Wheeler motion in California

2025(People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602 , 612–613.) Generally, we review a trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion “ ‘ “ ‘with great restraint,’ ” ’ ” considering “only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (Lenix, at p. 613.) In 2020, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill Number No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7.

2025In analyzing a third-stage Batson/Wheeler claim, “[a] trial court’s conclusions are entitled to deference only when the court made a ‘sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159 ; accord, People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 614 [“ ‘So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ”].) “A ‘reasoned’ effort involves, at a minimum, evaluating whether a proffered justification is support

2025BACKGROUND ON SECTION 231.7 Prior to the enactment of section 231.7, “trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the three-step inquiry established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 . . . .” (People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941 , 943.) The Legislature designed section 231.7 to address “the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry.” (People v. Jaime, supra, at p. 943.) The author of Assembly Bill No. 3070, which enacted section 231.7, stated that the Batson/Wheeler approach “has failed” because it

2025Such conduct also violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1146 [cleaned up]; see also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 ; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 .) The Batson/Wheeler analysis follows a three-step process: “First, the defendant must make a prima facie case by showing facts sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory purpose.

2025BACKGROUND ON SECTION 231.7 Prior to the enactment of section 231.7, “trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the three-step inquiry established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 . . . .” (People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941 , 943.) The Legislature designed section 231.7 to address “the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry.” (People v. Jaime, supra, at p. 943.) The author of Assembly Bill No. 3070, which enacted section 231.7, stated that the Batson/Wheeler approach “has failed” because it

2025Such conduct also violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1146 [cleaned up]; see also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 ; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 .) The Batson/Wheeler analysis follows a three-step process: “First, the defendant must make a prima facie case by showing facts sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory purpose.

2025(People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 383 ; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 ; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277 .) The standard for reviewing a Batson/Wheeler motion is well established.

2024(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276–277.)” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 383 (Scott).) “The discriminatory use 6 of peremptory challenges harms not only defendants but also ‘the excluded jurors and the community at large,’ as it ‘forecloses a significant opportunity to participate in civic life’ [citation] and ‘ “undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The exclusion by peremptory challenge of a single juror on the basis of race or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude requiring reversal.

2025In analyzing a third-stage Batson/Wheeler claim, “[a] trial court’s conclusions are entitled to deference only when the court made a ‘sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159 ; accord, People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 614 [“ ‘So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ”].) “A ‘reasoned’ effort involves, at a minimum, evaluating whether a proffered justification is support

2025It is true that at the second step of Batson, the question is whether the prosecutor has stated a race-neutral reason for the strike: “[T]he second stage of the Batson/Wheeler framework ‘does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. “ . . . [T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168 ; see Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768 .) But at the third step, the issue is “ ‘ “the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) In oth

2026Moreover, “[t]he proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry . . . is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924 (Reynoso).) 9 422.) Indeed, the prosecutor represented without dispute that there had been times when C.R. would appear at court looking “rundown,” and the trial court relatedly noted that C.R. had previously mentioned “his scheduling difficulty and his sleeping schedule.” Because the trial court was in the best position to assess the p

2026(Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 926 .) M.G.’s responses also adequately support the trial court’s determination that she did in fact “express some sympathy towards the defendants in this case.” For these reasons, the trial court’s denial of the Batson/Wheeler motion was not erroneous.11 B.

2019(People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168 ; Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 ; see also People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596 , 607- 608; People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225 .) Nonetheless, a prosecutor’s acceptance of a jury with members of a group that the prosecutor allegedly discriminated against “strongly suggests that [bias] was not a motive in his challenge” and, as such, is “an appropriate factor . . . to consider” in the Batson/Wheeler analysis.

2013(See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168 [“[w]hile the fact that the jury included members of a group allegedly discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an indication of good faith in exercising peremptories, and an appropriate factor for the trial court to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection”]; see, e.g., People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 187-188 [“the exclusion of two African-American jurors and the retention of two failed to raise an inference of racial discrimination”]; People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 796 [when African Americans constituted 26 percent of pros

2026“Under the Batson/Wheeler test, the ultimate question for the trial court in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge is whether the party exercising the objection engaged in ‘purposeful discrimination.’” (Guzman, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 475, italics added, quoting Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168 .) “‘Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019– 2020 Reg. Sess.) … to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenge

2026“Under the Batson/Wheeler test, the ultimate question for the trial court in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge is whether the party exercising the objection engaged in ‘purposeful discrimination.’” (Guzman, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 475, italics added, quoting Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168 .) “‘Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019– 2020 Reg. Sess.) … to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenge

2016(People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155 .) The reviewing court must affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion “‘[i]f the record “suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged” the jurors in question[.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1200 , abrogated on a different ground in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5 ; see People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 60 ; People v. Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 500-501 .) Stated differently, if the appellate court “can divine any nondiscriminatory basis for the

2016(People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 431 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1031-1032 ; People v. Gonzales (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 620, 631 .) Because a reasonable explanation for excusing Juror No. 6182 is apparent in the record, and because we view the trial court’s ruling with “‘considerable deference’” 8 (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1155 ), we conclude the Batson/Wheeler motion was properly denied.

