statute creates presumption (District of Columbia) · Go Syfert
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statute creates presumption in District of Columbia

8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1880–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Newman v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1997 · cited in 3 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2018
2 sentences

2018While "the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held" on the merits, Long v. United States , 910 A.2d 298 , 308 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Newman v. United States , 705 A.2d 246 , 261 (D.C. 1997) ), a hearing is unnecessary if the claims "(1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief." White v. United States , 146 A.3d 101 , 109 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hardy v. United States , 988 A.2d 950 , 961 (D.C. 2010) ).

2007Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-94 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . “[W]here the court is faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held.... ” Long v. United States, 910 A.2d 298, 308 (D.C.2006) (citing Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 261 (D.C.1997)).

23
Long v. United Statesgreen
dc · 2006 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2018
2 sentences

2018While "the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held" on the merits, Long v. United States , 910 A.2d 298 , 308 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Newman v. United States , 705 A.2d 246 , 261 (D.C. 1997) ), a hearing is unnecessary if the claims "(1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief." White v. United States , 146 A.3d 101 , 109 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hardy v. United States , 988 A.2d 950 , 961 (D.C. 2010) ).

2007Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-94 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . “[W]here the court is faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held.... ” Long v. United States, 910 A.2d 298, 308 (D.C.2006) (citing Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 261 (D.C.1997)).

12
Simon v. Dewgreen
dc · 1952 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1954–1965
2 sentences

1965As we stated in Simon v. Dew, D.C.Mun.App., 91 A.2d 214, 215-16 (1952), “Once the defendant’s ownership has been established, the statute creates a presumption of agency which places the burden of proof as to the question of consent upon the defendant-owner.” We went on to point out, however: “the defendant-owner overcomes the statutory presumption when he offers uncontradieted proof that the automobile was not at the time being used with his permission.

1954In Simon v. Dew, D.C.Mun.App., 91 A.2d 214, 215-216 , we summarized our view of the law to be: “(1) Once the defendant’s ownership has been established, the statute creates a presumption of agency which places the burden of proof as to the question of consent upon the defendant-owner. (2) The defendant-owner overcomes the statutory presumption when he offers uncontradicted proof that the automobile was not at the time being used with his permission.

12
U-Haul Co. of East Bay v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.green
dc · 1992 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Co., 616 A.2d 1264, 1265 (D.C.1992) (“The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act creates a rebuttable presumption that any operator of a vehicle has the consent of its owner and is therefore the owner’s agent”); Curtis, 537 A.2d at 1074 (“Once the defendant’s ownership has been established, the statute creates a presumption of agency which places the burden of proof as to the question of consent upon the defendant-owner.”) In other words, there is a rebuttable presumption that any person driving a car does so with the consent of the registered owner, and unless the owner comes forward with ev

11
Athridge v. Iglesiasgreen
dcd · 2005 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007See, e.g., Athridge v. Iglesias, 382 F.Supp.2d 42, 47 (D.D.C.2005) (clarifying that D.C.Code § 50-1301.08 does not create strict vicarious liability, instead deeming the legal concept “liability turning on the fulfillment of a condition”).

11
Curtis v. Cuffgreen
dc · 1987 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Co., 616 A.2d 1264, 1265 (D.C.1992) (“The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act creates a rebuttable presumption that any operator of a vehicle has the consent of its owner and is therefore the owner’s agent”); Curtis, 537 A.2d at 1074 (“Once the defendant’s ownership has been established, the statute creates a presumption of agency which places the burden of proof as to the question of consent upon the defendant-owner.”) In other words, there is a rebuttable presumption that any person driving a car does so with the consent of the registered owner, and unless the owner comes forward with ev

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Ginyard v. United States green
dc · 2003
1 sentence

2018"Under the last of those three categories, 'if no genuine doubt exists about the facts that are material to the motion, the court may conclude that no evidentiary hearing is necessary.' " Bellinger v. United States , 127 A.3d 505 , 515 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Ginyard v. United States , 816 A.2d 21 , 38 (D.C. 2003) ).

12018–2018
Hardy v. United States green
dc · 2010
1 sentence

2018While "the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held" on the merits, Long v. United States , 910 A.2d 298 , 308 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Newman v. United States , 705 A.2d 246 , 261 (D.C. 1997) ), a hearing is unnecessary if the claims "(1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief." White v. United States , 146 A.3d 101 , 109 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hardy v. United States , 988 A.2d 950 , 961 (D.C. 2010) ).

12018–2018
KEVIN M. BELLINGER v. UNITED STATES. green
dc · 2015
1 sentence

2018"Under the last of those three categories, 'if no genuine doubt exists about the facts that are material to the motion, the court may conclude that no evidentiary hearing is necessary.' " Bellinger v. United States , 127 A.3d 505 , 515 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Ginyard v. United States , 816 A.2d 21 , 38 (D.C. 2003) ).

12018–2018
JAYVON R. WHITE v. UNITED STATES. green
dc · 2016
1 sentence

2018While "the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held" on the merits, Long v. United States , 910 A.2d 298 , 308 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Newman v. United States , 705 A.2d 246 , 261 (D.C. 1997) ), a hearing is unnecessary if the claims "(1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief." White v. United States , 146 A.3d 101 , 109 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hardy v. United States , 988 A.2d 950 , 961 (D.C. 2010) ).

12018–2018
Agomo v. Fenty green
dc · 2007
1 sentence

2013As we have already discussed, the statute creates a presumption of vicarious liability, see supra note 2, and it recognizes only a few ways for the owner of a vehicle to avoid that liability once an infraction has been proven. 13 But “[t]he statutory mechanism for assessing liability once an infraction has been established in no way affects the requirement that the District prove the commission of a traffic infraction by clear and convincing evidence.” Agomo, 916 A.2d at 192-98 .

12013–2013
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2007Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-94 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . “[W]here the court is faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held.... ” Long v. United States, 910 A.2d 298, 308 (D.C.2006) (citing Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 261 (D.C.1997)).

2007Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-94 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . “[W]here the court is faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the statute creates a presumption that a hearing should be held.... ” Long v. United States, 910 A.2d 298, 308 (D.C.2006) (citing Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 261 (D.C.1997)).

12007–2007
Boyce v. Christy neutral
ohioctapp · 1870
1 sentence

1880Boyce v. Christy, 47 Mo. 70 .

11880–1880

Statutes the citing opinions construe

DC § D.C. Code § 23-110 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 48 (1925–2025) NY 32 (1913–2026) CA 30 (1931–2025) CT 22 (1927–2003) MO 13 (1895–2006) DC 8 (1880–2018) TX 7 (1976–2016) OH 6 (1870–2011) MN 6 (1981–2018) IN 6 (1901–2013) MS 6 (1987–2009) FL 5 (1990–2021) IA 5 (1927–1999) CO 5 (1978–2019) AL 5 (1873–1930) WA 5 (2015–2017) NJ 4 (2003–2019) LA 4 (1980–2008) WI 4 (1985–2020) NC 4 (1975–2014) MI 4 (1978–2026) OR 4 (1923–2023) PA 4 (1958–2004) ME 3 (1953–2017) AZ 3 (1967–2012) MA 3 (2007–2020) NH 3 (1997–2020) UT 2 (1993–2008) HI 2 (1971–1981) TN 2 (1980–1999) KS 2 (1989–2022) VT 2 (2006–2023) OK 2 (1977–1985)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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