8 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haughwout v. Tordentigreen2 sentences2022See Haughwout v. Tordenti, supra, 332 Conn. 559, 571 (true threats exception ‘‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Pelella, 327 Conn. 1, 17 , 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (‘‘[t]hreatening speech . . . works directly the harms of apprehen- sion and disruption, whether the apparent resolve proves bluster or not and whether the injury is threatened to be immediate or delayed’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the state’s claim tha 2022See Haughwout v. Tordenti, supra, 332 Conn. 559, 571 (true threats exception ‘‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Pelella, 327 Conn. 1, 17 , 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (‘‘[t]hreatening speech . . . works directly the harms of apprehen- sion and disruption, whether the apparent resolve proves bluster or not and whether the injury is threatened to be immediate or delayed’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the state’s claim tha | 2 | 2 |
Virginia v. Blackgreen2 sentences2018As we recognized in State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 451-52 n.10, 97 A.3d 946 , however, this general consensus was shaken by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 , 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003), which led to a split in authority **169 among the federal circuit courts of appeals about whether the true threats doctrine requires proof of subjective intent to intimidate the recipient of the threat or, instead, requires proof of objective foreseeability. 2018As we recognized in State v. Krijger , supra, 313 Conn. at 451-52 n.10, 97 A.3d 946 , however, this general consensus was shaken by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 , 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003), which led to a split in authority **169 among the federal circuit courts of appeals about whether the true threats doctrine requires proof of subjective intent to intimidate the recipient of the threat or, instead, requires proof of objective foreseeability. | 1 | 3 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018See Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705 , 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (threatening statute "must be interpreted with the commands of the [f]irst [a]mendment clearly in mind" and "[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech"); see also United States v. Turner , 720 F.3d 411 , 420 and n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between advocacy of violence, which is constitutionally protected speech, and true threats, which are not), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 49 , 190 L.Ed.2d 29 (2014). 2018See Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705 , 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (threatening statute "must be interpreted with the commands of the [f]irst [a]mendment clearly in mind" and "[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech"); see also United States v. Turner , 720 F.3d 411 , 420 and n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between advocacy of violence, which is constitutionally protected speech, and true threats, which are not), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 49 , 190 L.Ed.2d 29 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Turnergreen1 sentence2018See Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705 , 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (threatening statute "must be interpreted with the commands of the [f]irst [a]mendment clearly in mind" and "[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech"); see also United States v. Turner , 720 F.3d 411 , 420 and n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between advocacy of violence, which is constitutionally protected speech, and true threats, which are not), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 49 , 190 L.Ed.2d 29 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. , 529 U.S. 1 , 18, 120 S.Ct. 1084 , 146 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (United States Supreme Court "does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio"). 2018See Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. , 529 U.S. 1 , 18, 120 S.Ct. 1084 , 146 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (United States Supreme Court "does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sabatogreen2 sentences2018See State v. Sabato , 321 Conn. 729 , 733, 138 A.3d 895 (2016) ("[w]e conclude that the state is precluded from arguing that the defendant's text message constituted a true threat because the state never pursued such a theory of guilt at trial"). 2018See State v. Sabato , 321 Conn. 729 , 733, 138 A.3d 895 (2016) ("[w]e conclude that the state is precluded from arguing that the defendant's text message constituted a true threat because the state never pursued such a theory of guilt at trial"). | 1 | 1 |
D'Antoni v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2018See Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705 , 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (threatening statute "must be interpreted with the commands of the [f]irst [a]mendment clearly in mind" and "[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech"); see also United States v. Turner , 720 F.3d 411 , 420 and n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between advocacy of violence, which is constitutionally protected speech, and true threats, which are not), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 49 , 190 L.Ed.2d 29 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Ortega v. Enforcementgreen1 sentence2018See Watts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705 , 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (threatening statute "must be interpreted with the commands of the [f]irst [a]mendment clearly in mind" and "[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech"); see also United States v. Turner , 720 F.3d 411 , 420 and n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between advocacy of violence, which is constitutionally protected speech, and true threats, which are not), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 49 , 190 L.Ed.2d 29 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Elonis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018Moreover, the defendant asserts that Elonis v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2001 , 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015), a more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, signals the court's approval of a subjective intent requirement to make speech punishable under the true threats doctrine. 