2017(See People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707 , 721, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) When a reviewing court addresses the trial court's ruling on a Batson / Wheeler motion, it ordinarily reviews the issue for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946 , 970, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 .) A trial court's conclusions are entitled to deference only when the court made a "sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered." ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833 , 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 .) Wh

2017(See People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707 , 721, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) When a reviewing court addresses the trial court's ruling on a Batson / Wheeler motion, it ordinarily reviews the issue for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946 , 970, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 .) A trial court's conclusions are entitled to deference only when the court made a "sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered." ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833 , 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 .) Wh

2025People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 76 (Manibusan) [extending deference to the trial court and affirming the denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion where, after hearing the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing a prospective juror and defense counsel’s response, the trial court ruled, “ ‘It’s a proper use of a peremptory challenge’ ”]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 471 [“the trial court was not required to question the prosecutor or explain its findings on the record because . . . the prosecutor’s reasons were neither inherently implausible nor unsupported by the record”].) Further inqui

2024(People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 292 ; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386 (Silva).) A trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s Batson/Wheeler claim proceeds in three steps. “ ‘ “First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised a challenge based on impermissible criteria.

2021(See, e.g., Johnson, at p. 1105, fn. 3, conc. opn., Werdegar, J. [recognizing numerous appellate court decisions that employed limited remand procedures for Wheeler error, although not deciding the correctness of those decisions]; see also People v. Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 705-706 [noting the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216 , 227 suggested it would order a limited remand for Wheeler error in an appropriate case].) We find a limited remand is appropriate where, as here, the trial court never ruled on whether defendant had met his burden at the third Batso

2019(People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168 ; Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 ; see also People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596 , 607- 608; People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225 .) Nonetheless, a prosecutor’s acceptance of a jury with members of a group that the prosecutor allegedly discriminated against “strongly suggests that [bias] was not a motive in his challenge” and, as such, is “an appropriate factor . . . to consider” in the Batson/Wheeler analysis.

2023(Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343 .) To the contrary, the prosecutor thoroughly questioned Prospective Juror B. about his own and his 24 As noted above, when joining in the Batson/Wheeler challenge, Young’s counsel noted that there may have been one or two other African- American jurors in the venire. 26 family’s experiences with the criminal justice system and whether those experiences would affect his deliberations.

2022(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 .) African-American women are a cognizable group for purposes of Batson/Wheeler analysis.

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 ; see People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1285 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].) However, Wheeler error is structural because it is impossible to determine the effect on the trial of a “[juror] who [was not] there” 10 where a trial court sustained a possibly impermissible peremptory. 11 Ordinary Wheeler error also puts the judicial system in the untoward place of countenancing invidious discrimination, even if there were no prejudice to the particular defendant.

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 ; see People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1285 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].) However, Wheeler error is structural because it is impossible to determine the effect on the trial of a “[juror] who [was not] there” 10 where a trial court sustained a possibly impermissible peremptory. 11 Ordinary Wheeler error also puts the judicial system in the untoward place of countenancing invidious discrimination, even if there were no prejudice to the particular defendant.

2025(See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1053 [rejecting an argument that the trial court’s Batson/Wheeler ruling, articulated as “ ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral,’ ” evinced a misunderstanding of its obligation to assess the sincerity of the prosecutor’s stated reasons (italics omitted)]; id. at p. 1054; Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 76 .)15 As used by the trial court, the word “appear” is indicative of a subjective determination that the reasons provided by the prosecutor were 15 Even though the record in this case does not

2025J. substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] ‘We review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “ ‘with great restraint.’ ” [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deferen

2021In a typical criminal7 case, “ ‘ “[f]irst, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” ’ ” (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 476-477 (Snyder).) 6 The Legislature recently enacted legislation to address concerns with the Batson/Wheeler framework.

2020Because that conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous, the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion “must be sustained.” (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477 .) B.

2013In the wake of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ], our state law forerunner of Batson, this court in People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 672 P.2d 854 ] (Hall) emphasized that a trial court, in considering a Wheeler motion, must make “a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised challenges.” (Id. at pp. 167

2013In the wake of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ], our state law forerunner of Batson, this court in People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 672 P.2d 854 ] (Hall) emphasized that a trial court, in considering a Wheeler motion, must make “a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised challenges.” (Id. at pp. 167

2023In People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , the defendant raised a People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 objection at trial and was not prevented from raising a Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 objection for the first time on appeal since “Wheeler and Batson articulate the same standard.” ( Yeoman, supra, at p. 117 [no useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one properly preserved by a timely motion].) Therefore, “the same factual issues [were] properly before [the court] a

2023In People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , the defendant raised a People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 objection at trial and was not prevented from raising a Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 objection for the first time on appeal since “Wheeler and Batson articulate the same standard.” ( Yeoman, supra, at p. 117 [no useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one properly preserved by a timely motion].) Therefore, “the same factual issues [were] properly before [the court] a

2025J. substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] ‘We review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “ ‘with great restraint.’ ” [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deferen

2025Such conduct also violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1146 [cleaned up]; see also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 ; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 .) The Batson/Wheeler analysis follows a three-step process: “First, the defendant must make a prima facie case by showing facts sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory purpose.

