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30 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1981–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Anagnosgreen2 sentences2024Thus, whether Terhune’s motion alleged facts entitling him to suppression of evidence has no bearing on the relief actually available to the cited person in a refusal proceeding, namely, that the circuit court must “order that no action be taken on the operating privilege” based on the refusal if one of the issues raised at the proceeding is “determined favorably to the person.” See § 343.305(9)(d); Anagnos, 341 Wis. 2d 576 , ¶25 & n.7.2 ¶17 Here, Terhune was ultimately afforded the opportunity to challenge the revocation of his operating privileges based on evidence that he argued showed that 2022See State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶43 , 341 Wis. 2d 576 , 815 N.W.2d 675 (noting that a court may not revoke a defendant’s operating privilege if it determines that the defendant was not lawfully placed under arrest). ¶14 The County does not address Steinert’s argument that his transportation to the sheriff’s office was outside the vicinity of the stop and therefore violated WIS. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Reittergreen2 sentences2023Thus, the Implied Consent Law “impose[s] a condition on the right to obtain a license to drive on a Wisconsin highway,” and that condition “requires that a licensed driver, by applying for and receiving a license, consent to submit to chemical tests for intoxication under statutorily determined circumstances.” Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494 , 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974); see also Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 225 (“The implied consent law provides that Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege.”). 2017"By reason of the implied consent law, a driver . . . consents to submit to the prescribed chemical tests."9 State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 193 , 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980); see also State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 225 , 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999) ("The implied consent law provides that Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege."). | 2 | 2 |
County of Ozaukee v. Quellegreen2 sentences2023See Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 280 . ¶17 Cormican argues that these statements were misleading because the revocation of a person’s operating privilege does not, in fact, occur automatically when a person refuses a requested test. 2002WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.305(9)(a) states, in relevant part: "If a person refuses to take a test under *417 sub. (3) (a), the law enforcement officer shall immediately take possession of the person's license and prepare a notice of intent to revoke, by court order under sub. (10), the person's operating privilege." In concluding that this is an arresting officer's only recourse upon an arrestee's refusal to submit to chemical testing, Marshall relies on language from County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269 , 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), in which this court stated: Every driver in Wisconsi | 1 | 4 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2026STAT. § 343.305(9)(a), our state supreme court analyzed Birchfield and noted that “[t]here is no constitutional issue, however, when a state imposes only ‘civil penalties,’ such as revoking a person’s operating privileges, for refusing a warrantless blood draw.” Forrett, 401 Wis. 2d 678 , ¶8 n.5 (quoting Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 476-77 ). ¶21 Revocation of an individual’s operating privilege is the consequence for failing to comply with Wisconsin’s implied consent law. 2017A court-ordered revocation under § 343.305(10) is not a criminal penalty.9 Therefore, nothing in Birchfield undermines the longstanding provisions of Wisconsin's implied consent law. ¶74 On the contrary, the Supreme Court stated in Birchfield that "[i]t is well established that a search is reasonable when the subject consents, and that sometimes consent to a search need not be express but may be fairly inferred from context." Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (citations omitted). 9 A revocation under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (10) has other consequences, but they are not criminal penalties for the wit | 1 | 2 |
State v. Carlsongreen1 sentence2019See Carlson , 250 Wis. 2d 562 , ¶27. | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2017And, as a plurality of the Supreme Court explained in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013), "all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense." The "consent" to which this court in Neitzel and the Supreme 9 Our previous cases discussing implied consent clearly establish that an individual has already consented at the time an officer reads a driver the Informing the Accused form. 2017And, as a plurality of the Supreme Court explained in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013), "all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense." The "consent" to which this court in Neitzel and the Supreme Court in McNeely refer is consent sufficient under the Fourth Amendment — not some amorphous, lesser form of consent. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodsgreen2 sentences2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p 2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p | 1 | 1 |
State v. Willegreen2 sentences2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p 2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mordangreen2 sentences2000The relevant Pennsylvania statute provided that "it shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that the person's operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical testing." Id. at 108 (citation omitted). 2000The court concluded that although a "knowing refusal" might be required prior to imposing sanctions for refusing to submit to testing, "[n]o where *269 does the law require the officer to make certain that the motorist understands that he could exercise a right to refuse a breathalyzer test.... [A motorist has no] right to a knowing and conscious submission to the breath test." Id. at 108-09 . ¶ 18. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Zielkegreen2 sentences1990Instead, it says "in addition to other penalties which may be imposed." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the word "may" is used instead of the word "will." The partial text of the form appears in a footnote below. 1 Muente cites State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 54 , 403 N.W.2d 427, 433 (1987), for the proposition that when officers fail to comply with the implied consent statute, the license cannot be revoked. 1990Instead, it says "in addition to other penalties which may be imposed." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the word "may" is used instead of the word "will." The partial text of the form appears in a footnote below. 1 Muente cites State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 54 , 403 N.W.2d 427, 433 (1987), for the proposition that when officers fail to comply with the implied consent statute, the license cannot be revoked. | 1 | 1 |
