sense impression exception in District of Columbia

2026See, e.g., Sims, 14 213 A.3d at 1266-67 (to qualify as present sense impression, statement must reflect contemporaneity, spontaneity, and personal knowledge); Mayhand, 127 A.3d at 1209 n.13 (“Both the hearsay exception for present sense impressions and excited utterances require a showing of spontaneity . . . .”); Gardner v. United States, 898 A.2d 367, 374 (D.C. 2006) (“Statements sought to be admitted under the present sense impression exception to this general rule must have been made spontaneously and contemporaneously with the events described.”) (citation modified); Hallums, 841 A.2d at

2019This court recognized the admissibility of certain hearsay statements under the present sense impression exception in Hallums v. United States, 841 A.2d 1270, 1276 (D.C. 2004) (authorizing the admission of a hearsay statement “describing or explaining events which the declarant is observing at the time he or she makes the declaration or immediately thereafter”).

2019In light of the common origin of the present sense impression and excited utterance hearsay exceptions,10 we agree and now hold that all 10 See Burgess v. United States, 608 A.2d 733, 738 (D.C. 1992) (Rogers, C.J., concurring) (explaining that the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay was, like the excited utterance exception, “one of the four hearsay exceptions encompassed by the ancient term res gestae” and that the foundation for the trustworthiness of statements admitted under all of these exceptions was that they possessed “a degree of spontaneity”). 13 requiremen

2004The closest this court has come to recognizing the present sense impression was in Chief Judge Rogers’s concurring opinion in Burgess in which she stated that the “present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is well rooted in our common law” and that “there is no principled basis ... on which to recognize [excited utterances, statements of present bodily condition, and statements of present mental state], but not the present sense impression exception ... since all four exceptions are founded on the same policy.” Burgess, 608 A.2d at 738 (Rogers, C.J., concurring). 7 We agree with J

2006See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1100 (D.C.2005); Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 505 (D.C.2005). 18 .

2005Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 505 (D.C.2005) (holding that admission of a statement to civilians, admitted in evidence under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, does not violate confrontation rights as delineated in Crawford); see also United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that “a declarant’s statements to a confidential informant, whose true status is unknown to the declarant, do not constitute testimony within the meaning of Crawford”).

2004The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is “one of the four hearsay exceptions encompassed by the ancient term res gestae: (1) statements of present bodily condition, (2) statements of present mental states and emotions, (3) excited utterances, and (4) statements of present sense impression.” Burgess, 608 A.2d at 738 (Rogers, C.J., concurring) (citing Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329, 332 (D.C.1976); Watts v. Smith, 226 A.2d 160, 162 (D.C.1967); Wabisky v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 114 U.S.App.

2004The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is "one of the four hearsay exceptions encompassed by the ancient term res gestae: (1) statements of present bodily condition, (2) statements of present mental states and emotions, (3) excited utterances, and (4) statements of present sense impression." Burgess, 608 A.2d at 738 (Rogers, C.J., concurring) (citing Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329, 332 (D.C.1976); Watts v. Smith, 226 A.2d 160, 162 (D.C.1967); Wabisky v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 114 U.S.App.

2004The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is “one of the four hearsay exceptions encompassed by the ancient term res gestae: (1) statements of present bodily condition, (2) statements of present mental states and emotions, (3) excited utterances, and (4) statements of present sense impression.” Burgess, 608 A.2d at 738 (Rogers, C.J., concurring) (citing Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329, 332 (D.C.1976); Watts v. Smith, 226 A.2d 160, 162 (D.C.1967); Wabisky v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 114 U.S.App.

2004The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is "one of the four hearsay exceptions encompassed by the ancient term res gestae: (1) statements of present bodily condition, (2) statements of present mental states and emotions, (3) excited utterances, and (4) statements of present sense impression." Burgess, 608 A.2d at 738 (Rogers, C.J., concurring) (citing Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329, 332 (D.C.1976); Watts v. Smith, 226 A.2d 160, 162 (D.C.1967); Wabisky v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 114 U.S.App.

