ngri defense in Ohio

2020Bradford at ¶ 89; see also Monford at ¶ 74 (finding Cihonski inapplicable where the defendant did not present "one shred of evidence" relating to an NGRI defense or request an NGRI instruction); State v. Austin, 1st Dist.

2020Bradford at ¶ 89; see also Monford at ¶ 74 (finding Cihonski inapplicable where the defendant did not present "one shred of evidence" relating to an NGRI defense or request an NGRI instruction); State v. Austin, 1st Dist.

2025State v. Cochran, 2017-Ohio-216, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.). {¶ 34} When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. -11- Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 17

2025State v. Cochran, 2017-Ohio-216, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.). {¶ 34} When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. -11- Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 17

2025Instead, appellant acknowledged the wrongfulness and provided insight into his thought process, 16. suggesting he made the decision to hold back from committing more egregious conduct and exercised control over his actions. {¶ 35} “Where facts and circumstances indicate that an NGRI plea would have had a reasonable probability of success, it is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to enter the plea.” Walker at ¶ 30 , citing State v. Anaya, 2008-Ohio-1853, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.).

2024“Where facts and circumstances indicate that a NGRI plea would have had a reasonable probability of success, it is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to enter the plea.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Walker, 2023-Ohio-140, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Anaya, 2008-Ohio-1853, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.).

2022And as Dr. Martell stated, Garrett’s actions after murdering C.D. belie his NGRI claim. {¶ 141} “ ‘The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57 , 2006-Ohio-160 , 840 N.E.2d 1032, at ¶ 42 , quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 , 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

2022And as Dr. Martell stated, Garrett’s actions after murdering C.D. belie his NGRI claim. {¶ 141} “ ‘The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57 , 2006-Ohio-160 , 840 N.E.2d 1032, at ¶ 42 , quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 , 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

2024No. L-22-1032, 2023-Ohio-140, ¶ 30 (“Where facts and circumstances indicate that an NGRI plea would have had a reasonable 1 Cochran’s briefing refers to a psychiatrist’s evaluation, but the sentencing memorandum refers to a psychologist’s report.

2024“Where facts and circumstances indicate that a NGRI plea would have had a reasonable probability of success, it is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to enter the plea.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Walker, 2023-Ohio-140, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Anaya, 2008-Ohio-1853, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.).

2026See also State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973). {¶49} Because Baker entered a NGRI plea and advanced that affirmative defense at trial, he necessarily admitted committing the crime of Kidnapping.

2025See also State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973). {¶ 31} Because Duran entered the NGRI plea, he necessarily admitted committing the crime of attempted kidnapping.

2025Id. at ¶ 23, quoting and citing State v. Martin, 2016-Ohio-989, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.), citing e.g., State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166, ¶ 18 ; State v. Caudill, 48 Ohio St.2d 342, 342-43 (1976); State v. Langenkamp, 2008-Ohio-1136, ¶ 28-29 (3d Dist.); State v. McQueeney, 2002-Ohio-3731 , ¶ 34 (12th Dist.). {¶37} In the instant case, the plea hearing transcript shows that the assistant prosecutor notified the court that the parties entered into a plea agreement whereby the State agreed to dismiss the aggravated murder charge and attached firearm specification and Appellant would plead guilty to the murde

2022Shelby Nos. 17-07-08, 17-08-09, 2008-Ohio-1136, ¶ 29 (applying the McQueeney holding to a no contest plea).

2025“Preponderance of the evidence simply means ‘evidence which is of a greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.’ ” In re Starks, 2005-Ohio-1912, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1998). {¶ 26} Although Russell raises assignments of error relating to manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, we have held that the evidentiary support for an NGRI defense should be analyzed in the context of a manifest weight standard rather than a sufficiency of the evidence standard.

2025“Preponderance of the evidence simply means ‘evidence which is of a greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.’ ” In re Starks, 2005-Ohio-1912, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1998). {¶ 26} Although Russell raises assignments of error relating to manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, we have held that the evidentiary support for an NGRI defense should be analyzed in the context of a manifest weight standard rather than a sufficiency of the evidence standard.

2025State v. Cochran, 2017-Ohio-216, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.). {¶ 34} When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. -11- Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 17

2025State v. Cochran, 2017-Ohio-216, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.). {¶ 34} When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. -11- Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 17

2020See State v. Purcell, 107 Ohio App.3d 501, 506 , 669 N.E.2d 60 (1st Dist.1995) (counsel was not ineffective in failing to pursue an NGRI defense when such a defense was not supported by expert testimony); State v. Anaya, 191 Ohio App.3d 602 , 2010-Ohio- 6045, 947 N.E.2d 212, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (when circumstances indicated that entering an NGRI plea would be unsuccessful, counsel’s decision not to enter that plea is not unreasonable).

2020See State v. Purcell, 107 Ohio App.3d 501, 506 , 669 N.E.2d 60 (1st Dist.1995) (counsel was not ineffective in failing to pursue an NGRI defense when such a defense was not supported by expert testimony); State v. Anaya, 191 Ohio App.3d 602 , 2010-Ohio- 6045, 947 N.E.2d 212, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (when circumstances indicated that entering an NGRI plea would be unsuccessful, counsel’s decision not to enter that plea is not unreasonable).