| Kenosha County Department of Social Services v. Nelsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Service Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Adam M. Blackman
green
2 sentences2025In pertinent part, the Informing the Accused form tells the driver that one or more of the situations in paras. (3)(a) or (ar) apply and reads: “If you refuse to take any test that this agency requests, your operating privilege will be revoked and you will be subject to other penalties.” Sec. 343.305(4) (emphasis added). ¶23 WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.305(9)(a) “provides the penalty for refusing a post-arrest request for a chemical test under” § 343.305(3)(a), see Blackman, 377 Wis. 2d 339, ¶41 , and states that “[i]f a person refuses to take a test under sub. (3)(a), the law enforcement officer sh 2025STAT.] § 343.305(3)(ar)2. through §§ 343.305(3)(a) and 343.305(9)(a).” Blackman, 377 Wis. 2d 339, ¶35 . | 2 | 2020–2025 |
Washburn County v. Smith
green
2 sentences2024If the person refuses to consent to the requested test, and if a court subsequently determines that the refusal was improper, the court “shall revoke the person’s operating privilege.” See § 343.305(10)(a), (b)1. ¶18 “A refusal to submit to a chemical test for intoxication cannot result in revocation of operating privileges unless the person has first been adequately informed of his [or her] rights under the law.” Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶51 . 2020STAT.] § 343.305(4).” Washburn Cnty., 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶72 . | 2 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Neitzel
green
2 sentences2017"By reason of the implied consent law, a driver . . . consents to submit to the prescribed chemical tests."9 State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 193 , 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980); see also State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 225 , 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999) ("The implied consent law provides that Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege."). 2017"By reason of the implied consent law, a driver . . . consents to submit to the prescribed chemical tests."9 State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 193 , 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980); see also State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 225 , 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999) ("The implied consent law provides that Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege."). | 2 | 1999–2017 |
Scales v. State
green
2 sentences2023Thus, the Implied Consent Law “impose[s] a condition on the right to obtain a license to drive on a Wisconsin highway,” and that condition “requires that a licensed driver, by applying for and receiving a license, consent to submit to chemical tests for intoxication under statutorily determined circumstances.” Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494 , 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974); see also Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 225 (“The implied consent law provides that Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege.”). 2023Thus, the Implied Consent Law “impose[s] a condition on the right to obtain a license to drive on a Wisconsin highway,” and that condition “requires that a licensed driver, by applying for and receiving a license, consent to submit to chemical tests for intoxication under statutorily determined circumstances.” Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494 , 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974); see also Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 225 (“The implied consent law provides that Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege.”). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences2022At the time an officer requests a sample, the officer must read the information and warnings set forth in § 343.305(4), which are generally incorporated into a form entitled “Informing the Accused.” See State v. Schmidt, 2004 WI App 235, ¶10 , 277 Wis. 2d 561 , 691 N.W.2d 379 . ¶11 If the driver refuses to take the test, the officer “shall immediately prepare a notice of intent to revoke … the person’s operating privilege.” WIS. 2022At the time an officer requests a sample, the officer must read the information and warnings set forth in § 343.305(4), which are generally incorporated into a form entitled “Informing the Accused.” See State v. Schmidt, 2004 WI App 235, ¶10 , 277 Wis. 2d 561 , 691 N.W.2d 379 . ¶11 If the driver refuses to take the test, the officer “shall immediately prepare a notice of intent to revoke … the person’s operating privilege.” WIS. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Dixon v. Love
green
1 sentence2019Love , 431 U.S. at 113 . ¶11 Because the demands of due process are flexible, an erroneous circuit court order that revokes an individual's operating privilege does not make that order void per se; instead, we look at the magnitude of the court's error. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Grady
green
1 sentence2017Any convictions for moving violations arising out of the incident or occurrence giving rise to sentencing under this section. ¶53 In Grady, this court determined that "a circuit court satisfies its [statutory] obligation when the record of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the court actually considered the sentencing guidelines and so stated on the record." 302 Wis. 2d 80, ¶3 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Swanson
green
2 sentences2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p 2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Nordness
green
2 sentences2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p 2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Seibel
green
2 sentences2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p 2008Section 346.63(1) provides in relevant part that "[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: ... (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." 5 See Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(a)5.a. (providing that at a refusal hearing, the court considers the issue whether the defendant "was lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s. 346.63(1)..."); Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9)(d) (providing that if one or more issues considered under § 343.305(9)(a)5. is determined favorably to the defendant, "the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the p | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Schmerber v. California
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Renard
green
2 sentences2004By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 2 Because of this conclusion, we do not address the State's argument that, even if Schmidt had made a proper request for an additional test, the officer's failure to administer an additional test does not entitle Schmidt to the remedy of suppression of the blood test results. 3 The refusal to submit to a test is, in itself, grounds for penalties under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9), including revocation of the person's operating privilege. 4 In addition to distinguishing S 2004By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 2 Because of this conclusion, we do not address the State's argument that, even if Schmidt had made a proper request for an additional test, the officer's failure to administer an additional test does not entitle Schmidt to the remedy of suppression of the blood test results. 3 The refusal to submit to a test is, in itself, grounds for penalties under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9), including revocation of the person's operating privilege. 4 In addition to distinguishing S | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Piddington
