8 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 2020–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 . 2022Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 .3 Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether defendant’s successive postconviction petition comports with the dictates under the Act. ¶ 37 A. Cause 3 In his brief, defendant states that “the Illinois Supreme Court has made clear that a successive post-conviction petition is a proper vehicle for youthful defendants 18 and over to litigate an as-applied Miller-type challenge under the eighth amendment or Illinois proportionate penalties clause.” Defendant’s statement misstates the law and conflates eighth amendment claims and pr | 3 | 4 |
People v. Elliottgreen2 sentences2024See Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 59 (where the defendant argued his sentence was excessive for “reasons that parallel a Miller-type claim,” the court concluded that the defendant’s “eligibility for parole was relevant” and “militates against finding his sentence excessive, greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense”). ¶ 89 Accordingly, from our review of the record, the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when it resentenced Aguilar to 50 years in prison. ¶ 90 III. 2024See Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 59 (where the defendant argued his sentence was excessive for “reasons that parallel a Miller-type claim,” the court concluded that the defendant’s “eligibility for parole was relevant” and “militates against finding his sentence excessive, greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense”). ¶ 89 Accordingly, from our review of the record, the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when it resentenced Aguilar to 50 years in prison. ¶ 90 III. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 . 2022Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 .3 Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether defendant’s successive postconviction petition comports with the dictates under the Act. ¶ 37 A. Cause 3 In his brief, defendant states that “the Illinois Supreme Court has made clear that a successive post-conviction petition is a proper vehicle for youthful defendants 18 and over to litigate an as-applied Miller-type challenge under the eighth amendment or Illinois proportionate penalties clause.” Defendant’s statement misstates the law and conflates eighth amendment claims and pr | 1 | 2 |
People v. Clemonsgreen2 sentences2024See Scott, 2019 IL App (1st) 181586-U , ¶ 31. 6 No. 1-22-1255 ¶ 16 As the proportionate penalties clause is broader than the protections of the eighth amendment (see People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶¶ 39-40 ), however, our supreme court has not foreclosed the possibility of “emerging adults” of 18 or 19 years old raising challenges to their sentences under the proportionate penalties clause based on a Miller-type analysis. 2024See Scott, 2019 IL App (1st) 181586-U , ¶ 31. 6 No. 1-22-1255 ¶ 16 As the proportionate penalties clause is broader than the protections of the eighth amendment (see People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶¶ 39-40 ), however, our supreme court has not foreclosed the possibility of “emerging adults” of 18 or 19 years old raising challenges to their sentences under the proportionate penalties clause based on a Miller-type analysis. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences2024People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶¶ 36-44 (collecting cases). 2024People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶¶ 36-44 (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2020Thus, there is no evidence in the record that he considered ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ [citation], as we now understand those terms to mean ***.” Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 92 . 19 No. 1-17-3135 specifically rejected an argument by the State that a trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s age and PSI decades ago sufficed to reject a Miller-type claim now. ¶ 76 We find that, where defendant’s argument finds support in both the filed record and recent case law, it cannot be considered frivolous and patently without merit. ¶ 77 As a final note, this court’s recen 2020Thus, there is no evidence in the record that he considered ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ [citation], as we now understand those terms to mean ***.” Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 92 . 19 No. 1-17-3135 specifically rejected an argument by the State that a trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s age and PSI decades ago sufficed to reject a Miller-type claim now. ¶ 76 We find that, where defendant’s argument finds support in both the filed record and recent case law, it cannot be considered frivolous and patently without merit. ¶ 77 As a final note, this court’s recen | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2024Subsequent to this court’s remand directing second stage proceedings in defendant’s case, our supreme court in People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 20 , reiterated that “a voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) The Jones court explained that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise a Miller-type claim for that reason, and because the court, in being able to accept or reject the plea agreement, was able to exercise discretion in entering the final sentence. 2024Subsequent to this court’s remand directing second stage proceedings in defendant’s case, our supreme court in People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 20 , reiterated that “a voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) The Jones court explained that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise a Miller-type claim for that reason, and because the court, in being able to accept or reject the plea agreement, was able to exercise discretion in entering the final sentence. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Clark
green
2 sentences2024But the reasoning in Miller “does not apply to discretionary life sentences under proportionate penalties clause standards where the circuit court does consider all relevant mitigating factors at sentencing and the - 12 - No. 1-22-1719 circuit court’s exercise of discretion is supported by the evidence in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 72 . ¶ 37 However, this court has observed that “the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21,” and we have generally rejected a Miller-type claim under the proportionate penalties clause where, as here, the defendant 2024But the reasoning in Miller “does not apply to discretionary life sentences under proportionate penalties clause standards where the circuit court does consider all relevant mitigating factors at sentencing and the - 12 - No. 1-22-1719 circuit court’s exercise of discretion is supported by the evidence in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 72 . ¶ 37 However, this court has observed that “the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21,” and we have generally rejected a Miller-type claim under the proportionate penalties clause where, as here, the defendant | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Harvey
green
1 sentence2020Relying on Buffer, this court in People v. Harvey, 2019 IL App (1st) 153581, ¶ 13 , specifically rejected an argument by the State that a trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s age and PSI decades ago sufficed to reject a Miller- type claim now. ¶ 76 We find that, where defendant’s argument finds support in both the filed record and recent case law, it cannot be considered frivolous and patently without merit. ¶ 77 As a final note, this court’s recent opinion in People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430 , is distinguishable from the case at bar. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Carrasquillo
green
2 sentences2020Thus, there is no evidence in the record that he considered ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ [citation], as we now understand those terms to mean ***.” Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 92 . 19 No. 1-17-3135 specifically rejected an argument by the State that a trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s age and PSI decades ago sufficed to reject a Miller-type claim now. ¶ 76 We find that, where defendant’s argument finds support in both the filed record and recent case law, it cannot be considered frivolous and patently without merit. ¶ 77 As a final note, this court’s recen 2020Thus, there is no evidence in the record that he considered ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ [citation], as we now understand those terms to mean ***.” Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 92 . 19 No. 1-17-3135 specifically rejected an argument by the State that a trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s age and PSI decades ago sufficed to reject a Miller-type claim now. ¶ 76 We find that, where defendant’s argument finds support in both the filed record and recent case law, it cannot be considered frivolous and patently without merit. ¶ 77 As a final note, this court’s recen | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.