2025Instead, appellant argues his trial counsel erred in failing to file an NGRI plea at the initial stages of the proceeding, and as a result, he was denied effective assistance of counsel. {¶ 32} To establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must demonstrate “(1) deficient performance of counsel, i.e., performance falling below an 15. objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding's result would have been different.” State v. Willis, 2017-Ohio-8924, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.), quotin

2014Franklin No. 03AP- 340, 2004-Ohio-1008, ¶21 . “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . {¶20} Counsel’s decision not to pursue an NGRI defense may have been based upon the lack of any indication in the competency evaluation that Ryther-Collins had ever suffered a severe mental disease or defect.

2025State v. Taylor, 2002-Ohio-7017, ¶ 64 . “[T]he burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense . . . is upon the accused.” R.C. 2901.05(A).

2025State v. Taylor, 2002-Ohio-7017, ¶ 64 . “[T]he burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense . . . is upon the accused.” R.C. 2901.05(A).

2022State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002- Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 64 . “[T]he burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense * * * is upon the accused.” R.C. 2901.05(A).

2022State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002- Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 64 . “[T]he burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense * * * is upon the accused.” R.C. 2901.05(A).

2025We presume appellant’s counsel provided competent representation and appellant “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100 (1985), quoting Strickland at 694-695 . {¶ 33} As previously addressed, an NGRI plea is an affirmative defense, and requires demonstration that “at the time of the commission of the offense, the person did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the person’s acts.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(14).

2025We presume appellant’s counsel provided competent representation and appellant “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100 (1985), quoting Strickland at 694-695 . {¶ 33} As previously addressed, an NGRI plea is an affirmative defense, and requires demonstration that “at the time of the commission of the offense, the person did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the person’s acts.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(14).

2025Medina at 449 ; see also State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166, ¶ 16-17 . {¶ 27} In Ohio, both competency and a plea of NGRI are governed by statute, R.C. 2945.37 through 2945.402, with Crim.R. 11(A) requiring a written plea of NGRI, made “by either the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.” The evaluations conducted for each, furthermore, assess different matters; competency determinations require an evaluation of “the defendant’s present mental condition” and a plea of NGRI requires evaluation of “the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense charged.” R.C. 2945.371(A). {¶ 28} In thi

2025Medina at 449 ; see also State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166, ¶ 16-17 . {¶ 27} In Ohio, both competency and a plea of NGRI are governed by statute, R.C. 2945.37 through 2945.402, with Crim.R. 11(A) requiring a written plea of NGRI, made “by either the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.” The evaluations conducted for each, furthermore, assess different matters; competency determinations require an evaluation of “the defendant’s present mental condition” and a plea of NGRI requires evaluation of “the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense charged.” R.C. 2945.371(A). {¶ 28} In thi

2024Walton’s Counsel was Not Ineffective for Failing to Enter a NGRI Plea on Walton’s behalf {¶22} Walton relies primarily on State v. Tenace, 121 Ohio App.3d 702 (6th Dist. 1997) in support of his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written NGRI plea on his behalf.

2024It recognized that while the “psychiatric evidence elicited” from the competency reports will likely not support the appellant’s NGRI plea that “does not lessen defendant's right to enter his chosen plea.” Id. “[A] breakdown occurred in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude that appellant was deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel.

2014Vaughn v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 301 (1965).

2010Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 301 , 31 O.O.2d 567 , 209 N.E.2d 164 .

2026It does not reason that he could now disavow that admission and argue for postconviction purposes that he really did not commit the offense and that his counsel was ineffective in not presenting evidence at trial in support of Baker’s new claim of innocence. {¶50} In sum, upon reviewing Baker’s second postconviction claim in light of the record before us and the applicable legal authority, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying that claim. {¶51} Finally, Baker argues on appeal that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition for postconviction relief without

2026See State v. Hess, 2014-Ohio-3193, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.) (stating that an “NGRI defense is wholly inconsistent with the theory that was presented at trial, i.e. that Hess did not engage in any wrongful conduct”). {¶19} Tolliver testified in his own defense at trial.

2026See State v. Hess, 2014-Ohio-3193, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.) (stating that an “NGRI defense is wholly inconsistent with the theory that was presented at trial, i.e. that Hess did not engage in any wrongful conduct”). {¶19} Tolliver testified in his own defense at trial.

2026It does not reason that he could now disavow that admission and argue for postconviction purposes that he really did not commit the offense and that his counsel was ineffective in not presenting evidence at trial in support of Baker’s new claim of innocence. {¶50} In sum, upon reviewing Baker’s second postconviction claim in light of the record before us and the applicable legal authority, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying that claim. {¶51} Finally, Baker argues on appeal that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition for postconviction relief without

2025State v. McConnell, 2021-Ohio-41, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Eick, 2011-Ohio-1498, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.). {¶13} “Where the insanity is simply a temporary condition brought on by the voluntary ingestion of drugs or alcohol, it does not suffice to establish an NGRI defense.” State v. Swanson, 2014-Ohio-549 , ¶ 14 (6th Dist.).

2025State v. McConnell, 2021-Ohio-41, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Eick, 2011-Ohio-1498, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.). {¶13} “Where the insanity is simply a temporary condition brought on by the voluntary ingestion of drugs or alcohol, it does not suffice to establish an NGRI defense.” State v. Swanson, 2014-Ohio-549 , ¶ 14 (6th Dist.).