order directing hearing (California) · Go Syfert
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order directing hearing in California

8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
San Bernardino County Department of Public Social Services v. Servando M.green
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

22
Merced County Department of Social Services v. Christopher W.green
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

22
In Re Eli F.green
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

22
JENNIFER T. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Jennifer T., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 259-260; In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 248-249; In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 722 .) Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3)(A) provides: “A trial court, after issuance of an order directing a hearing pursuant to this section be held, shall advise all parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review as set forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues.

2015(Jennifer T., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 259-260; In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 248-249; In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 722 .) Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3)(A) provides: “A trial court, after issuance of an order directing a hearing pursuant to this section be held, shall advise all parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review as set forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues.

13
KARL S. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998(Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) However, a parent “in default by the filing of a late notice of intent may obtain relief from that default for good cause shown.” (Jonathan M. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ]; Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) To ensure that a parent aggrieved by a setting order is made aware of the requirements of the statute and its impact on the parent’s right to appellate review of such an order, section 366.26, subdivision (Z)(3)(A), directs the juvenile court to give appropriate notice to the parties, as foll

1998(Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) However, a parent “in default by the filing of a late notice of intent may obtain relief from that default for good cause shown.” (Jonathan M. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ]; Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) To ensure that a parent aggrieved by a setting order is made aware of the requirements of the statute and its impact on the parent’s right to appellate review of such an order, section 366.26, subdivision (Z)(3)(A), directs the juvenile court to give appropriate notice to the parties, as foll

11
Jonathan M. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998(Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) However, a parent “in default by the filing of a late notice of intent may obtain relief from that default for good cause shown.” (Jonathan M. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ]; Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) To ensure that a parent aggrieved by a setting order is made aware of the requirements of the statute and its impact on the parent’s right to appellate review of such an order, section 366.26, subdivision (Z)(3)(A), directs the juvenile court to give appropriate notice to the parties, as foll

1998(Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) However, a parent “in default by the filing of a late notice of intent may obtain relief from that default for good cause shown.” (Jonathan M. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ]; Karl S., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) To ensure that a parent aggrieved by a setting order is made aware of the requirements of the statute and its impact on the parent’s right to appellate review of such an order, section 366.26, subdivision (Z)(3)(A), directs the juvenile court to give appropriate notice to the parties, as foll

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Merced County Department of Social Services v. Christopher W.green
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

1992(Cf. In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 553, 562-563 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 ]; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ]; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 453 ] [construing § 366.25, subd. (j)].) [4] A claim that the court erred in terminating reunification services is not cognizable in an appeal from an order authorizing a termination action, as it is designed to overturn the court's order referring that matter for a termination hearing. ( Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at p. 246 .) There is a split of authority regar

12

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Cathina W. v. Bessie W. green
calctapp · 1998
2 sentences

2015(Jennifer T., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 259-260; In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 248-249; In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 722 .) Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3)(A) provides: “A trial court, after issuance of an order directing a hearing pursuant to this section be held, shall advise all parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review as set forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues.

2015(Jennifer T., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 259-260; In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 248-249; In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 722 .) Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3)(A) provides: “A trial court, after issuance of an order directing a hearing pursuant to this section be held, shall advise all parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review as set forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues.

22015–2015
Miller & Lux Inc. v. James green
· 1919
1 sentence

2021And in Miller & Lux v. James (1919) 180 Cal. 38, 48 , we explained that an initial decision rendered on appeal was vacated by the order granting a rehearing.

12021–2021
Gray v. Cotton green
cal · 1913
1 sentence

2021The opinion subsequent to the reargument constitutes the exposition of the law applicable to the facts of the case, and the only one to which the attention of the Court can be directed.” (Id. at p. 276.) Likewise, in Gray v. Cotton (1913) 166 Cal. 130, 138 , we held that it was error for the appellants to rely on a department decision “which never became final, but was vacated by an order directing a hearing in Bank,” and “[t]he court in Bank subsequently reached a different conclusion from that announced in department” (id. at pp. 138–139).

12021–2021
In Re Merrick green
calctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2015(Cf. In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235 , 247–249 [appellate court reviewed mother’s claims on appeal from setting order because court failed to orally provide her with notice of the writ requirement]; Jennifer T. v. Superior Court (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 254, 260 (Jennifer T.) [where juvenile court failed to orally advise mother of her writ rights, appellate court construed purported appeal from order setting § 366.26 hearing as a standard petition for writ of mandate ‘without regard to the shortened period for writ 4 Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3) provides in pertinent part: ““Th

12015–2015
Santa Clara County Department of Family & Children's Services v. F.S. green
calctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2015This notice shall be made orally to a party if the party is present at the time of the making of the order or by first-class mail by the clerk of the court to the last known address of a party not present at the time of the making of the order.” (Italics added.) 9. review that would otherwise be applicable ([California Rules of Court,] [r]ules 8.450, 8.452.)’].)” (In re A.H. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 337, 350 , fn. omitted.) Father asserts that because he was not given an oral advisement and the juvenile court did not make an oral ICWA finding, it was unlikely he knew he needed to file a writ wit

12015–2015
Sganga v. Township of Teaneck neutral
nj · 1943
2 sentences

1952In Sganga v. Teaneck Tp., 130 N.J.L. 218 [ 32 A.2d 505 ], there was no discharge involved.

1952In Sganga v. Teaneck Tp., 130 N.J.L. 218 [ 32 A.2d 505 ], there was no discharge involved.

11952–1952
In re Carney neutral
va · 1944
2 sentences

1952In In re Carney, 182 Va. 907 [ 30 S.E.2d 789 ], the act involved provided that: "Whenever the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia shall have reasonable cause to believe that the judge of any court of record in this State ... is afflicted with an illness or disability, mental or physical, which renders such judge ... permanently incapacitated or incompetent to discharge the duties of his office, it shall be the duty of the Court to enter an order directing an inquiry to determine such judge's ... capacity and competency. ..." (Italics added.) This case involved a situation where there was spec

1952In In re Carney, 182 Va. 907 [ 30 S.E.2d 789 ], the act involved provided that: "Whenever the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia shall have reasonable cause to believe that the judge of any court of record in this State ... is afflicted with an illness or disability, mental or physical, which renders such judge ... permanently incapacitated or incompetent to discharge the duties of his office, it shall be the duty of the Court to enter an order directing an inquiry to determine such judge's ... capacity and competency. ..." (Italics added.) This case involved a situation where there was spec

11952–1952

Where else courts name it

NY 41 (1952–2025) CA 8 (1952–2021) PA 4 (1947–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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