context of an administrative hearing in California

1990For example, an adjacent property owner may *1352 testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.’ (Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .)” (183 Cal.App.3d at p. 246, fn. 8.) Here, a man who had leased adjacent property for seven years wrote the Supervisors on December 6, asserting that in his experience, “Pulling on to Carmel Valley Road from this area is a nightmare ....

1986For example, an adjacent property owner may testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .) 9 Dr. Curry’s approach, not surprisingly, was debunked by Mission Ranch’s hydrologist, Dr. Ray Lindsley, who advocated the Fox demarcation line. 10 Section 2.3.3.5 provides that field surveys by qualified individuals or agencies be required in order to determine precise locations of the habitat, and 2.3.3.1 is the wetlands definition quoted above. 12 Markley v. City Council (1982)

1988Section 3303, subdivision (g) provides: “If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense, he shall be immediately informed of his constitutional rights.” We determined that, in the context of an administrative inquiry into possible criminal misconduct, the officer’s “constitutional rights” consisted of the basic Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]), as modified by the principles of Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra, 414 U.S. at pages 77-79 [38 L.Ed

1988Section 3303, subdivision (g) provides: “If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense, he shall be immediately informed of his constitutional rights.” We determined that, in the context of an administrative inquiry into possible criminal misconduct, the officer’s “constitutional rights” consisted of the basic Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]), as modified by the principles of Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra, 414 U.S. at pages 77-79 [38 L.Ed

2019Nevertheless, there is no discussion in the EIR of the Three-Foot Cyclist law, and no analysis of the significant risk to motorists and cyclists that will be caused by the General Plan’s Mobility Policy that allows unmitigated LOS F conditions on narrow residential streets.” While personal observations are evidence that may properly be considered in the context of an administrative hearing, “ ‘in the absence of a specific factual foundation in the record, dire predictions by nonexperts regarding the consequences of a project do not constitute substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Unsubstantiated

1999In Lentz , the court held that a recipient of welfare benefits may assert the equitable estoppel defense in the context of an administrative hearing of the Department of Social Services (DSS). ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The court further held that the statutory scheme contemplates the application of the equitable estoppel defense. ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The holding in Lentz does not stand for the all-encompassing conclusion that equitable principles apply to all administrative proceedings.

1999In Lentz , the court held that a recipient of welfare benefits may assert the equitable estoppel defense in the context of an administrative hearing of the Department of Social Services (DSS). ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The court further held that the statutory scheme contemplates the application of the equitable estoppel defense. ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The holding in Lentz does not stand for the all-encompassing conclusion that equitable principles apply to all administrative proceedings.

1999In Curtin v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 481 , 176 Cal. Rptr. 690 , the court discussed equitable principles in the context of an administrative per se proceeding conducted to review the suspension of an individual's driver's license.

1999In Curtin v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 481 , 176 Cal. Rptr. 690 , the court discussed equitable principles in the context of an administrative per se proceeding conducted to review the suspension of an individual's driver's license.

1988Section 3303, subdivision (g) provides: “If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense, he shall be immediately informed of his constitutional rights.” We determined that, in the context of an administrative inquiry into possible criminal misconduct, the officer’s “constitutional rights” consisted of the basic Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]), as modified by the principles of Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra, 414 U.S. at pages 77-79 [38 L.Ed

1988“In other words, [Officer Lybarger] should have been told, among other things, that although he had the right to remain silent and not incriminate himself, (1) his silence could be deemed insubordination, leading to administrative discipline, and (2) any statement made under the compulsion of the threat of such discipline could not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding. [Citations.]” (Lybarger, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 829 .) 3 We noted that Officer Lybarger was properly informed of the consequences of remaining silent, but was not told that any statements he made could not b

1986For example, an adjacent property owner may testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .) 9 Dr. Curry’s approach, not surprisingly, was debunked by Mission Ranch’s hydrologist, Dr. Ray Lindsley, who advocated the Fox demarcation line. 10 Section 2.3.3.5 provides that field surveys by qualified individuals or agencies be required in order to determine precise locations of the habitat, and 2.3.3.1 is the wetlands definition quoted above. 12 Markley v. City Council (1982)

1986For example, an adjacent property owner may testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .) 9 Dr. Curry’s approach, not surprisingly, was debunked by Mission Ranch’s hydrologist, Dr. Ray Lindsley, who advocated the Fox demarcation line. 10 Section 2.3.3.5 provides that field surveys by qualified individuals or agencies be required in order to determine precise locations of the habitat, and 2.3.3.1 is the wetlands definition quoted above. 12 Markley v. City Council (1982)

1986For example, an adjacent property owner may testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .) 9 Dr. Curry’s approach, not surprisingly, was debunked by Mission Ranch’s hydrologist, Dr. Ray Lindsley, who advocated the Fox demarcation line. 10 Section 2.3.3.5 provides that field surveys by qualified individuals or agencies be required in order to determine precise locations of the habitat, and 2.3.3.1 is the wetlands definition quoted above. 12 Markley v. City Council (1982)

1986For example, an adjacent property owner may testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .) 9 Dr. Curry’s approach, not surprisingly, was debunked by Mission Ranch’s hydrologist, Dr. Ray Lindsley, who advocated the Fox demarcation line. 10 Section 2.3.3.5 provides that field surveys by qualified individuals or agencies be required in order to determine precise locations of the habitat, and 2.3.3.1 is the wetlands definition quoted above. 12 Markley v. City Council (1982)

1986For example, an adjacent property owner may testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .) 9 Dr. Curry’s approach, not surprisingly, was debunked by Mission Ranch’s hydrologist, Dr. Ray Lindsley, who advocated the Fox demarcation line. 10 Section 2.3.3.5 provides that field surveys by qualified individuals or agencies be required in order to determine precise locations of the habitat, and 2.3.3.1 is the wetlands definition quoted above. 12 Markley v. City Council (1982)

1986For example, an adjacent property owner may testify to traffic conditions based upon personal knowledge.” (Citizens Assn, for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 173 .) 9 Dr. Curry’s approach, not surprisingly, was debunked by Mission Ranch’s hydrologist, Dr. Ray Lindsley, who advocated the Fox demarcation line. 10 Section 2.3.3.5 provides that field surveys by qualified individuals or agencies be required in order to determine precise locations of the habitat, and 2.3.3.1 is the wetlands definition quoted above. 12 Markley v. City Council (1982)