green
Positive treatment
Issue: affirmative defenseOH ↗
Issue: self-defense claimOH ↗
Issue: accused asserts defenseOH ↗
Issue: defendant raises defenseOH ↗
31.6 score
G Cite
cited 9× by 9 distinct cases, 1986–2025 · 2 courts ·
…justification for admitted conduct.
at p. 19
✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 · 2 courts ·
…constitutes a denial or contradiction of evidence offered by the prosecution to prove an intent to kill.
✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 1983–2015 · 3 courts ·
…which the defendant claims exempts him from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by the prosecution are true.
✓
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973
1999
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Sherburne
State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St. 2d 18, 19 (1973), citing State v. Vargo, 116 Ohio St. 495, 507 (1927). {¶ 26} Preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence, or evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Buck
State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986), citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973). {¶ 11} “There are two types of self-defense in Ohio: (1) defense against danger of bodily harm, also known as non-deadly force self-defense; and (2) defense against danger 6 of death or great bodily harm, or deadly force self-defense.” State v. McClain, 2025- Ohio-577, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Fabian
(2×)
An accident is a mere physical happening or event, out of the usual order of things and not reasonably (anticipated) (foreseen) as a natural or probable result of a lawful act.” Ohio Jury Instructions, CR § 421.01(2) (2025). “[T]he defense of accident is not an excuse or justification for the admitted act; it is a complete denial that an unlawful act was committed because the defendant did not have the requisite mens rea.” State v. Crawford, 2016-Ohio-7779, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Courtney
But “an affirmative defense is not an element of a crime.” State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 24 . {¶22} In Ohio, self-defense is an affirmative defense that justifies “‘admitted conduct.’” State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986), quoting State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Krieger
State v. O'Dell, 2009-Ohio-1040, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 20 (1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Lewis
State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986), citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith
By challenging the state’s evidence regarding the elements of felonious assault, appellant does not address the effect of her assertion of self-defense. “[T]his defense admits the facts claimed by the prosecution and then relies on independent facts or circumstances which the defendant claims exempt him from liability.” (Citation omitted) State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in State v. Brooks, 2022- Ohio-2478, ¶ 15 (“The only thing that the amendments to R.C. 2901.05 changes is which party has the burden of proving of disprovin…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Wilson
(2×)
This court has explained affirmative defenses such as self-defense this way: “[Affirmative defenses] represent not a mere denial or contradiction of evidence which the prosecution has offered as proof of an essential element of the crime charged, but, rather, they represent a substantive or independent matter ‘which the defendant claims exempts him from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by the prosecution are true.’ ” State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19, 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973), quoting 1 Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Section 19, at 54-55 (12th Ed.1955).…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Walker
That would only be the case if Mr. Walker had sought to prove the affirmative defense of self-defense, which is "an admission of the prohibited conduct coupled with a claim that the surrounding facts or circumstances exempt the accused from liability therefore; 'justification for admitted conduct.' " State v. Grubb, 111 Ohio App.3d 277, 282 (2d Dist.1996), quoting State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 20 (1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atlas Industrial Contractors LLC v. In2Gro Technologies LLC
Affirmative defenses “represent a substantive or independent matter which the defendant claims exempts him from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by the [plaintiff] are true . . . .” State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St. 2d 18, 19 , 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973). “[T]he burden of proving an affirmative defense rests with the party raising the defense.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Mielcarek, 9th Dist.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Vinson
State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973) (A claim of self-defense admits the facts claimed by the prosecution and then relies on independent facts or circumstances which the defendant claims exempt him from liability.). {¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons, we find that appellant has not demonstrated that she met the requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). {¶ 31} Because appellant's petition is a successive petition for postconviction relief, and because appellant failed to produce evidence to support a finding that any of the R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) exceptions applied, the trial court lacked juris…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Petway
State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973); R.C. 2901.05(B)(1).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Thomas
