non-delegation doctrine in Pennsylvania

2025The non-delegation doctrine requires the legislature to make the basic policy choices and provide the “standards which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions.” Protz, 161 A.3d at 834 .

2025The WCJ award violates the non-delegation doctrine under Protz, 161 A.3d 827 .

2024As touched upon above, the non-delegation doctrine “requires that the basic policy choices involved in ‘legislative power’ actually be made by the [l]egislature as constitutionally mandated.” Chartiers, 211 A.2d at 492 .

2024As touched upon above, the non-delegation doctrine “requires that the basic policy choices involved in ‘legislative power’ actually be made by the [l]egislature as constitutionally mandated.” Chartiers, 211 A.2d at 492 .

2023Notably, Employer does not challenge the WCJ’s findings of fact or whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, but rather Employer’s argument is solely that TCE exposure cannot be a basis on which to award WC benefits to Claimant under Section 108(r) of the Act because it was not listed as a Group 1 carcinogen when Section 108(r) was added to the Act and, thus, violates the non-delegation doctrine under Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827, 841 (Pa. 2017).11 However, unlike Protz and Pennsylvania Builders Association v. Departme

2019In contrast, we held in Pennsylvania Builders Association v. Department of Labor and Industry, 4 A.3d 215, 224-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), that the General Assembly did not violate the non-delegation doctrine when it delegated the authority to adopt the Uniform Construction Code (UCC), see 34 Pa. Code §§ 401 - 401.16, 403.1-403-142, including future editions, to the Department of Labor and Industry (L & I) and International Code Council (ICC).

2025This “rule requiring express legislative delegation is tempered by the recognition that [a governmental body] is invested with the implied authority necessary to the effectuation of its express mandates.” Com. v. Beam, 788 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. 2002); accord Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489 (the non-delegation doctrine does not mandate that “all details of administration must be precisely or separately enumerated in the statute”); see also Beam, 788 A.2d at 361 (quoting City of Columbia v. Board of Health & Env’t Control, 355 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.C. 1987)) (“The delegation of authority to an administrativ

2004Servs., 408 F.Supp. 321, 341 (D.D.C.1976), aff'd 433 U.S. 425 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 , 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), which include the non-delegation doctrine embodied in Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. [3] See Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 380 , 839 A.2d 265, 274 (2003); Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 492 Pa. 92, 95 , 422 A.2d 487, 489 (1980).

2024“While the legislature cannot delegate the power to make a law, it may, where necessary, confer authority and discretion in connection with the execution of the law . . . .” Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277, 284 (Pa. 1947).

2024“While the legislature cannot delegate the power to make a law, it may, where necessary, confer authority and discretion in connection with the execution of the law . . . .” Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277, 284 (Pa. 1947).

2021See City of Williamsport Bureau of Codes v. DeRaffele, 170 A.3d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

2019See City of Williamsport Bureau of Codes v. DeRaffele, 170 A.3d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

2016See Holgate Bros., 331 Pa. at 260 , 200 A. at 675 (“In all such occasions ... the legislative body must surround such authority with definite standards, policies and limitations to which such administrative officers, boards or commissions, must strictly adhere and by which they are strictly governed”).

2016See Holgate Bros., 331 Pa. at 260 , 200 A. at 675 (“In all such occasions ... the legislative body must surround such authority with definite standards, policies and limitations to which such administrative officers, boards or commissions, must strictly adhere and by which they are strictly governed”).

2016See generally William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168 , 346 A.2d 269 (1975) (plurality) (reciting that the non- delegation rule serves two interrelated purposes: to ensure the Legislature makes basic policy choices, and to protect against the arbitrary exercise of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power).

2016See generally William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168 , 346 A.2d 269 (1975) (plurality) (reciting that the non- delegation rule serves two interrelated purposes: to ensure the Legislature makes basic policy choices, and to protect against the arbitrary exercise of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power).

2007However, in Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275 , 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (“PAGE ”), this Court found that the General Assembly’s attempt to effectuate this intent via the Gaming Act violated the non-delegation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in the absence of more specific legislative standards by which the Board is to make such determinations.

2007However, in Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275 , 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (“PAGE ”), this Court found that the General Assembly’s attempt to effectuate this intent via the Gaming Act violated the non-delegation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in the absence of more specific legislative standards by which the Board is to make such determinations.

1981We have often held that “the legislature cannot delegate its power to make laws to any other body or authority.. . . [citations omitted] . . . ‘While not specifically set forth in the Constitution, the non-delegation rule is a natural corollary to Article II, § 1 since it requires that the basic policy choices involved in “legislative power” actually be made by the Legislature as constitutionally mandated.’ ” State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Life Fellowship of Pennsylvania, 441 Pa. 293, 297 , 272 A.2d 478 (1971).

1981We have often held that “the legislature cannot delegate its power to make laws to any other body or authority.. . . [citations omitted] . . . ‘While not specifically set forth in the Constitution, the non-delegation rule is a natural corollary to Article II, § 1 since it requires that the basic policy choices involved in “legislative power” actually be made by the Legislature as constitutionally mandated.’ ” State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Life Fellowship of Pennsylvania, 441 Pa. 293, 297 , 272 A.2d 478 (1971).

