unfair competition claim in California

2010In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court held that in the context of an unfair competition claim by a competitor, the term ‘unfair’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 ‘means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) The court also held that ‘to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protect

2010In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court held that in the context of an unfair competition claim by a competitor, the term ‘unfair’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 ‘means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) The court also held that ‘to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protect

2014Whether a practice is deceptive or fraudulent is “one question of fact, requiring consideration and weighing of evidence from both sides before it can be resolved.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1472 .) Though the jury found Nguyen and Rallis had made false representations of fact regarding the status of the cashier’s check and the funds in the IOLTA, it also found those employees had reasonable grounds for believing the false representations were true.

2007A perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable under” ’ the UCL.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ].) “Unfairness” under section 17200 has been described as violating established public policy or “is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” (McKell, at p. 1473; see also Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 680 [ 43 Cal

2023Code,] §§ 17204, 17535.) ‘The phrase “as a result of” in its plain and ordinary sense means “caused by” and requires a showing of a causal connection or reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.’ (Hall v. Time Inc. [(2008)] 158 Cal.App.4th [847,] 855; see also Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. [(2009)] 171 Cal.App.4th [1305,] 1349 [‘the phrase “as a result of” connotes an element of causation (i.e., [plaintiff] lost money because of [defendants’] unfair competition)’]; Medina v. Safe-Guard Products, Internat., Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 105, 115 [‘the “as a result” language imports a reliance or

2011Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 105, 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 ] [“the ‘as a result’ language imports a reliance or causation element into” § 17204].) This commonsense reading of the language mirrors how we have interpreted the same language in other consumer protection statutes such as the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ.

2021(City of Redlands v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 398, 416 [“a court may not issue a broad injunction to simply obey the law . . 24 .”]; Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 752 [same].) Thus, the trial court properly dismissed the hospitals’ unfair competition claim to the extent it sought injunctive relief but erred in dismissing that claim to the extent it sought restitution.9 The latter error was harmless, however, given that the hospitals were able to effectively pursue restitution as part of their quantum meruit claim.

2021(City of Redlands v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 398, 416 [“a court may not issue a broad injunction to simply obey the law . . 24 .”]; Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 752 [same].) Thus, the trial court properly dismissed the hospitals’ unfair competition claim to the extent it sought injunctive relief but erred in dismissing that claim to the extent it sought restitution.9 The latter error was harmless, however, given that the hospitals were able to effectively pursue restitution as part of their quantum meruit claim.

2021(City of Redlands v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 398, 416 [“a court may not issue a broad injunction to simply obey the law . . 24 .”]; Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 752 [same].) Thus, the trial court properly dismissed the hospitals’ unfair competition claim to the extent it sought injunctive relief but erred in dismissing that claim to the extent it sought restitution.9 The latter error was harmless, however, given that the hospitals were able to effectively pursue restitution as part of their quantum meruit claim.

2021(City of Redlands v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 398, 416 [“a court may not issue a broad injunction to simply obey the law . . 24 .”]; Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 752 [same].) Thus, the trial court properly dismissed the hospitals’ unfair competition claim to the extent it sought injunctive relief but erred in dismissing that claim to the extent it sought restitution.9 The latter error was harmless, however, given that the hospitals were able to effectively pursue restitution as part of their quantum meruit claim.

2013But, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the unfair competition claims in this case were “interrelated.” (See Pellegrino v. Robert Half Internat., Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 278 , 288–289; see also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124 , 129–130.) Proof of the unfair competition claim required proof of the vacation policy embodied in section 227.3.

2010Citing Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130 [158 Cal.Rptr.1, 599 P.2d 83 ], the appellate court in Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 448 ], stated: “When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.

2010In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court held that in the context of an unfair competition claim by a competitor, the term ‘unfair’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 ‘means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) The court also held that ‘to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protect

2010In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court held that in the context of an unfair competition claim by a competitor, the term ‘unfair’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 ‘means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) The court also held that ‘to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protect

2007A perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable under” ’ the UCL.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ].) “Unfairness” under section 17200 has been described as violating established public policy or “is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” (McKell, at p. 1473; see also Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 680 [ 43 Cal

2007A perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable under” ’ the UCL.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ].) “Unfairness” under section 17200 has been described as violating established public policy or “is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” (McKell, at p. 1473; see also Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 680 [ 43 Cal

2007Instead, one need only show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-1267 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ]; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ],) 8 When an unfair competition claim is based on an alleged fraudulent business practice—that is, a practice likely to deceive a reasonable consumer—“a plaintiff need not plead the exact language of every deceptive statement; it is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to describe a scheme to mislead customers, and al

2007Instead, one need only show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-1267 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ]; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ],) 8 When an unfair competition claim is based on an alleged fraudulent business practice—that is, a practice likely to deceive a reasonable consumer—“a plaintiff need not plead the exact language of every deceptive statement; it is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to describe a scheme to mislead customers, and al

2014If the Legislature has permitted certain conduct or considered a situation and concluded no action should lie, courts may not override that determination.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 182 .) To the extent Methven’s unfair competition claim was based on “fraud” by bank employees, the evidence did not compel a verdict in his favor as a matter of law.

2014The unfair competition claim fails, because it must be based on violation of a specific underlying law (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 ), and no such violation is properly pleaded in this case.

