operating privilege in Pennsylvania

2025Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code provides: “[i]f any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so,” the Department shall suspend the operating privilege for 1 year, or 18 months under certain conditions. 75 Pa.C.S. §1547(b). 5 Martinovic v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d 30, 34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).4 This Court reviews the question of whether and officer had reasonable grounds on a case-by-case basis.

2018See Martinovic v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d 30, 34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (noting that in order for DOT to meet its prima facie burden establishing its entitlement to suspend a licensee’s operating privilege, DOT must show, inter alia, that the licensee was “specifically warned” about the consequences of refusing a chemical test).

2023To sustain the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under Section 1547 of committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Banner, 737 A.2d at 1205 .

2022To sustain the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, DOT has the burden of proving at the statutory appeal hearing that the licensee: (1) was arrested for [DUI] by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under [the] influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was warned that refusal might result in a license suspension. 7 Banner, 737 A.2d at 1206 .

2019Kollar v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 7 A.3d 336, 339 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

2011In order to sustain a suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under Section 1547 of the Code for a refusal to submit to chemical testing, DOT must establish that the licensee: (1) was arrested for driving under the influence by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was warned that refusal might result in a license suspension. *1257 Kollar v. Dep’t of Transp., Burea

2026“Once a police officer provides the implied consent warnings to a motorist, the officer has done all that is legally required to ensure the motorist is fully advised of the consequences of her failure to submit to chemical testing.” Park v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 178 A.3d 274, 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

2020Whether or not the police department had the ability to conduct the chemical test is not relevant to the question of whether Licensee had the meaningful opportunity to consent. 12 whether to sustain the suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege is whether Licensee “refused to submit to chemical testing.” Park, 178 A.3d at 280 .

2022Piasecki v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 6 A.3d 1067 , 1070 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 6 “[s]uspension of operating privileges upon conviction” and provides, in relevant part: (1) [PennDOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of an individual under paragraph (2) upon receiving a certified record of the individual’s conviction of or an adjudication of delinquency for: (i) an offense under [S]ection 3802; or (ii) an offense which is substantially similar to an offense enumerated in [S]ection 3802 reported to the department under Article III of the compact in [S]ection

2021The Department’s burden of proof when it suspends a licensee’s operating privilege for one year under Section 1543(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code is to establish that: (1) the Department received a record of conviction for violation of Section 1543(a) of the Vehicle Code; and (2) the Department’s records show that the licensee was “under suspension, recall or cancellation on the date of violation, and had not been restored.” Piasecki v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 6 A.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (quoting Orndoff v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 654 A.2d 1,

2026Moreover, Section 6309.2 of our Vehicle Code provides the following: If a person operates a motor vehicle ... on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth while the person’s operating privilege is suspended, revoked, canceled, recalled or disqualified or where the person is unlicensed, as verified by an appropriate law enforcement officer in cooperation with the department, the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the vehicle ... or, in the interest of public safety, direct that the vehicle be towed and stored[3] by the appropriate towing and storage agent ..., and the appropriate judic

2021Pertinently, the Vehicle Code addresses “Immobilization, towing and storage of vehicle for driving without operating privileges or registration,” and provides: If a person operates a motor vehicle . . . on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth while the person’s operating privilege is suspended, revoked, . . . or where the person is unlicensed, . . . the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the vehicle . . . or, in the interest of public safety, direct that the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and storage agent . . ., and the appropriate judicial authority shall

2021Our Supreme Court has established that a suspension of an individual’s operating privilege is a “sanction.” Terraciano, 753 A.2d at 235 n.3.

2016February 3, 2015, Hearing, Commonwealth Exhibit No. C-1; R.R. at 34a. 5 In Terraciano v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 753 A.2d 233, 236 (Pa. 2000), the Court held that, in order to sustain an appeal of a license suspension based on delay, a licensee must establish that: (1) an unreasonable delay chargeable to the Department led the licensee to believe that his operating privilege would not be impaired; and (2) prejudice would result in having the licensee’s operating privilege suspended after that delay.

2025Walkden v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); Marone v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 990 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

2025Walkden v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 432, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 5 one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in violation of section . . . 3802[.] (b) Civil penalties for refusal.-- (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing

2022See Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa. 1994) (the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(3) includes secondary review of appeals from operating privilege suspensions); 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a) (if an appeal is filed in a court of the Commonwealth that lacks jurisdiction, the court shall not quash the appeal “but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal . . . shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date when the appeal . . . was first filed” in the court withou

2018Bell v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 96 A.3d 1005, 1019 (Pa. 2014) (suspension of driving privilege is a “civil sanction wholly unrelated to [a licensee’s] appeal of the criminal conviction”); Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 884 (1994) (“scope of review of an operating privilege 2 Licensee later filed a separate “Motion to Strike Off Judgment.” O.R., Item #15.