2023(See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491 , 543–545 [rejecting Batson/Wheeler challenge to strike where “[t]he prosecutor’s challenge to [the juror] was based on her personal experience that police officers lied, not on a theoretical perception that she, a member of a minority group, might view the police with distrust”].) Moreover, as the prosecutor explained, he would have exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a juror of any race who held this view, going on to give the example of another prospective juror—Ms. B.—who was White but held a court failed to conduct step three at all and th

2022In Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 , the California Supreme Court “ ‘held that the use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group membership violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.’ ” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 116 .) Eight years later in Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79 , “ ‘the United States Supreme Court held that such a practice violates, inter alia, the defendant’s right to equal protection of th

2025In analyzing a third-stage Batson/Wheeler claim, “[a] trial court’s conclusions are entitled to deference only when the court made a ‘sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159 ; accord, People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 614 [“ ‘So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ”].) “A ‘reasoned’ effort involves, at a minimum, evaluating whether a proffered justification is support

2025However, under the three-step Baston/Wheeler framework,“ ‘[t]here “is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible discrimination.” ’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 766 .) The first step requires the defendant to “ ‘make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In his opening brief, Walker does not argue that he made a prima facie 28 showing of race discrimination in the prose

2023(People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 686 .) “Although the correlation between surname and group membership is not exact, such precision is unnecessary.” (Ibid.) 12 Based on discussions regarding the Batson/Wheeler motion between trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court, we presume seven of the eight jurors excluded were Hispanic or of Hispanic origin.

2014(See People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667 , 684- 686 [Hispanics are cognizable group subject to Batson/Wheeler motion], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221 .) The prosecutor responded to the challenge by addressing each of the three selections.

2021“A Batson/Wheeler motion is timely if it is made before jury impanelment is completed, which does not occur ‘ “until the alternates are selected and sworn.” ’ (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970 .)” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) As our Supreme Court has explained in McDermott, “discriminatory motive may become sufficiently apparent to establish a prima facie case only during the selection of alternate jurors, and a motion promptly made before the alternates are sworn, and before any remaining unselected prospective jurors are dismissed, is timely not only as to the prospec

2021“A Batson/Wheeler motion is timely if it is made before jury impanelment is completed, which does not occur ‘ “until the alternates are selected and sworn.” ’ (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970 .)” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) As our Supreme Court has explained in McDermott, “discriminatory motive may become sufficiently apparent to establish a prima facie case only during the selection of alternate jurors, and a motion promptly made before the alternates are sworn, and before any remaining unselected prospective jurors are dismissed, is timely not only as to the prospec

2025J. substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] ‘We review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “ ‘with great restraint.’ ” [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deferen

2020(See People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1146-1147 [identifying Batson/Wheeler as a pretrial issue]; People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 649 [same].) In Akopyan I, we remanded for the trial court to reconsider its denial of its sua sponte Batson/Wheeler motion in light of defense counsel’s justifications for his first four peremptory challenges.

2023(Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 416 ; accord, People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1212 ; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 863 .) With respect to jury selection, “‘[t]here “is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing 3. party to demonstrate impermissible discrimination.”’ [Citations.] Under a now familiar three-step process, a defendant [bringing a Batson/Wheeler motion] must first ‘make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminato

2022Third, the court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 612 .) “The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” (Id. at pp. 612–613.) Our review of the trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion is deferential, and we examine “only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial cou

2024Third, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] ‘The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the [defendant].’ ” ’ ” (Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 760 .) “ ‘ “The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry, of course, is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reaso

2022If the defendant believes that subsequent events should be considered by the trial court, a renewed objection is required to permit appellate consideration of these subsequent developments.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 624 ; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1319 (Chism).) Thus, as the court in Chism declared, “if [Hicks] believed the trial court should have considered any postruling 33 developments, he could have, and should have, renewed his Batson/Wheeler claim.” (Chism, at p. 1319.) And because he did not, his claim based on Prospective Juror 3218’s responses made after the trial

2026Third, if such a reason was offered, the court was required to evaluate the prosecutor’s stated rationale 16. and determine whether Parra demonstrated “it ‘ “[is] more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated.” ’ ”7 (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1071 .) We review the trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion at the first step for substantial evidence.

2025(Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. 488 , 499; People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044 , 1071.) A trial court must analyze a defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion using a three-prong test.