2020(See, e.g., Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166 [an element of a misrepresentation claim is “resulting damage”]; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 [resulting damage an element for deceit and false promise]; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310 , 320–321 [private standing to bring an unfair competition claim “ ‘is limited to any “person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property” as a result of unfair competition’ ”].) Jason first relies on the same evidence discussed above to argue AAA NCNU misrepre

2015Section 17200 et seq. “requires that a plaintiff’s economic injury come ‘as a result of’ the unfair competition or a violation of the false advertising law. (§§ 17204, 17535.) ‘The phrase “as a result of” in its plain and ordinary sense means “caused by” and requires a showing of a causal connection or reliance on the alleged 4 All subsequent statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code. 10 misrepresentation.’ ” (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 326 .) Section 17500 also requires an individual suing under the statute “to have ‘ “suffered injury in fact” ’ and to have ‘ “lost m

2010In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court held that in the context of an unfair competition claim by a competitor, the term ‘unfair’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 ‘means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) The court also held that ‘to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protect

2010In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court held that in the context of an unfair competition claim by a competitor, the term ‘unfair’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 ‘means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) The court also held that ‘to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protect

2007Instead, one need only show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-1267 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ]; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ],) 8 When an unfair competition claim is based on an alleged fraudulent business practice—that is, a practice likely to deceive a reasonable consumer—“a plaintiff need not plead the exact language of every deceptive statement; it is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to describe a scheme to mislead customers, and al

2007Instead, one need only show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-1267 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ]; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ],) 8 When an unfair competition claim is based on an alleged fraudulent business practice—that is, a practice likely to deceive a reasonable consumer—“a plaintiff need not plead the exact language of every deceptive statement; it is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to describe a scheme to mislead customers, and al

2015Many cases have explained that section 47(b) encompasses not only testimony in court and statements made in pleadings, but also statements made prior to the filing of a lawsuit, whether in preparation for anticipated litigation or to investigate the feasibility of filing a lawsuit. [Citation.]” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 361 (Hagberg).) However, “[a] prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates 20 to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. [Citations.]” (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1251 .) In

2015The plaintiff in Rubin was a co-owner of a mobile home park, who sued a park resident and her attorneys after they sent the co-owner a letter complaining of defects in park operation and giving notice of their intention to sue him. ( Rubin, supra, at p. 1191 .) The amended complaint included an unfair competition claim alleging that the defendant attorneys had a pattern of meeting with mobile home park residents for the purpose of soliciting their participation in litigation against the park owner.

2014(See Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1346 .) Finally, because Mulhearn was not an insured, he cannot state a cause of action against Lawyers Title for declaratory relief regarding his rights and obligations under the 4 Mulhearn did not allege and does not argue that in his individual capacity he is a third party beneficiary of the insurance policy.

2011“As a Result of”: Causation or Reliance Proposition 64 requires that a plaintiff’s economic injury come “as a result of’ the unfair competition or a violation of the false advertising law. (§§ 17204, 17535.) “The phrase ‘as a result of’ in its plain and ordinary sense means ‘caused by’ and requires a showing of a causal connection or reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.” (Hall v. Time Inc., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 ; see also Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 [“the phrase ‘as a result of’ connotes an element of causation (i.e., [plaintiff] lost money

2010In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court held that in the context of an unfair competition claim by a competitor, the term ‘unfair’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 ‘means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’ (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) The court also held that ‘to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protect

2007(See Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1273-1274 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 ] [noting the split of authority and urging the California Supreme Court to resolve it].) This court, however, has followed the line of authority that also requires the allegedly unfair business practice be “tethered” to a legislatively declared policy or has some actual or threatened *1240 impact on competition.

2007A perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable under” ’ the UCL.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ].) “Unfairness” under section 17200 has been described as violating established public policy or “is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” (McKell, at p. 1473; see also Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 680 [ 43 Cal

2007A perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant information, is actionable under” ’ the UCL.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ].) “Unfairness” under section 17200 has been described as violating established public policy or “is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” (McKell, at p. 1473; see also Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 680 [ 43 Cal

2007Instead, one need only show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-1267 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ]; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ],) 8 When an unfair competition claim is based on an alleged fraudulent business practice—that is, a practice likely to deceive a reasonable consumer—“a plaintiff need not plead the exact language of every deceptive statement; it is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to describe a scheme to mislead customers, and al

2007Instead, one need only show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ ” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-1267 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ]; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ],) 8 When an unfair competition claim is based on an alleged fraudulent business practice—that is, a practice likely to deceive a reasonable consumer—“a plaintiff need not plead the exact language of every deceptive statement; it is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to describe a scheme to mislead customers, and al

2023(See Helfend, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 10 [collateral source rule is based on “a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and for other eventualities”].) Williamson suggests people would be encouraged to buy medical insurance if they could use their insurer’s purchase of medication as a source of injury to establish standing for an unfair competition claim.

2021(See Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1060 [“ ‘[i]f the [underlying] claim is dismissed, then there is no “unlawful” act upon which to base[ ] the derivative Unfair Competition claim’ ”].) Because we affirm the judgment in HN’s favor on all of Rebolledo’s other causes of action, we likewise affirm the trial court’s judgment in HN’s favor on Rebolledo’s UCL cause of action. 31 DISPOSITION We affirm the trial court’s judgment in Hombre Nuevo’s favor.

2020(See, e.g., Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166 [an element of a misrepresentation claim is “resulting damage”]; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 [resulting damage an element for deceit and false promise]; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310 , 320–321 [private standing to bring an unfair competition claim “ ‘is limited to any “person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property” as a result of unfair competition’ ”].) Jason first relies on the same evidence discussed above to argue AAA NCNU misrepre

2020(See, e.g., Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166 [an element of a misrepresentation claim is “resulting damage”]; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 [resulting damage an element for deceit and false promise]; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310 , 320–321 [private standing to bring an unfair competition claim “ ‘is limited to any “person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property” as a result of unfair competition’ ”].) Jason first relies on the same evidence discussed above to argue AAA NCNU misrepre