2019This petition is the second (at least) attempt in the past three years in which a petitioner has invited this Court to address the constitutionality of the procedure by which the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) suspends an individual’s driver’s license under the Implied Consent Law.1 See Regula v. Pa., Dep’t of Transp., 1 The Implied Consent Law, in pertinent part, provides: (b) Civil penalties for refusal.-- (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be condu

2019See Regula, 146 A.3d at 844 (“Courts of this Commonwealth have consistently followed and cited Wysocki for . . . distinguishing between the civil license suspension and the criminal [driving under the influence] proceedings.”). (i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a period of 12 months. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b). [219 WAL 2019] - 2 In the decision below in the instant case, the Commonwealth Court outlined that, “[t]o support the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under the Implied Consent Law, [Penn]DOT must prove that the licensee: (1) was arrested for DUI by an officer wh

2022In response to a police officer’s request for a chemical test, “‘anything less than an unqualified, unequivocal assent . . . constitutes a refusal . . . .’” Nardone v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 130 A.3d 738, 748 (Pa. 2015) (quoting Todd v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 2 The Department suspended Licensee’s operating privilege for 12 months pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i). 5 723 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. 1999)).

2019In order to support a suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege under section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code, DOT had the burden of proving the following: (1) Licensee was arrested for violating Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code by a police officer who had “reasonable grounds to believe” that [l]icensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle while in violation of Section 3802 (i.e., while driving under the influence); (2) Licensee was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) Licensee refused to do so; and (4) Licensee was specifically warned that a refusa

2025Trial Ct. Op. at 3. 4 This Court’s “review is limited to determining whether [the trial court] committed an error of law, whether [the trial court] abused its discretion, or whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Garlick v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 176 A.3d 1030 , 1035 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). 3 DOT argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that Licensee satisfied her burden of proving that she was incapable of making a knowing and conscious decision to refuse chemical testing.5 Initially, [t]o support the suspension of a

2025This Court has explained: To support the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under [Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code], DOT 4 This Court’s “review is limited to determining whether [the trial court] committed an error of law, whether [the trial court] abused its discretion, or whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Garlick v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 176 A.3d 1030 , 1035 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). 3 must prove that the licensee: (1) was arrested for DUI by an officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating

2020See also Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539 , 541 n.4 (Pa. 1996). held a de novo hearing on the matter on June 19, 2019.

2005Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 546 Pa. 241, 247 , 684 A.2d 539, 542 (1996). [3] In a typical license suspension case the Department must establish that the licensee: (1) was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was specifically warned that a refusal would result in a license suspension.

2018Regarding convictions under Section 1543(b)(1), we have explained: In Commonwealth v. Kane, [] 333 A.2d 925, 927 ([Pa.] 1975), our Supreme Court held that it is necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant had actual notice of a suspension in order to sustain a conviction of driving while under suspension.

2017In Commonwealth v. Kane, 333 A.2d 925 (Pa. 1975), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was necessary for the Commonwealth to establish that the operator was aware that his license was suspended in order to prove a conviction under the predecessor statute to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a), 75 P.S. § 624.

2017Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Moss, 605 A.2d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). 3 (b) Suspension for refusal.-- (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person as follows: (i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a period of 12 months. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i). 3 Citing this Court’s decision in Broadbelt v. Department of Transportati

2010Instead, we agree with the Department that all that is required is that the warnings be read to the licensee and the licensee be given “a meaningful opportunity to comply with [S]ection 1547 of the [Implied Consent Law].” (Department’s Br. at 11 (quoting Broadbelt v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 903 A.2d 636, 640 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006)).) Section 1547(b)(2) of the Implied Consent Law sets forth the warning requirements, providing: (2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that: (i) the person’s operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal

2009This Court has found that, in order to sustain a suspension of a license’s operating privilege under Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code, the Department must prove (1) the vehicle was required to be registered in the Commonwealth; (2) financial responsibility was not maintained for the vehicle; and (3) the licensee operated the vehicle while it was not covered by the required financial responsibility. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(4)(i)-(ii); Dubolino v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (citing Richards v. Department of Transportation, Burea