2025This Court considered, and rejected, this argument in City of Philadelphia v. Healey (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), 297 A.3d 872 , 882 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (en banc), in which we explained: [U]nlike Protz and Pennsylvania Builders Association v. Department of Labor & Industry, 4 A.3d 215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), wherein the General Assembly expressly authorized third parties to set standards that substantively affected [workers’ compensation] recipients and builders without the necessary safeguards in place, in Section 108(r) of the Act, the General Assembly merely established the IARC’s Group

2023In addition, well-settled delegation standards and case law specify that the General Assembly has the authority “to delegate to [the IARC], its execution and administrative authority over Pennsylvania’s [occupational disease classifications], . . . as long as: (1) basic policy choices are still made by the General Assembly; and (2) the legislation contains adequate standards to guide and restrain the exercise of those functions.” Pa. Builders Ass’n v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 4 A.3d 215, 224 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); see also Protz. 12 without the necessary safeguards in place, in Section 108(r) of t

2022Id. 31 Petitioners have not asserted that Act 88 itself violates the non-delegation clause; rather, the constitutional infirmity lies in the manner in which the Board carried out its duties.

2019In Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf, 198 A.3d 1205, 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), the statutory provision at issue referenced future standards of 14 a private entity’s code by using the phrase “or any subsequent edition,” without including any guidelines or standards to restrain the private entity’s future enactments.

2022Protz I, 124 A.3d at 416-17 .

2021See Protz I, 124 A.3d at 415-16 .

1987Rev. 713 (1969), wherein Professor Davis wrote: [T]he protections [against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power] should grow beyond the non-delegation doctrine to a much broader requirement, judicially enforced, that as for as is practicable administrators must structure their discretionary power through appropriate safeguards and must confine and guide their discretionary powers through standards, principles and rules. 448 Pa. at 202 -03 n. 14, 292 A. 2d at 284 n. 14. 7 Joseph Trzybinski, the manager of environmental control problems for ECDH testified: Q.

1987Rev. 713 (1969), wherein Professor Davis wrote: [T]he protections [against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power] should grow beyond the non-delegation doctrine to a much broader requirement, judicially enforced, that as for as is practicable administrators must structure their discretionary power through appropriate safeguards and must confine and guide their discretionary powers through standards, principles and rules. 448 Pa. at 202 -03 n. 14, 292 A. 2d at 284 n. 14. 7 Joseph Trzybinski, the manager of environmental control problems for ECDH testified: Q.

2025The petition sought to temporarily and permanently enjoin the Department from enforcing Section 1171a.29(c). [J-57-2024] - 6 Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 915 A.2d 1165, 1186 (Pa. 2007)).

2025This “rule requiring express legislative delegation is tempered by the recognition that [a governmental body] is invested with the implied authority necessary to the effectuation of its express mandates.” Com. v. Beam, 788 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. 2002); accord Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489 (the non-delegation doctrine does not mandate that “all details of administration must be precisely or separately enumerated in the statute”); see also Beam, 788 A.2d at 361 (quoting City of Columbia v. Board of Health & Env’t Control, 355 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.C. 1987)) (“The delegation of authority to an administrativ

2025Konig v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, 50 P.3d 718, 726 (Cal. 2002).

2025This “rule requiring express legislative delegation is tempered by the recognition that [a governmental body] is invested with the implied authority necessary to the effectuation of its express mandates.” Com. v. Beam, 788 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. 2002); accord Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489 (the non-delegation doctrine does not mandate that “all details of administration must be precisely or separately enumerated in the statute”); see also Beam, 788 A.2d at 361 (quoting City of Columbia v. Board of Health & Env’t Control, 355 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.C. 1987)) (“The delegation of authority to an administrativ

2025This “rule requiring express legislative delegation is tempered by the recognition that [a governmental body] is invested with the implied authority necessary to the effectuation of its express mandates.” Com. v. Beam, 788 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. 2002); accord Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489 (the non-delegation doctrine does not mandate that “all details of administration must be precisely or separately enumerated in the statute”); see also Beam, 788 A.2d at 361 (quoting City of Columbia v. Board of Health & Env’t Control, 355 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.C. 1987)) (“The delegation of authority to an administrativ

2025Dist. of Phila., 132 A.3d 957, 968 (Pa. 2016) (standard for obtaining permanent injunctive relief is satisfied where petitioner has established that an entity has acted, or intends to act, in a manner that violates the non-delegation doctrine, and petitioner seeks to prevent that entity from initiating or continuing such conduct); cf. Pa. Builders Ass’n v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 284 A.3d 1287 , 1306 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (statute that contravenes non- delegation doctrine is void ab initio, cannot be enforced, and is properly enjoined on a permanent basis upon proper application for such relief,

2023See id. 6 have explained, the non-delegation doctrine prohibits the General Assembly from incorporating, sight unseen, subsequent modifications to such standards without also providing adequate criteria to guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated authority. [Protz II, 161 A.3d at 838-39 .] ....

2020See Young v. Fetterolf, 182 A. 676, 680 (Pa. 1936) (“The vesting in certain officials or persons by the legislative branch of government, of the power to suspend the operation of laws, has more than once received unequivocal judicial sanction.”). 30 Even assuming that the Governor’s delegated power under Section 7301(c) amounted to a power to suspend laws, this Court already has concluded that the Governor’s actions do not violate the separation of powers doctrine, Friends of Danny DeVito, 227 A.3d at 892-93, and, as noted above, Section 7301(c) complies with the requirements of the non-delega