1992See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . .At least twenty-eight states recognize the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.

1992The government does not argue on appeal that the statement was admissible under the state of mind exception. [4] See Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 186 (D.C.App.) (present bodily condition), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 521 , 112 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.App.1977) (state of mind); Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.App. 1977) (excited utterance). [5] See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . [6] At least twenty-eight s

2026See, e.g., Sims, 14 213 A.3d at 1266-67 (to qualify as present sense impression, statement must reflect contemporaneity, spontaneity, and personal knowledge); Mayhand, 127 A.3d at 1209 n.13 (“Both the hearsay exception for present sense impressions and excited utterances require a showing of spontaneity . . . .”); Gardner v. United States, 898 A.2d 367, 374 (D.C. 2006) (“Statements sought to be admitted under the present sense impression exception to this general rule must have been made spontaneously and contemporaneously with the events described.”) (citation modified); Hallums, 841 A.2d at

2019See Woodfolk, 656 A.2d at 1150 n.14 (noting that “[p]reponderance of the evidence is the most commonly accepted standard in determining the admissibility of evidence” (citing 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 53 n.8 (4th ed. 1992))); see also Bemis, 45 F.3d at 1373 (explaining that personal perception for present sense impression must be established by a preponderance of the evidence).

2019See Woodfolk, 656 A.2d at 1150 n.14 (noting that “[p]reponderance of the evidence is the most commonly accepted standard in determining the admissibility of evidence” (citing 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 53 n.8 (4th ed. 1992))); see also Bemis, 45 F.3d at 1373 (explaining that personal perception for present sense impression must be established by a preponderance of the evidence).

2011The definition of hearsay is “an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” Dutch, 997 A.2d at 688 (emphasis added), so understandably Smith’s attorney was trying “to get it in” for its truth by arguing that it fit within the present sense impression exception.

2006See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1100 (D.C.2005); Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 505 (D.C.2005). 18 .

2006See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1100 (D.C.2005); Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 505 (D.C.2005). 18 .

2006See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1100 (D.C.2005); Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 505 (D.C.2005). 18 .

2005Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 505 (D.C.2005) (holding that admission of a statement to civilians, admitted in evidence under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, does not violate confrontation rights as delineated in Crawford); see also United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that “a declarant’s statements to a confidential informant, whose true status is unknown to the declarant, do not constitute testimony within the meaning of Crawford”).

2004Id. at 355-56 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 ; see also Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126, 119 S.Ct. 1887 . “[S]uch out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.” White, 502 U.S. at 355 , 112 S.Ct. 736 .

2004Id. at 355-56 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 ; see also Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126, 119 S.Ct. 1887 . “[S]uch out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.” White, 502 U.S. at 355 , 112 S.Ct. 736 .

2004See also, e.g., United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir.1991) (“The underlying rationale of the present sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to defective recognition or conscious fabrication.”) (quoting United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir.1979)); In re Japanese Elec.

2004See also, e.g., United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir.1991) ("The underlying rationale of the present sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to defective recognition or conscious fabrication.") (quoting United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir.1979)); In re Japanese Elec.

2004See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding admission under Rule 803(1) of decedent victim’s statement during telephone call that “I’m with Kiane and Rico”); United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631 , 633-34 n. 3 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that where victim pointed to defendant and said to police, “That’s Tony,” the statement was admissible under Rule 803(1)); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1985) (upholding admission of statement in a wiretapped telephone conversation that “Michael’s back”); United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 19

2004See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding admission under Rule 803(1) of decedent victim's statement during telephone call that "I'm with Kiane and Rico"); United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631 , 633-34 n. 3 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that where victim pointed to defendant and said to police, "That's Tony," the statement was admissible under Rule 803(1)); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1985) (upholding admission of statement in a wiretapped telephone conversation that "Michael's back"); United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 19

2004Id. at 355-56 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 ; see also Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126, 119 S.Ct. 1887 . “[S]uch out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.” White, 502 U.S. at 355 , 112 S.Ct. 736 .