2009This Court has found that, in order to sustain a suspension of a license's operating privilege under Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code, the Department must prove (1) the vehicle was required to be registered in the Commonwealth; (2) financial responsibility was not maintained for the vehicle; and (3) the licensee operated the vehicle while it was not covered by the required financial responsibility. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(4)(i)-(ii); Dubolino v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Cmwlth.2002) (citing Richards v. Department of Transportation, Bure

2022Officer O’Connor proceeded to read to Licensee, in English, the warnings required by the Implied Consent Law 4 and our Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989) (O’Connell warnings),5 which are listed on the Department of Transportation DL-26B Form.6 Officer O’Connor read the DL- 4 Section 1547(b)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code provides: (2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person [under arrest for DUI] that: (i) the person’s operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical

2020You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code[, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802]. 2 The Implied Consent Law provides, in relevant part, that: (1) If any person placed under arrest for violation of [S]ection 3802 [of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance),] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, [DOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of the

2011Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Ingram, 538 Pa. 236 , 648 A.2d 285 (1994).

2011Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Ingram, 538 Pa. 236 , 648 A.2d 285 (1994).

2013See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1542(a), (b)(1.1), (d); Bursick, 526 Pa. at 11 , 584 A.2d at 298 (“[PennDOT] is required to revoke the operating privilege of any person whose driving record meets criteria defining a habitual offender.

2013See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1542(a), (b)(1.1), (d); Bursick, 526 Pa. at 11 , 584 A.2d at 298 (“[PennDOT] is required to revoke the operating privilege of any person whose driving record meets criteria defining a habitual offender.

2020Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Boucher, 691 A.2d 450, 453 (Pa. 1997); Martinovic v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d 30, 34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

2010Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Boucher, 547 Pa. 440 , 691 A.2d 450 (1997).

2025Licensee first argues that DOT failed to establish that Officer Kozarovich had reasonable grounds to request that Licensee undergo a chemical test. 4 Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part: (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of [S]ection 3802 [of the Vehicle Code] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, [DOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of the person as follows: (i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a period of 12 months. 75 Pa.C.S.

2018Id. at 878 . 3 (i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a period of 12 months. .... (2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that: (i) the person’s operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical testing and the person will be subject to a restoration fee of up to $2,000; and (ii) if the person refuses to submit to chemical testing,[8] upon conviction or plea for violating [S]ection 3802(a)(1) [of the Vehicle Code], the person will be subject to the penalties provided in [S]ection 3804(c) [of the Vehicle Code] (relating to penalties)

2023(Bureau’s Reply Br. at 4-7.) We must agree as, for over 30 years, this Court has held that mandatory civil penalties, such as the suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege under the Vehicle Code, “are not subject to the terms of a plea agreement arising from related criminal charges.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501, 503 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).

2023For over 30 years this Court has held that mandatory civil penalties, such as the suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege under the Vehicle Code, “are not subject to the terms of a plea agreement arising from related criminal charges.” Lefever, 533 A.2d at 503 .

2023Boseman v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 157 A.3d 10, 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

2019(Id.) Common pleas further concluded that pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), and Boseman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 157 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), Licensee had no constitutional right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to the chemical test of his blood.

2018(Id. at 5.) Licensee’s timely appeal followed.8 7 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 939 (Pa. 1996) (a refusal to submit to chemical testing occurred where a licensee closed her eyes, turned her head, ignored the officer’s requests, and exhibited gamesmanship by stating during a fleeting moment that she would assent to chemical testing). 8 Licensee is not contending that the Department failed to establish its prima facie case for sustaining the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege, which requires that it prove the following: 1) licensee was arrested for [DUI] . . . by a p

2000While we acknowledge that Conrad was explicitly overruled by this Court in its en banc decision in Smith v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 655 A.2d 232 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), more recently in Brown , we noted that the Supreme Court revived Conrad in its decision in Department of Transportation v. Renwick, 543 Pa. 122 , 669 A.2d 934 (1996).

1980Section 1547(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b) (2), states: “It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that the person’s operating privilege will be suspended or revoked upon refusal to submit to a chemical test.” In Peppelman v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262 , 403 A.2d 1041 (1979), we held that a suspension of driving privilege for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test was not proper where a police officer advised the driver that his operating' privilege could be suspended upon his refusal to submit to the test rathther than advising the dri

1980Section 1547(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b) (2), states: “It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that the person’s operating privilege will be suspended or revoked upon refusal to submit to a chemical test.” In Peppelman v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262 , 403 A.2d 1041 (1979), we held that a suspension of driving privilege for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test was not proper where a police officer advised the driver that his operating' privilege could be suspended upon his refusal to submit to the test rathther than advising the dri