non-delegation doctrine in Rhode Island

2010Although the Constitution has been interpreted to forbid unconditional delegations of legislative power, our Supreme Court has recognized that modern problems of ever-increasing complexity require administrative expertise 30 and that strict adherence to the non-delegation doctrine "would detrimentally inhibit the Legislature's ability to execute its constitutional duties." Id. (stating that non-delegation doctrine should not be so strictly applied that it inhibits the General Assembly's ability to execute its constitutional duties); Milardo , 434 A.2d at 270-71 (stating that delegation of legi

2008Complete and unlimited delegation of the legislative power to an administrative body, which by its nature cannot satisfy the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, would be unconstitutional. 13 It has long been established, however, that legislatures can delegate so-called quasi-legislative power 14 to other bodies pursuant to the exercise of their plenary powers without offending the non-delegation doctrine, provided that they furnish these entities with sufficient guidance. 15 See, e.g., Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission, 756 A.2d 186, 192 (R.I.2000); see also Milardo v. Coast

2000Indeed, we have long been mindful of the notion expressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court that ‘the problems which a modern legislature must confront are of such complexity that strict adherence to ideal notions of the non-delegation doctrine would unduly hamper the General Assembly in the exercise of its constitutionally vested powers.’ Adams v. North Carolina Department of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 696-97 , 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978).

2000Indeed, we have long been mindful of the notion expressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court that ‘the problems which a modern legislature must confront are of such complexity that strict adherence to ideal notions of the non-delegation doctrine would unduly hamper the General Assembly in the exercise of its constitutionally vested powers.’ Adams v. North Carolina Department of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 696-97 , 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978).

2000Cf. South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir.1974) (agency must have flexibility; Congress cannot acquire sufficient information to manage detailed process of enforcement).

2000Cf. South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir.1974) (agency must have flexibility; Congress cannot acquire sufficient information to manage detailed process of enforcement).

2008Complete and unlimited delegation of the legislative power to an administrative body, which by its nature cannot satisfy the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, would be unconstitutional. 13 It has long been established, however, that legislatures can delegate so-called quasi-legislative power 14 to other bodies pursuant to the exercise of their plenary powers without offending the non-delegation doctrine, provided that they furnish these entities with sufficient guidance. 15 See, e.g., Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission, 756 A.2d 186, 192 (R.I.2000); see also Milardo v. Coast

2008Complete and unlimited delegation of the legislative power to an administrative body, which by its nature cannot satisfy the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, would be unconstitutional. 13 It has long been established, however, that legislatures can delegate so-called quasi-legislative power 14 to other bodies pursuant to the exercise of their plenary powers without offending the non-delegation doctrine, provided that they furnish these entities with sufficient guidance. 15 See, e.g., Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission, 756 A.2d 186, 192 (R.I.2000); see also Milardo v. Coast

2008Complete and unlimited delegation of the legislative power to an administrative body, which by its nature cannot satisfy the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, would be unconstitutional. 13 It has long been established, however, that legislatures can delegate so-called quasi-legislative power 14 to other bodies pursuant to the exercise of their plenary powers without offending the non-delegation doctrine, provided that they furnish these entities with sufficient guidance. 15 See, e.g., Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission, 756 A.2d 186, 192 (R.I.2000); see also Milardo v. Coast

1987This so-called non-delegation doctrine does not entirely prohibit the General Assembly from delegating portions of its legislative power so long as the delegation is reasonable. 5 Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School District Committee, 116 R.I. 90, 97 , 352 A.2d 634, 638 (1976).

1987This so-called non-delegation doctrine does not entirely prohibit the General Assembly from delegating portions of its legislative power so long as the delegation is reasonable. 5 Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School District Committee, 116 R.I. 90, 97 , 352 A.2d 634, 638 (1976).