Summit No. 26024, 2012-Ohio-2882, ¶ 29 , citing State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St.3d 63 (1911), and defendants must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence, State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Thornton
Hamilton No. C-110773, 2013- Ohio-239, ¶5, citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Diggs
No. 08AP-942, 2009-Ohio- 2401, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973). " 'Duress consists of any conduct which overpowers a person's will and coerces or constrains his performance of an act which he otherwise would not have performed.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Archer
In addition to the specific requirements for establishing the defense of self-defense, it is fundamental that, as an affirmative defense, Mr. Archer was required to establish that he had a “justification for admitted conduct.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Gomez
No. CA2010-12-121, 2011-Ohio-6535 , ¶ 29, citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Pineda
Rather, it is an admission of the prohibited conduct coupled with a claim that the surrounding facts or circumstances exempt the accused from liability!, therefore a] ‘justification for admitted conduct.’ ”) (quoting State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith, Unpublished Decision (7-20-2001)
Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18 19; State v. Roy (Mar. 27, 1996), Adams App. No. 95CA590).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cornell Rhodes v. Anthony J. Brigano
See Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47 , 547 N.E.2d 962, 965 (1989); State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973); White v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 344-45 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 , 107 S.Ct. 1370 , 94 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Decker
“The Defendant: Yes, sir.” The defense of insanity is an affirmative defense based on an excuse “ ‘ “which the defendant claims exempts him from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by the prosecution are true.” ’ ” State v. Humphries (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 99 [ 5 O.O.3d 89 ], quoting State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St. 2d 18, 19 [ 62 O.O.2d 340 ].
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Elmer Cantrell v. Frank Gray
See Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 593 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1979). 36 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. * The Honorable David S. Porter, Senior U. S. District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by disignation 1 Petitioner's codefendant, David Strickland, pled guilty 2 See state v. Humphries, 364 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (1977); State v. Poole, 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973); Ohio Rev.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Martin
This court, in State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St. 2d 18, 19 [ 62 O.O.2d 340 ], characterized the defense of self-defense as a “justification for admitted conduct.” Self-defense represents more than a “denial or contradiction of evidence which the prosecution has offered as proof of an essential element of the crime charged * * Id.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mann v. Gray
(2×)
In State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973), the Ohio Supreme Court stated: This Court has consistently recognized that there are certain “justification[s] for admitted conduct” allowed to a defendant in a criminal case, provable for the most part under the plea of not guilty, which are referred to as “affirmative defenses.” As characterized by one authority, they represent not a mere denial or contradiction of evidence which the prosecution has offered as proof of an essential element of the crime charged, but, rather, they represent a substantive or independent m…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Larry Fornash v. Ronald C. Marshall
State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Robertson
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973) (an affirmative defense is not a “denial or contradiction” of the essential elements of the crime charged but is a justification that exempts a defendant from liability); State v. Wilson, 2024-Ohio-776, ¶ 22 (noting an affirmative defense “must be a ‘true’ defense—a justification for the conduct—not a negation of the elements of the underlying charge”).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Stokes
See State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986), citing State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973) (Self-defense “admits the facts claimed by the prosecution and then relies on independent facts or circumstances which the defendant claims exempt him from liability.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Maumee v. Yeager
(2×)
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19-20 , 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Cross
See generally State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973).1 {¶15} This analysis is separate from proof of the elements of the offense.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Deaton
(2×)
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973), syllabus. {¶ 21} To “be entitled to a jury instruction on accident, there must be evidence to support the argument that the [defendant] acted lawfully and that the result was unintended.” State v. Jones, 2d Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Toyer
(2×)
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Black
(2×)
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19-20 , 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973).
