8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. McLauringreen1 sentence2021See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 ; Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 274 (2013) (observing that, under Supreme Court case law, it is “enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration” (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 497 (2009) (“not[ing] the similarity between our plain-error analysis and the parallel analysis under the federal rules”). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 ; Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 274 (2013) (observing that, under Supreme Court case law, it is “enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration” (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 497 (2009) (“not[ing] the similarity between our plain-error analysis and the parallel analysis under the federal rules”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hilliergreen1 sentence2021See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 ; Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 274 (2013) (observing that, under Supreme Court case law, it is “enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration” (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 497 (2009) (“not[ing] the similarity between our plain-error analysis and the parallel analysis under the federal rules”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Olanogreen2 sentences2009We have previously noted the similarity between our plain-error analysis and the parallel analysis under the federal rules (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 184-87 ), and we note that the federal analysis, like our own, places the burden of persuasion squarely on the defendant (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187 ; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 , 123 L. 2009We have previously noted the similarity between our plain-error analysis and the parallel analysis under the federal rules (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 184-87 ), and we note that the federal analysis, like our own, places the burden of persuasion squarely on the defendant (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187 ; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 , 123 L. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Guptagreen2 sentences1996Thus, although the supreme court in dicta recently referred to section 2-622 as a "condition" ( Miller v. Gupta, (1996), 174 Ill.2d 120, 126 , 220 Ill.Dec. 217, 220 , 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 ("the legislature has made the filing of a section 2-622 certificate of merit a condition of proceeding with a meritorious medical malpractice action")), to reconcile that statement with what it said in McCastle and DeLuna I , the court must have been referring to a pleading condition or requirement, not to a precondition that is jurisdictional in nature. 1996Thus, although the supreme court in dicta recently referred to section 2—622 as a "condition” (Miller v. Gupta, 174 Ill. 2d 120, 126 (1996) ("the legislature has made the filing of a section 2—622 certificate of merit a condition of proceeding with a meritorious medical malpractice action”)), to reconcile that statement with what it said in McCastle and DeLuna I, the court must have been referring to a pleading condition or requirement, not to a precondition that is jurisdictional in nature. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ford Motor Company v. Lonon
green
2 sentences1974In affirming the judgment of the trial court, even though there was no privity in the traditional sense, our supreme court, at pages 61-62 and 67, said: “Section 402B and a parallel rule relating to pecuniary loss were adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the recent case of Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400 , 398 S.W.2d 240 . 1974In affirming the judgment of the trial court, even though there was no privity in the traditional sense, our supreme court, at pages 61-62 and 67, said: “Section 402B and a parallel rule relating to pecuniary loss were adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the recent case of Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400 , 398 S.W.2d 240 . | 2 | 1969–1974 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lori A. Malander, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of David M. Malander, Sr., and Kathleen Malander
green
2 sentences2021Malander, 996 N.E.2d at 415 . ¶ 30 The defendant argued the plaintiffs’ failed to allege a parallel claim because plaintiffs’ claim was essentially the defendant’s technicians should have provided additional warnings above and beyond the warnings on the device’s label. 2021Malander, 996 N.E.2d at 417 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Herron
green
2 sentences2009We have previously noted the similarity between our plain-error analysis and the parallel analysis under the federal rules (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 184-87 ), and we note that the federal analysis, like our own, places the burden of persuasion squarely on the defendant (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187 ; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 , 123 L. 2009We have previously noted the similarity between our plain-error analysis and the parallel analysis under the federal rules (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 184-87 ), and we note that the federal analysis, like our own, places the burden of persuasion squarely on the defendant (Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187 ; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 , 123 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital
green
2 sentences1996In that case, the court stated, "[a]s we have already demonstrated, [section 2-622] is essentially no different from the parallel requirement generally applicable in malpractice cases that the plaintiff in such an action present expert testimony to demonstrate the applicable standard of care and its breach." DeLuna I, 147 Ill.2d at 73 , 167 Ill.Dec. 1009 , 588 N.E.2d 1139 . 1996In that case, the court stated, "[a]s we have already demonstrated, [section 2—622] is essentially no different from the parallel requirement generally applicable in malpractice cases that the plaintiff in such an action present expert testimony to demonstrate the applicable standard of care and its breach.” DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d at 73 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.
green
2 sentences1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . 1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co.
green
2 sentences1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . 1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . 1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
green
2 sentences1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . 1989Plaintiff argued that he had “alleged facts” demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for his success on the merits of his suits and claims, satisfying the tests of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124 , 421 N.E.2d 876 , Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 520 , 478 N.E.2d 1354 , and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 502 , 485 N.E.2d 372 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
cluster 316626
green
1 sentence1984In a leading case construing section 3 — 406, the court said regarding the parallel defense of forgery: “[W]e are convinced that the meaning of sec. 3 — 406 is best reflected by precluding a drawer from recovery under these or similar circumstances only where his negligent conduct contributes to the forgery, not merely to the unwarranted issuance of the checks ***.” (Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 491 F.2d 192 ,197.) Cases with similar holdings are cited in Maddox v. First Westroads Bank (1977), 199 Neb. 81 , 256 N.W.2d 647 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Fred Meyer, Inc. v. TEMCO METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY
green
2 sentences1984In Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Temco Metal Products Co. (1973), 267 Or. 230 , 516 P.2d 80 , checks of the drawer were stolen and the drawer’s signature forged on them. 1984In Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Temco Metal Products Co. (1973), 267 Or. 230 , 516 P.2d 80 , checks of the drawer were stolen and the drawer’s signature forged on them. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Maddox Ex Rel. Fitzgerald v. First Westroads Bank
green
2 sentences1984In a leading case construing section 3 — 406, the court said regarding the parallel defense of forgery: “[W]e are convinced that the meaning of sec. 3 — 406 is best reflected by precluding a drawer from recovery under these or similar circumstances only where his negligent conduct contributes to the forgery, not merely to the unwarranted issuance of the checks ***.” (Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 491 F.2d 192 ,197.) Cases with similar holdings are cited in Maddox v. First Westroads Bank (1977), 199 Neb. 81 , 256 N.W.2d 647 . 1984In a leading case construing section 3 — 406, the court said regarding the parallel defense of forgery: “[W]e are convinced that the meaning of sec. 3 — 406 is best reflected by precluding a drawer from recovery under these or similar circumstances only where his negligent conduct contributes to the forgery, not merely to the unwarranted issuance of the checks ***.” (Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974), 491 F.2d 192 ,197.) Cases with similar holdings are cited in Maddox v. First Westroads Bank (1977), 199 Neb. 81 , 256 N.W.2d 647 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.