , 1050 (App. 2010) (holding that it is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) to consider a "document that is central to the complaint" but was not appended to the complaint). ¶ 13 Second, Dunn's argument that the 2018Ctr., LP v. Callaway , 226 Ariz. 287 , 289, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d 938 , 940 (App. 2010) (holding that "even if a document is not attached to the complaint, if it is central to the claim, the court may consider it without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment"); see also Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLC , 224 Ariz. 60 , 64, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 1046 , 1050 (App. 2010) (holding that it is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) to consider a "document that is central to the complaint" but was not appended to the complaint). ¶ 13 Second, Dunn's argument that the | 1 | 1 |
Fish v. Tandy Corp.green1 sentence2018Corp. , 138 Ariz. 514 , 519, 675 P.2d 1333 , 1338 (App. 1983) (rejecting an assertion that a third-party beneficiary "is considered a party" to a contract for purposes of determining whether a written agreement superseded a separate oral contact); see also Fish v. Tandy Corp. , 948 S.W.2d 886 , 899 (Tex. App. 1997) ("In the present case, as a matter of law, the letter agreement and the distribution agreement cannot merge because the two agreements are between different parties."). ¶ 21 Accordingly, the superior court did not err in finding that the integration clause in the Separation Agreemen | 1 | 1 |
Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc., 206 Ariz. 264, ¶ 12 , 77 P.3d 439, ¶ 12 (2003) (with few limitations, parties of relatively equal bargaining power may determine the terms of their contractual arrangements); Irwin v. Pac. 2004See Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc., 206 Ariz. 264, ¶ 12 , 77 P.3d 439, ¶ 12 (2003) (with few limitations, parties of relatively equal bargaining power may determine the terms of their contractual arrangements); Irwin v. Pac. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Suciu v. AMFAC Distributing Corp.
green
2 sentences2018Corp. , 138 Ariz. 514 , 519, 675 P.2d 1333 , 1338 (App. 1983) (rejecting an assertion that a third-party beneficiary "is considered a party" to a contract for purposes of determining whether a written agreement superseded a separate oral contact); see also Fish v. Tandy Corp. , 948 S.W.2d 886 , 899 (Tex. App. 1997) ("In the present case, as a matter of law, the letter agreement and the distribution agreement cannot merge because the two agreements are between different parties."). ¶ 21 Accordingly, the superior court did not err in finding that the integration clause in the Separation Agreemen 2018Corp. , 138 Ariz. 514 , 519, 675 P.2d 1333 , 1338 (App. 1983) (rejecting an assertion that a third-party beneficiary "is considered a party" to a contract for purposes of determining whether a written agreement superseded a separate oral contact); see also Fish v. Tandy Corp. , 948 S.W.2d 886 , 899 (Tex. App. 1997) ("In the present case, as a matter of law, the letter agreement and the distribution agreement cannot merge because the two agreements are between different parties."). ¶ 21 Accordingly, the superior court did not err in finding that the integration clause in the Separation Agreemen | 1 | 2018–2018 |
ELM RETIREMENT CENTER, LP v. Callaway
green
2 sentences2018Ctr., LP v. Callaway , 226 Ariz. 287 , 289, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d 938 , 940 (App. 2010) (holding that "even if a document is not attached to the complaint, if it is central to the claim, the court may consider it without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment"); see also Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLC , 224 Ariz. 60 , 64, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 1046 , 1050 (App. 2010) (holding that it is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) to consider a "document that is central to the complaint" but was not appended to the complaint). ¶ 13 Second, Dunn's argument that the 2018Ctr., LP v. Callaway , 226 Ariz. 287 , 289, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d 938 , 940 (App. 2010) (holding that "even if a document is not attached to the complaint, if it is central to the claim, the court may consider it without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment"); see also Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLC , 224 Ariz. 60 , 64, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 1046 , 1050 (App. 2010) (holding that it is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) to consider a "document that is central to the complaint" but was not appended to the complaint). ¶ 13 Second, Dunn's argument that the | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
2 sentences1994Integration Clause Although parties may contractually disclaim potential tort liability by a clear expression of intent to do so, Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Disk v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 143 Ariz. 368 , 694 P.2d 198 (1984), our courts have carved out an exception for cases involving fraud. 1994Integration Clause Although parties may contractually disclaim potential tort liability by a clear expression of intent to do so, Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Disk v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 143 Ariz. 368 , 694 P.2d 198 (1984), our courts have carved out an exception for cases involving fraud. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hill v. Jones
green
2 sentences1994Relying on Lufty , Division One of this court reversed, holding that “the clause could not shield sellers from liability should buyers be able to prove fraud.” Hill, 151 Ariz. at 83 , 725 P.2d at 1117 . 1994Relying on Lufty , Division One of this court reversed, holding that “the clause could not shield sellers from liability should buyers be able to prove fraud.” Hill, 151 Ariz. at 83 , 725 P.2d at 1117 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lutfy v. R. D. Roper & Sons Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1994In finding the integration clause unenforceable, the court concluded that “any provision in a contract making it possible for a party thereto to free himself from the consequences of his own fraud in procuring its execution is invalid and necessarily constitutes no defense.” 57 Ariz. at 506 , 115 P.2d at 166 . 1994In finding the integration clause unenforceable, the court concluded that “any provision in a contract making it possible for a party thereto to free himself from the consequences of his own fraud in procuring its execution is invalid and necessarily constitutes no defense.” 57 Ariz. at 506 , 115 P.2d at 166 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.