examined
Cited "see"
State v. Monford
(6×)
See State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 , 62 O.O.2d 340 , 294 N.E.2d 888 , quoting Anderson, 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.), Section 19 (affirmative defenses “represent not a mere denial or contradiction of evidence which the prosecution has offered as proof of an essential element of the crime charged, but, rather, they represent a substantive or independent matter ‘which the defendant claims exempts him from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by the prosecution are true’ ”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Huskins v. Huskins
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d at 19 (self-defense is a “justification defense” which functions as an excuse for an otherwise wrongful act).
examined
Cited "see"
Socha v. Wilson
(4×)
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19-20 , 294 N.E.2d 888 , 62 O.O.2d 340 , 63 A.L.R.3d 932 (1973) (among the affirmative defenses in a criminal case are self-defense, duress, insanity and intoxication and they must be proved by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Humphries, 5 O.O.3d 89 , 51 Ohio St.2d 95 , 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (discussing defense of insanity); State v. Baker, 88 Ohio App.3d 204 , 623 N.E.2d 672 (9th Dist.1993) (self-defense).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Moore, Unpublished Decision (6-25-2004)
(2×)
See, State v. Powell (Sept. 29, 1997), Ross App. No. 96CA2257, citing State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888 (finding that an affirmative defense is one in which the defendant admits the elements of the crime but seeks to prove some additional fact or facts that absolves the defendant of guilt).
examined
Cited "see"
John W. Byrd, Jr. v. Terry L. Collins, Warden
(3×)
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Ohio 1973) (listing intoxication as one of several affirmative defenses consistently recognized in Ohio).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Craig, Unpublished Decision (1-19-2000)
(2×)
See State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888 ; see, also, State v. Stubblefield (Feb. 13, 1991), Hamilton App. No. C-890597, unreported.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Robinson, Unpublished Decision (4-2-1999)
(2×)
See State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353 , 595 N.E.2d 915 . 17 State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 19 , 294 N.E.2d 888 , 889 , quoting Anderson, 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence (12 Ed.), 54-55, Section 19. 18 State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172 , 175 , 485 N.E.2d 717 , 720-721 .
examined
Cited "see"
Robert Melchior v. Arnold R. Jago
(4×)
See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 , 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Robinson
See State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St. 2d 18 . i Í * # # “ Inasmuch as self-defense is an affirmative defense requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence, it is incumbent upon a defendant claiming self-defense to offer' evidence tending to establish that defense, including, if necessary, his own testimony.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Baker
See also State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973). {¶49} Because Baker entered a NGRI plea and advanced that affirmative defense at trial, he necessarily admitted committing the crime of Kidnapping.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Duran
See also State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19 (1973). {¶ 31} Because Duran entered the NGRI plea, he necessarily admitted committing the crime of attempted kidnapping.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Maggie W. Thomas v. Dorothy Arn, Superintendent
(2×)
See also State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95 , 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) and State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 , 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The State of Ohio
v.
Poole
v.
Poole
No. 72-477.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Mar 14, 1973.
294 N.E.2d 888
1973 Ohio LEXIS 396
Mr. John T. Corrigan, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Curtis L. Smith, for appellee., Messrs. Tuma, Kurtz, Gray & Modica and Mr. Donald A. Modica, for appellant.
Brown, Celebrezze, Corrigan, Herbert, Neill, Stern.
Cited by 159 opinions | Published
Herbert, J.
The question which prompted our allowance of the motion for leave to appeal in this first degree murder case is whether defendant’s contention that the killing was an accident is an affirmative defense, requiring the defendant to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence.
This court has consistently recognized that there are certain “justification[s] for admitted conduct”[1] allowed to a defendant in a criminal case, provable for the most part under the plea of not guilty, which are referred to as ‘ ‘ affirmative defenses. ’ ’ As characterized by one authority, they represent not a mere denial or contradiction of evidence which the prosecution has offered as proof of an essential element of the crime charged, but, rather, they represent a substantive or independent matter “which the defendant claims exempts him from liability even if it is conceded that the facts claimed by the prosecution are true.”[2] Among those defenses, in Ohio, are self-defense[3] duress[4] insanity[5] and intoxication[6] Affirmative defenses must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Vargo (1927), 116 Ohio St. 495, 507, 156 N. E. 600. How[*20] ever, it has long been established that accident is not an affirmative defense in this state. Jones v. State (1894), 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N. E. 79.
