8 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2016The Wheeler standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 2016The Wheeler standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sorrelsgreen2 sentences2016See Sorrels, 389 Ill. 2015See Sorrels, 389 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Jewelers Mutual Insurance v. Firstar Bank Illinoisgreen2 sentences2019Because the masthead disclaimer purports to exculpate Law Bulletin from liability for altering the Wheeler Take Notice and publishing the defective content, it is unenforceable as a matter of law.” In support, Wheeler cites Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Firstar Bank Illinois, 213 Ill. 2d 58, 65 (2004), which held that a party cannot contract to act in a certain manner and then exculpate itself from liability for breach of that very promise because otherwise the party’s contractual duties would be illusory. ¶ 115 Wheeler’s claim of error is without merit. 2018Because the masthead disclaimer purports to exculpate Law Bulletin from liability for altering the Wheeler Take Notice and publishing the defective content, it is unenforceable as a matter of law." In support, Wheeler cites Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Firstar Bank Illinois , 213 Ill. 2d 58 , 65, 289 Ill.Dec. 635 , 820 N.E.2d 411 (2004), which held that a party cannot contract to act in a certain manner and then exculpate itself from liability for breach of that very promise because otherwise the party's contractual duties would be illusory. ¶ 115 Wheeler's claim of error is without merit. | 1 | 2 |
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleasongreen1 sentence2021“The decision whether to impose sanctions under Rule 137 is committed to the sound discretion of the circuit judge, and that decision will not be overturned unless it represents an abuse of discretion.” Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 487 (1998). ¶ 87 We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wheeler’s motion for sanctions. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wheelergreen2 sentences2012See id. (“If the jury could have reached a contrary verdict had the improper remarks not been made, or the reviewing court cannot say that the prosecutor’s improper remarks did not contribute to defendant’s conviction, a new trial should be granted.” (Emphasis added.)). ¶ 18 In sum, although the State committed error, such error is not reversible. 2012See id. (“If the jury could have reached a contrary verdict had the improper remarks not been made, or the reviewing court cannot say that the prosecutor’s improper remarks did not contribute to defendant’s conviction, a new trial should be granted.” (Emphasis added.)). ¶ 18 In sum, although the State committed error, such error is not reversible. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Giraud
green
2 sentences2016Defendant, citing People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶¶ 4-6 , 980 N.E.2d 1107 , argues that the present case involves a question of statutory interpretation that should be reviewed de novo. ¶ 25 We agree with the State that the Wheeler standard is appropriate in this case. 2016Defendant, citing People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶¶ 4-6 , 980 N.E.2d 1107 , argues that the present case involves a question of statutory interpretation that should be reviewed de novo. ¶ 25 We agree with the State that the Wheeler standard is appropriate in this case. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences1982(People v. Allen (1981) 96 Ill. 1982(People v. Allen (1981) 96 Ill. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Teague
green
1 sentence1982The Teague court expressed concern with the effect the Wheeler test would have on the scope of peremptory challenges and stated that if Payne were to be followed, “then the peremptory challenge [would be] so effectively emasculated as to destroy its function which Swain and Illinois [have] recognized.” ( 108 Ill. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Gaines
green
2 sentences1982(People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 342, 359 , 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1054 .) As our supreme court pointed out, such a showing is required even under Wheeler. 1982(People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 342, 359 , 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1054 .) As our supreme court pointed out, such a showing is required even under Wheeler. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.