2004See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding admission under Rule 803(1) of decedent victim’s statement during telephone call that “I’m with Kiane and Rico”); United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631 , 633-34 n. 3 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that where victim pointed to defendant and said to police, “That’s Tony,” the statement was admissible under Rule 803(1)); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1985) (upholding admission of statement in a wiretapped telephone conversation that “Michael’s back”); United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 19

2004See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding admission under Rule 803(1) of decedent victim's statement during telephone call that "I'm with Kiane and Rico"); United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631 , 633-34 n. 3 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that where victim pointed to defendant and said to police, "That's Tony," the statement was admissible under Rule 803(1)); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1985) (upholding admission of statement in a wiretapped telephone conversation that "Michael's back"); United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 19

2004See also, e.g., United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir.1991) (“The underlying rationale of the present sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to defective recognition or conscious fabrication.”) (quoting United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir.1979)); In re Japanese Elec.

2004See also, e.g., United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir.1991) ("The underlying rationale of the present sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to defective recognition or conscious fabrication.") (quoting United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir.1979)); In re Japanese Elec.

2004See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding admission under Rule 803(1) of decedent victim’s statement during telephone call that “I’m with Kiane and Rico”); United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631 , 633-34 n. 3 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that where victim pointed to defendant and said to police, “That’s Tony,” the statement was admissible under Rule 803(1)); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1985) (upholding admission of statement in a wiretapped telephone conversation that “Michael’s back”); United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 19

2004See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (upholding admission under Rule 803(1) of decedent victim's statement during telephone call that "I'm with Kiane and Rico"); United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631 , 633-34 n. 3 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that where victim pointed to defendant and said to police, "That's Tony," the statement was admissible under Rule 803(1)); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1985) (upholding admission of statement in a wiretapped telephone conversation that "Michael's back"); United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 19

1992The government does not argue on appeal that the statement was admissible under the state of mind exception. [4] See Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 186 (D.C.App.) (present bodily condition), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 521 , 112 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.App.1977) (state of mind); Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.App. 1977) (excited utterance). [5] See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . [6] At least twenty-eight s

1992The government does not argue on appeal that the statement was admissible under the state of mind exception. [4] See Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 186 (D.C.App.) (present bodily condition), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 521 , 112 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.App.1977) (state of mind); Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.App. 1977) (excited utterance). [5] See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . [6] At least twenty-eight s

1992See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . .At least twenty-eight states recognize the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.

1992The government does not argue on appeal that the statement was admissible under the state of mind exception. [4] See Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 186 (D.C.App.) (present bodily condition), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 521 , 112 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.App.1977) (state of mind); Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.App. 1977) (excited utterance). [5] See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . [6] At least twenty-eight s

1992The government does not argue on appeal that the statement was admissible under the state of mind exception. [4] See Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 186 (D.C.App.) (present bodily condition), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 521 , 112 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.App.1977) (state of mind); Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.App. 1977) (excited utterance). [5] See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . [6] At least twenty-eight s

1992The government does not argue on appeal that the statement was admissible under the state of mind exception. [4] See Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 186 (D.C.App.) (present bodily condition), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 521 , 112 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Gezmu v. United States, 375 A.2d 520, 522 (D.C.App.1977) (state of mind); Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.App. 1977) (excited utterance). [5] See Pratt v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 612 , 616 n. 6 (D.C.App.1979); see also Wabisky, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 23 , 309 F.2d at 318 . [6] At least twenty-eight s

1992Booth v. State, 508 A.2d 976, 979 (Md.1986) (listing states).

1992Booth v. State, 508 A.2d 976, 979 (Md.1986) (listing states).