11 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
George Lambert, D/B/A Rainbow Fruit v. Sam Kysar and Joan Kysar, D/B/A Lewis River Tree Farmgreen2 sentences2025See Cambridge Biotech, 433 Mass. at 130 n.7; accord Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1112 (1st Cir. 1993) (“contract-related tort claims involving the same operative facts as a parallel claim for breach of contract should be heard in the forum selected by the contracting parties”). 1995“The better general rule, we think, is that contract-related tort claims involving the same operative facts as a parallel claim for breach of contract should be heard in the forum selected by the contracting parties.” Id. at 1121-1122 . | 1 | 2 |
Cambridge Biotech Corp. v. Pasteur Sanofi Diagnosticsgreen1 sentence2025See Cambridge Biotech, 433 Mass. at 130 n.7; accord Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1112 (1st Cir. 1993) (“contract-related tort claims involving the same operative facts as a parallel claim for breach of contract should be heard in the forum selected by the contracting parties”). | 1 | 1 |
Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc.green1 sentence2015Compare Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int'l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs “failed to allege facts in their complaint alleging the presence of the elements of a parallel claim” where they did not specify particular federal requirements defendant allegedly violated but “simply incant[ed] the magic words” that defendant violated FDA regulations (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Poly v. Moylangreen1 sentence2013We decline the defendants’ invitation to deviate from the well-established principle that “[a] judge may make independent and, therefore, different, findings on the c. 93A aspect of a case that arises from the same facts which gave rise to parallel common law claim.” Poly v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 151 (1996), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997), quoting Wyler v. Bonnell Motors, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 567 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Wyler v. Bonnell Motors, Inc.green1 sentence2013We decline the defendants’ invitation to deviate from the well-established principle that “[a] judge may make independent and, therefore, different, findings on the c. 93A aspect of a case that arises from the same facts which gave rise to parallel common law claim.” Poly v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 151 (1996), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997), quoting Wyler v. Bonnell Motors, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 567 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pinagreen1 sentence2012Citing Commonwealth v. Pina, 430 Mass. 266, 273 (1999), the judge denied the request. | 1 | 1 |
Nina Michael v. Shiley, Inc. Hospital Products Group, Inc., (Formerly Howmedica, Inc.) Pfizer, Incgreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1325-27 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 516 U.S. 815 (1995) (enforcement of statement on FDA-approved label involves voluntary commitment and in any event, amounts to parallel requirement); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d at 915 (express warranty claim arises from representations of the parties made basis of the bargain between them and does not necessarily interfere with operation of the PMA); Steele v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 295 F.Sup.2d 439, 456 (D.N.J. 2003) (claim that device does not conform to statements in FDA-approved materials involves | 1 | 1 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.green1 sentence2007See, e.g., Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1325-27 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 516 U.S. 815 (1995) (enforcement of statement on FDA-approved label involves voluntary commitment and in any event, amounts to parallel requirement); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d at 915 (express warranty claim arises from representations of the parties made basis of the bargain between them and does not necessarily interfere with operation of the PMA); Steele v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 295 F.Sup.2d 439, 456 (D.N.J. 2003) (claim that device does not conform to statements in FDA-approved materials involves | 1 | 1 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrgreen1 sentence2007See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495, 513 (O’Connor, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
Braswell v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1325-27 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 516 U.S. 815 (1995) (enforcement of statement on FDA-approved label involves voluntary commitment and in any event, amounts to parallel requirement); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d at 915 (express warranty claim arises from representations of the parties made basis of the bargain between them and does not necessarily interfere with operation of the PMA); Steele v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 295 F.Sup.2d 439, 456 (D.N.J. 2003) (claim that device does not conform to statements in FDA-approved materials involves | 1 | 1 |
Barbara MITCHELL and Gregory Mitchell, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COLLAGEN CORPORATION, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1325-27 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 516 U.S. 815 (1995) (enforcement of statement on FDA-approved label involves voluntary commitment and in any event, amounts to parallel requirement); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d at 915 (express warranty claim arises from representations of the parties made basis of the bargain between them and does not necessarily interfere with operation of the PMA); Steele v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 295 F.Sup.2d 439, 456 (D.N.J. 2003) (claim that device does not conform to statements in FDA-approved materials involves | 1 | 1 |
Hickman v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2000See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 , 67 S.Ct. 385, 388 (1947). 2000See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 , 67 S.Ct. 385, 388 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