2018Moreover, the defendant asserts that Elonis v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2001 , 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015), a more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, signals the court's approval of a subjective intent requirement to make speech punishable under the true threats doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. George Hoffgreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d 1265 -66 (Immigration Naturalization Service agent); see also United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-93 (1st Cir. 1997) (Federal Bureau of Investigations special agent); United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States forest service officer); United States v. Pacione, 950 F.2d 1348, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 , 112 S. Ct. 3054 , 120 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Fulmergreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d 1265 -66 (Immigration Naturalization Service agent); see also United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-93 (1st Cir. 1997) (Federal Bureau of Investigations special agent); United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States forest service officer); United States v. Pacione, 950 F.2d 1348, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 , 112 S. Ct. 3054 , 120 L. | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. City of New Orleansgreen2 sentences2003The defendant analogizes the true threats doctrine to the fighting words doctrine, under which some courts have concluded that, where a police officer is the only person “upon whose sensibilities the inflammatory language could have played, a conviction can be supported only for ‘[ejxtremely offensive behavior supporting an inference that the actor wished to provoke the policeman to violence.’ ” State v. Nelson, 38 Conn. Sup. 349, 354 , 448 A.2d 214 (1982); see also Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 , 94 S. Ct. 970 , 39 L. 2003The defendant analogizes the true threats doctrine to the fighting words doctrine, under which some courts have concluded that, where a police officer is the only person “upon whose sensibilities the inflammatory language could have played, a conviction can be supported only for ‘[ejxtremely offensive behavior supporting an inference that the actor wished to provoke the policeman to violence.’ ” State v. Nelson, 38 Conn. Sup. 349, 354 , 448 A.2d 214 (1982); see also Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 , 94 S. Ct. 970 , 39 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alfredo Orozco-Santillangreen1 sentence2003Specifically, with respect to the defendant’s incident involving Robert Labonte, a Wethersfield police sergeant, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s conduct was not constitutionally protected, but I would not apply the true threats doctrine; see United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1990); because a narrower constitutional ground is applicable. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ronald J. Pacionegreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d 1265 -66 (Immigration Naturalization Service agent); see also United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-93 (1st Cir. 1997) (Federal Bureau of Investigations special agent); United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States forest service officer); United States v. Pacione, 950 F.2d 1348, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 , 112 S. Ct. 3054 , 120 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pelella
green
2 sentences2022See Haughwout v. Tordenti, supra, 332 Conn. 559, 571 (true threats exception ‘‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Pelella, 327 Conn. 1, 17 , 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (‘‘[t]hreatening speech . . . works directly the harms of apprehen- sion and disruption, whether the apparent resolve proves bluster or not and whether the injury is threatened to be immediate or delayed’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the state’s claim tha 2022See Haughwout v. Tordenti, supra, 332 Conn. 559, 571 (true threats exception ‘‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Pelella, 327 Conn. 1, 17 , 170 A.3d 647 (2017) (‘‘[t]hreatening speech . . . works directly the harms of apprehen- sion and disruption, whether the apparent resolve proves bluster or not and whether the injury is threatened to be immediate or delayed’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the state’s claim tha | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Baccala
green
2 sentences2018In contrast, fighting words are "those words that have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baccala , supra, 326 Conn. at 234 , 163 A.3d 1 . 2018In contrast, fighting words are "those words that have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baccala , supra, 326 Conn. at 234 , 163 A.3d 1 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
green
1 sentence2018Finally, one state court that has rejected the claim that Black adopted a subjective intent requirement reasoned that the purpose underlying the true threats doctrine, namely, protecting the targets of threats from the fear of violence, would not be "served by hinging constitutionality on the speaker's subjective intent ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stanley , supra, 170 P.3d at 789 , quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058 , 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 , 123 S.Ct. 2637 , 156 L.Ed. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Eyl v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.