green
2 sentences2004By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 2 Because of this conclusion, we do not address the State's argument that, even if Schmidt had made a proper request for an additional test, the officer's failure to administer an additional test does not entitle Schmidt to the remedy of suppression of the blood test results. 3 The refusal to submit to a test is, in itself, grounds for penalties under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9), including revocation of the person's operating privilege. 4 In addition to distinguishing S 2004By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 2 Because of this conclusion, we do not address the State's argument that, even if Schmidt had made a proper request for an additional test, the officer's failure to administer an additional test does not entitle Schmidt to the remedy of suppression of the blood test results. 3 The refusal to submit to a test is, in itself, grounds for penalties under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9), including revocation of the person's operating privilege. 4 In addition to distinguishing S | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. McCrossen
green
2 sentences2004By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 2 Because of this conclusion, we do not address the State's argument that, even if Schmidt had made a proper request for an additional test, the officer's failure to administer an additional test does not entitle Schmidt to the remedy of suppression of the blood test results. 3 The refusal to submit to a test is, in itself, grounds for penalties under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9), including revocation of the person's operating privilege. 4 In addition to distinguishing S 2004By the Court. — Judgment affirmed. 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 2 Because of this conclusion, we do not address the State's argument that, even if Schmidt had made a proper request for an additional test, the officer's failure to administer an additional test does not entitle Schmidt to the remedy of suppression of the blood test results. 3 The refusal to submit to a test is, in itself, grounds for penalties under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (9), including revocation of the person's operating privilege. 4 In addition to distinguishing S | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Kniess
neutral
2 sentences2001The result in Doyen is consistent with the court of appeals decision in State v. Kniess, 178 Wis. 2d 451 , 504 N.W.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1993). 2001The result in Doyen is consistent with the court of appeals decision in State v. Kniess, 178 Wis. 2d 451 , 504 N.W.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1993). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Bolling
green
2 sentences2001If no hearing was requested, the revocation period shall begin 30 days after the date of the refusal.... 3 In State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558 , 570-71, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998), we stated that the purpose behind the different ways in which a special prosecutor may be appointed is targeted at controlling the Department of Administration (DOA) expenditures. 2001If no hearing was requested, the revocation period shall begin 30 days after the date of the refusal.... 3 In State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558 , 570-71, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998), we stated that the purpose behind the different ways in which a special prosecutor may be appointed is targeted at controlling the Department of Administration (DOA) expenditures. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Rydeski
green
1 sentence1999Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2); Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 193 ; Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 109 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Village of Oregon v. Bryant
green
2 sentences1995In that case the driver, Bryant, argued that the Informing the Accused form was inaccurate and misleading because, by stating that failing "any" test will result in suspension, it "deters the [driver] from knowing that [as stated in the administrative appeal form], if he [or she] takes additional tests and any of those test results are not within the prohibited range, 'the administrative suspension of the person's operating privilege [may] be rescinded.'" Id. at 686 , 524 N.W.2d at 637 (quoting § 343.305(8)(b)5, Stats.). *569 The supreme court agreed with Bryant that one arrested for OWI "shou 1995In that case the driver, Bryant, argued that the Informing the Accused form was inaccurate and misleading because, by stating that failing "any" test will result in suspension, it "deters the [driver] from knowing that [as stated in the administrative appeal form], if he [or she] takes additional tests and any of those test results are not within the prohibited range, 'the administrative suspension of the person's operating privilege [may] be rescinded.'" Id. at 686 , 524 N.W.2d at 637 (quoting § 343.305(8)(b)5, Stats.). *569 The supreme court agreed with Bryant that one arrested for OWI "shou | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Raley v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1992He cites Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), and McDonnell v. Commissioner of Pub. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Warner v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1991Warner v. Department of Transp., 102 Wis. 2d 232, 236 , 306 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1981). 344.14 Suspension for failure to deposit security; impoundment of vehicle; exceptions. (1) If a person who was given notice pursuant to s. 344.13(3) fails to deposit security in the amount and by the time specified in the notice, the secretary shall forthwith suspend the person's operating privilege if the person was the operator of a motor vehicle involved in the accident and all the person's registrations if the person was the owner of a motor vehicle involved in the accident unless the person furnishes p 1991Warner v. Department of Transp., 102 Wis. 2d 232, 236 , 306 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1981). 344.14 Suspension for failure to deposit security; impoundment of vehicle; exceptions. (1) If a person who was given notice pursuant to s. 344.13(3) fails to deposit security in the amount and by the time specified in the notice, the secretary shall forthwith suspend the person's operating privilege if the person was the operator of a motor vehicle involved in the accident and all the person's registrations if the person was the owner of a motor vehicle involved in the accident unless the person furnishes p | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Wilke green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Derenne green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.