By raising the defense of accident, “the defendant denies any intent * # *, He denies that he committed an unlawful act and says that the result is accidental.”[7] Evidence which he offers in his own behalf to establish such a defense constitutes a denial or contradiction of evidence offered by the prosecution to prove an intent to MIL As this court said in Jones v. State, supra, at pages 342 and 343, in which an accused also raised the defense of accidental shooting to a murder charge:
“* * * The intent or purpose, to kill, being an essential constituent of the offense, should be averred and proven. Fouts v. The State, 8 Ohio St., 98; Kain v. The State, Ib., 306; Hagan v. The State, 10 Ohio St., 459. This purpose, like every other material averment of the indictment, is put in issue by the plea of not guilty and to authorize a conviction must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the state has shown that the death was the result of design, purpose, or intent — and these terms in this relation are synonymous — then the notion of accident is necessarily excluded. That which is designedly or purposely accomplished cannot, in the very nature of things, be accidental. Therefore, when the plaintiff in error introduced evidence tending to prove that the gun was accidentally discharged, he was merely controverting the truth of the averment in the indictment that it was purposely discharged.
“This was not an affirmative defense # * *.
“# * * pe se£ up no other defense than that the state had not established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts constituting the crime charged against him, one of which facts was an intent to Mil.. * * *”
The defense of accident or accidental homicide does not legally represent a “justification for admitted conduct.”[*21] Like the defenses of alibi[8] or entrapment,[9] accident is generally embraced in a charge dealing with the elements of the offense and the burden imposed upon the state to establish the existence of those elements.
Appellee has argued that if the trial court’s charge was erroneous, the jury was not misled and no prejudice resulted from the error. However, appellant’s sole theory at trial was that the fatal shot was an accident. There were several witnesses whose statements on examination and cross-examination bore upon that theory. The defendant testified in his own behalf to that effect. He obviously defended himself by attempting to create in the minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt that he intentionally shot the decedent. In that light, the error in the charge with respect to the defense of accident was highly prejudicial..
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Judgment reversed.
O’Neill, C. J., Corrigan, Stern, Celebrezze, W. Brown and P. Brown, JJ., concur.1
McCormick, Evidence (2 Ed.), 801.
2
Anderson, 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (12 Ed.), 54 and 55, Section 19.
3
Silvus v. State (1871), 22 Ohio St. 90; Weaver v. State (1874), 24 Ohio St. 584; State v. Vancak (1914), 90 Ohio St. 211, 107 N. E. 511; Szalki v. State (1917), 96 Ohio St. 36, 117 N. E. 12; Ezell v. State (1928), 119 Ohio St. 39, 162 N. E. 106; State v. Nolton (1969), 19 Ohio St. 2d 133, 249 N. E. 2d 797.
4
State v. Sappienza (1911), 84 Ohio St. 63, 95 N. E. 381.
5
Bergin v. State (1876), 31 Ohio St. 111; Kelch v. State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 146, 45 N. E. 6; State v. Staten (1969), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N. E. 2d 293.
6
Long v. State (1923), 109 Ohio St. 77, 141 N. E. 691; State v. Vargo, infra (116 Ohio St. 495); State v. Salmon (1967), 10 Ohio App. 2d 175, 226 N. E. 2d 784.
7
4 Ohio Jury Instructions (1970), 177, Section 411.01.
8
State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St. 2d 56, 236 N. E. 2d 545; 4 Ohio Jury Instructions 179, Section 411.03.
9
State v. Dutton Drugs (1965), 3 Ohio App. 2d 118, 209 N. E. 2d 597.