Crowson v. Sealaska Corp.green1 sentence1995On the other hand, for example, in Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905, 910 (Alaska 1985), the court determined that an action to rescind contracts for fraud was not barred by a forum selection clause applying to proceedings to “enforce any term or provision” of a contract, because seeking to rescind a contract, although intrinsically related to the terms of the agreement, was not an action to “enforce” any term of the agreement. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Killeleagreen1 sentence1987Rule 3:08, DF 14 (b), as appearing in 382 Mass. 808 (1981), for a parallel rule applicable to defense counsel. 4 See Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 693 (1983); Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 331-332 (1975). 5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 592 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470 (1978). 6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 910-911 (1983) (improper to argue that the defendant will walk the streets); Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 644-649 (1976) (improper to argue that on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, def | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Shelleygreen1 sentence1987Rule 3:08, DF 14 (b), as appearing in 382 Mass. 808 (1981), for a parallel rule applicable to defense counsel. 4 See Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 693 (1983); Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 331-332 (1975). 5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 592 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470 (1978). 6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 910-911 (1983) (improper to argue that the defendant will walk the streets); Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 644-649 (1976) (improper to argue that on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, def | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Earltopgreen1 sentence1987Rule 3:08, DF 14 (a), as appearing in 382 Mass. 807 (1981), for a parallel rule applicable to defense counsel. 3 Commonwealth v. Earltop, 372 Mass. 199, 203-204 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen1 sentence1987Rule 3:08, DF 14 (b), as appearing in 382 Mass. 808 (1981), for a parallel rule applicable to defense counsel. 4 See Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 693 (1983); Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 331-332 (1975). 5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 592 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470 (1978). 6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 910-911 (1983) (improper to argue that the defendant will walk the streets); Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 644-649 (1976) (improper to argue that on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, def | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Grazianogreen1 sentence1987Rule 3:08, DF 14 (b), as appearing in 382 Mass. 808 (1981), for a parallel rule applicable to defense counsel. 4 See Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 693 (1983); Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 331-332 (1975). 5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 592 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470 (1978). 6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 910-911 (1983) (improper to argue that the defendant will walk the streets); Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 644-649 (1976) (improper to argue that on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, def | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clarygreen1 sentence1987Rule 3:08, DF 14 (b), as appearing in 382 Mass. 808 (1981), for a parallel rule applicable to defense counsel. 4 See Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 693 (1983); Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 331-332 (1975). 5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 592 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470 (1978). 6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 910-911 (1983) (improper to argue that the defendant will walk the streets); Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 644-649 (1976) (improper to argue that on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, def | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mahdigreen1 sentence1987Rule 3:08, DF 14 (b), as appearing in 382 Mass. 808 (1981), for a parallel rule applicable to defense counsel. 4 See Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 693 (1983); Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 331-332 (1975). 5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 592 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470 (1978). 6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 910-911 (1983) (improper to argue that the defendant will walk the streets); Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 644-649 (1976) (improper to argue that on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, def | 1 | 1 |
Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1982See Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Newkirk-Stewart
green
1 sentence2013We decline the defendants’ invitation to deviate from the well-established principle that “[a] judge may make independent and, therefore, different, findings on the c. 93A aspect of a case that arises from the same facts which gave rise to parallel common law claim.” Poly v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 151 (1996), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997), quoting Wyler v. Bonnell Motors, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 567 (1993). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Bruton v. United States
green
1 sentence2004The defendant’s parallel claim concerning his waiver of the right to a separate trial under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), is similarly unavailing. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Harnois v. QUANNAPOWITT DEVELOPMENT, INC.
green
2 sentences1995In Harnois , however, the parallel clause was followed by the words “or by reason of the operations under this contract, whether such liability be the result of the alleged active or passive negligence of the Owner or Contractor, their agents, servants, employees.” Ibid. 1995In Harnois , however, the parallel clause was followed by the words “or by reason of the operations under this contract, whether such liability be the result of the alleged active or passive negligence of the Owner or Contractor, their agents, servants, employees.” Ibid. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Commonwealth v. De Christoforo
green
1 sentence1987Commonwealth v. DeChristoforo, 360 Mass. 531, 536-537 (1971), aff’d sub nom. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.