green
1 sentence2018Finally, one state court that has rejected the claim that Black adopted a subjective intent requirement reasoned that the purpose underlying the true threats doctrine, namely, protecting the targets of threats from the fear of violence, would not be "served by hinging constitutionality on the speaker's subjective intent ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stanley , supra, 170 P.3d at 789 , quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058 , 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 , 123 S.Ct. 2637 , 156 L.Ed. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Krijger
green
2 sentences2018Id., at 476 , 24 A.3d 42 . 2018Id., at 476 , 24 A.3d 42 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Yates v. Henton
green
1 sentence2018Finally, one state court that has rejected the claim that Black adopted a subjective intent requirement reasoned that the purpose underlying the true threats doctrine, namely, protecting the targets of threats from the fear of violence, would not be "served by hinging constitutionality on the speaker's subjective intent ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stanley , supra, 170 P.3d at 789 , quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058 , 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 , 123 S.Ct. 2637 , 156 L.Ed. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Roberts v. State
neutral
2 sentences2018The defendant contends that, when he sent the e-mail regarding Judge Bozzuto, he could not have foreseen that it would be communicated to her because he sent it "to friends and fellow travelers." To the extent that the defendant contends that threatening speech that is not communicated directly to the target of the speech cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a punishable true threat, we disagree. *31 Numerous courts have held to the contrary. 27 Although the reasoning **196 of *32 these cases is somewhat ad hoc, in light of the purpose of the true threats doctrine, which is not to punish thr 2018App. at 108 , 78 S.W.3d 743 (essence of threat is "communication, not utterance"); we conclude that threatening speech that is not communicated directly to the target may **197 nevertheless be punished if the state establishes that the defendant's intent that the threat would be communicated to the target meets the same standard that the state must satisfy in order to punish speech that is directed specifically to the target. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Stanley
green
1 sentence2018Finally, one state court that has rejected the claim that Black adopted a subjective intent requirement reasoned that the purpose underlying the true threats doctrine, namely, protecting the targets of threats from the fear of violence, would not be "served by hinging constitutionality on the speaker's subjective intent ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stanley , supra, 170 P.3d at 789 , quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058 , 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 , 123 S.Ct. 2637 , 156 L.Ed. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
cluster 777725
green
1 sentence2018Finally, one state court that has rejected the claim that Black adopted a subjective intent requirement reasoned that the purpose underlying the true threats doctrine, namely, protecting the targets of threats from the fear of violence, would not be "served by hinging constitutionality on the speaker's subjective intent ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stanley , supra, 170 P.3d at 789 , quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists , 290 F.3d 1058 , 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 , 123 S.Ct. 2637 , 156 L.Ed. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Deloreto
green
1 sentence2017"Imminence," we stated, "is not a requirement under the true threats doctrine." Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Cook
green
2 sentences2017We rejected the claim, concluding that neither the statute under which Cook was charged nor the true threats doctrine required proof of imminence. 11 Id., at 256-57 , 947 A.2d 307 . 2017We rejected the claim, concluding that neither the statute under which Cook was charged nor the true threats doctrine required proof of imminence. 11 Id., at 256-57 , 947 A.2d 307 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2003The defendant analogizes the true threats doctrine to the fighting words doctrine, under which some courts have concluded that, where a police officer is the only person “upon whose sensibilities the inflammatory language could have played, a conviction can be supported only for ‘[ejxtremely offensive behavior supporting an inference that the actor wished to provoke the policeman to violence.’ ” State v. Nelson, 38 Conn. Sup. 349, 354 , 448 A.2d 214 (1982); see also Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 , 94 S. Ct. 970 , 39 L. 2003The defendant analogizes the true threats doctrine to the fighting words doctrine, under which some courts have concluded that, where a police officer is the only person “upon whose sensibilities the inflammatory language could have played, a conviction can be supported only for ‘[ejxtremely offensive behavior supporting an inference that the actor wished to provoke the policeman to violence.’ ” State v. Nelson, 38 Conn. Sup. 349, 354 , 448 A.2d 214 (1982); see also Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 , 94 S. Ct. 970 , 39 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Borg v. Mikes
green
1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d 1265 -66 (Immigration Naturalization Service agent); see also United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-93 (1st Cir. 1997) (Federal Bureau of Investigations special agent); United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States forest service officer); United States v. Pacione, 950 F.2d 1348, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 , 112 S. Ct. 3054 , 120 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hudson v. Washington
green
1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d 1265 -66 (Immigration Naturalization Service agent); see also United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-93 (1st Cir. 1997) (Federal Bureau of Investigations special agent); United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States forest service officer); United States v. Pacione, 950 F.2d 1348, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 , 112 S. Ct. 3054 , 120 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
King v. Ridley
green
1 sentence2003See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d 1265 -66 (Immigration Naturalization Service agent); see also United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-93 (1st Cir. 1997) (Federal Bureau of Investigations special agent); United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States forest service officer); United States v. Pacione, 950 F.2d 1348, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 , 112 S. Ct. 3054 , 120 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Valdivia
green
2 sentences2003In State v. Valdivia, 95 Haw. 465, 474 , 24 P.3d 661 (2001), the defendant stated to a police officer: “I’m gonna lull you and your police uniform . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant was convicted under the state’s terroristic threats statute, which required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant threatened, by words, to cause bodily injury to another in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing that person. 2003In State v. Valdivia, 95 Haw. 465, 474 , 24 P.3d 661 (2001), the defendant stated to a police officer: “I’m gonna lull you and your police uniform . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant was convicted under the state’s terroristic threats statute, which required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant threatened, by words, to cause bodily injury to another in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing that person. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.