statute creates exception in Connecticut

2003We are aware that “[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dreher v. Joseph, 60 Conn. App. 257, 262 , 759 A.2d 114 (2000); see also Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976); Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

2003We are aware that “[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dreher v. Joseph, 60 Conn. App. 257, 262 , 759 A.2d 114 (2000); see also Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976); Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

1991Second, “ ‘[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.’ ” Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937), citing Bickart v. Sanditz, 105 Conn. 766, 772 , 136 A. 580 (1927); State v. Turello, 183 Conn. 330, 335 , 439 A.2d 364 (1981).

1991Second, “ ‘[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.’ ” Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937), citing Bickart v. Sanditz, 105 Conn. 766, 772 , 136 A. 580 (1927); State v. Turello, 183 Conn. 330, 335 , 439 A.2d 364 (1981).

1993Furthermore, when a statute creates an exception to a general rule, the exception should not be extended "beyond its specific statutory bounds." State v. Turello, 183 Conn. 330 , 335-36 , 439 A.2d 364 (1981).

1993Furthermore, when a statute creates an exception to a general rule, the exception should not be extended "beyond its specific statutory bounds." State v. Turello, 183 Conn. 330 , 335-36 , 439 A.2d 364 (1981).

2003We are aware that “[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dreher v. Joseph, 60 Conn. App. 257, 262 , 759 A.2d 114 (2000); see also Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976); Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

2003We are aware that “[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dreher v. Joseph, 60 Conn. App. 257, 262 , 759 A.2d 114 (2000); see also Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976); Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

2000In 1981, the legislature enacted General Statutes § 7-163a, which not only permits a town to adopt an ordinance that requires abutting landowners to remove snow and ice on public sidewalks, but also empowers the town to shift liability to the abutting landowner for injuries caused by a violation of the ordinance. 4 We are not aware, however, of any statutory counterpart that specifically enables a municipality to shift liability for raised or uneven sidewalks to abutting landowners. “[ W]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is no

2000In 1981, the legislature enacted General Statutes § 7-163a, which not only permits a town to adopt an ordinance that requires abutting landowners to remove snow and ice on public sidewalks, but also empowers the town to shift liability to the abutting landowner for injuries caused by a violation of the ordinance. 4 We are not aware, however, of any statutory counterpart that specifically enables a municipality to shift liability for raised or uneven sidewalks to abutting landowners. “[ W]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is no

2000In Cooper v. Cavallaro, 2 Conn. App. 622 , 481 A.2d 101 (1984), this court considered a factual situation very similar to the one in the present case.

2000In Cooper v. Cavallaro, 2 Conn. App. 622 , 481 A.2d 101 (1984), this court considered a factual situation very similar to the one in the present case.

1999Staples v. Palten , 214 Conn. 195 (1990); Bickart v. Sanditz , 105 Conn. 766 (1927).

1994Anderson CT Page 618 v. Nedovich, 19 Conn. App. 85 , 89 , 561 A.2d 948 (1989).

1994Anderson CT Page 618 v. Nedovich, 19 Conn. App. 85 , 89 , 561 A.2d 948 (1989).

1990First, “ ‘[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.’ Bickart v. Sanditz, 105 Conn. 766, 772 , 136 A. 580 [1927]; Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 [1937].” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976); see Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 424 , 479 A.2d 187 (1984); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 549 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981).

1990First, “ ‘[w]hen a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.’ Bickart v. Sanditz, 105 Conn. 766, 772 , 136 A. 580 [1927]; Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 [1937].” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976); see Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 424 , 479 A.2d 187 (1984); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 549 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981).

1990Second, a “ ‘remedial’ statute is to be construed in favor of those whom it was intended to protect.” Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Sup. 249, 252 (D.D.C. 1989); see E.E.O.C. v. Pattin-Marion, A Div. of Eastern Co., 588 F. Sup. 41, 45 (S.D.Ill. 1984); State v. Avcollie, 174 Conn. 100, 110-11 , 384 A.2d 315 (1977); Hartford Fire Ins.

1990Second, a “ ‘remedial’ statute is to be construed in favor of those whom it was intended to protect.” Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Sup. 249, 252 (D.D.C. 1989); see E.E.O.C. v. Pattin-Marion, A Div. of Eastern Co., 588 F. Sup. 41, 45 (S.D.Ill. 1984); State v. Avcollie, 174 Conn. 100, 110-11 , 384 A.2d 315 (1977); Hartford Fire Ins.

1976In language as applicable to the statutory rights of the plaintiff here as to those established by the Connecticut statute pertaining to chattel mortgages there under consideration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in the case of In re New Idea Yankee Togs, Inc., 339 F.2d 544 , 546: “The chattel mortgage is a creature of statute and the technical requirements of the statute cannot be altered or mitigated by importing and applying equitable principles which have attached to real estate mortgages,” especially considering “the absence of a suggestion of legislati

1976In language as applicable to the statutory rights of the plaintiff here as to those established by the Connecticut statute pertaining to chattel mortgages there under consideration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in the case of In re New Idea Yankee Togs, Inc., 339 F.2d 544 , 546: “The chattel mortgage is a creature of statute and the technical requirements of the statute cannot be altered or mitigated by importing and applying equitable principles which have attached to real estate mortgages,” especially considering “the absence of a suggestion of legislati

1976In language as applicable to the statutory rights of the plaintiff here as to those established by the Connecticut statute pertaining to chattel mortgages there under consideration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in the case of In re New Idea Yankee Togs, Inc., 339 F.2d 544 , 546: “The chattel mortgage is a creature of statute and the technical requirements of the statute cannot be altered or mitigated by importing and applying equitable principles which have attached to real estate mortgages,” especially considering “the absence of a suggestion of legislati

1927Patten v. Smith, 4 Conn. 450, 454 .