Wheeler motion (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

Wheeler motion in California

438 California opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2026 121 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (80)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Lenixgreen
cal · 2008 · cited in 76 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2025
2 sentences

2025(People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602 , 612-613.) Generally, we review a trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion “ ‘ “ ‘with great restraint,’ ” ’ ” considering “only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (Lenix, at p. 613.) In 2020, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill Number No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7.

2025(See People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1159 [“When a reviewing court addresses the trial court’s ruling on a Batson/Wheeler motion, it ordinarily reviews the issue for substantial evidence”]; Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613-614 [“So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal”].) But the difference in review standard is dictated by the distinct nature of each inquiry.

3976
Batson v. Kentuckygreen
scotus · 1986 · cited in 119 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–2026
2 sentences

2026(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277; People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1145 (Banks).) “Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal.” (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 .) “A Batson/Wheeler objection triggers a three-step inquiry. ‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has 26 PEOPL

2026(See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).) In denying the defense’s Batson/Wheeler motion, the trial court found that defendant had not made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was racially discriminatory.

36119
People v. Wheelerred
cal · 1978 · cited in 172 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–2026
2 sentences

2026(See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).) In denying the defense’s Batson/Wheeler motion, the trial court found that defendant had not made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was racially discriminatory.

2026In describing the outline for what has come to be known as comparative juror analysis in the Batson/Wheeler framework, Wheeler speaks of statistical proof with disfavor, viewing it as pertinent only to “earlier stage[s] in the jury selection process, i.e., whether the master list or the grand or petit jury venire constitutes a representative cross-section of the community[,]” and of no utility in “demonstrat[ing] racial motivation in the striking of blacks from a petit jury.” (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 279.)52 On this point, Wheeler preserves the disaggregated approach to discrete stages

26172
People v. Scottgreen
cal · 2015 · cited in 52 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2026(Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 387, fn. 1 .) The majority reasons that the trial court’s purported third stage ruling “could not have addressed reasons related to Prospective Juror No. 206” and therefore decides to “review the court’s denial of Shove’s Batson/Wheeler motion as to Prospective Juror No. 206 as a first-stage denial” while 4 As in Snow, there are significant reasons to doubt, after the passage of nearly 20 years, that the judge could accurately assess the prosecutor’s reasons for any juror.

2016(Id. at p. 393 (maj. opn.); but see id. at pp. 409-414 (dis. opn. of Liu, J. [disagreeing with majority’s analysis of Hernandez and finding third-stage review is proper when prosecutor states reasons and trial court issues a ruling].) We begin our analysis by noting that California authority on this issue, in the words of Scott, is “not . . . entirely consistent.” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 386 .) On one hand, the predicate in Scott was an express ruling by the trial court on both the prima facie and ultimate issues of discrimination.

2352
People v. Gutierrezgreen
cal · 2017 · cited in 45 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2026
2 sentences

2026(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277; People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1145 (Banks).) “Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal.” (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 .) “A Batson/Wheeler objection triggers a three-step inquiry. ‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has 26 PEOPL

2026(People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1157 .) These rights can be violated if “any specific prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds.” (Id. at p. 1158.) “Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson 11 and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal.” (Ibid.) The Legislature’s choice here also is generally consistent with its 2022 enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, eliminating the requirement of a prima facie showing at tri

1845
People v. Reynosogreen
cal · 2003 · cited in 44 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2026
2 sentences

2026(Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 926 .) M.G.’s responses also adequately support the trial court’s determination that she did in fact “express some sympathy towards the defendants in this case.” For these reasons, the trial court’s denial of the Batson/Wheeler motion was not erroneous.11 B.

2026Moreover, “[t]he proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry . . . is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924 (Reynoso).) 9 422.) Indeed, the prosecutor represented without dispute that there had been times when C.R. would appear at court looking “rundown,” and the trial court relatedly noted that C.R. had previously mentioned “his scheduling difficulty and his sleeping schedule.” Because the trial court was in the best position to assess the p

1744
People v. Turneryellow
cal · 1994 · cited in 26 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–2022
2 sentences

1996(People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 18-23 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [so holding as to a Wheeler motion]; People v. Tapia (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 984, 1014 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 ] [following Jackson]; cf. Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 364-369 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 408-412] (plur. opn. by Kennedy, J.) [concluding that tiie federal “clearly erroneous” standard—which is practically the same as the California substantial evidence test—is applicable on direct review of a state court decision involving a Batson motion]; id. at p. 372 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 414] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J

1996(People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 18-23 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [so holding as to a Wheeler motion]; People v. Tapia (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 984, 1014 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 ] [following Jackson]; cf. Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 364-369 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 408-412] (plur. opn. by Kennedy, J.) [concluding that tiie federal “clearly erroneous” standard—which is practically the same as the California substantial evidence test—is applicable on direct review of a state court decision involving a Batson motion]; id. at p. 372 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 414] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J

1726
Johnson v. Californiagreen
scotus · 2005 · cited in 53 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2026
2 sentences

2026(Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) Step one of the Batson/Wheeler test requires the defendant to “make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 .) If the defendant makes out a prima facie case, the second step shifts the burden “ ‘to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” (Ibid.) At step three, the trial court decides “ ‘whether the opponent of the strike has proved pur

2026“Under the Batson/Wheeler test, the ultimate question for the trial court in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge is whether the party exercising the objection engaged in ‘purposeful discrimination.’” (Guzman, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 475, italics added, quoting Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168 .) “‘Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019– 2020 Reg. Sess.) … to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenge

1653
People v. Fuentesgreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 30 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–2026
2 sentences

2026Group bias is a presumption that jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds.” (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 713 .) In evaluating a Batson/Wheeler claim, we first determine whether the defendant made out a prima facie case of discrimination.

2017(See People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707 , 721, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) When a reviewing court addresses the trial court's ruling on a Batson / Wheeler motion, it ordinarily reviews the issue for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946 , 970, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 .) A trial court's conclusions are entitled to deference only when the court made a "sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered." ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833 , 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 .) Wh

1630
People v. Howardred
cal · 1992 · cited in 30 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–2021
2 sentences

2016(People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 431 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1031-1032 ; People v. Gonzales (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 620, 631 .) Because a reasonable explanation for excusing Juror No. 6182 is apparent in the record, and because we view the trial court’s ruling with “‘considerable deference’” 8 (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1155 ), we conclude the Batson/Wheeler motion was properly denied.

2016(People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155 .) The reviewing court must affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion “‘[i]f the record “suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged” the jurors in question[.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1200 , abrogated on a different ground in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5 ; see People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 60 ; People v. Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 500-501 .) Stated differently, if the appellate court “can divine any nondiscriminatory basis for the

1630
People v. Silvagreen
cal · 2001 · cited in 28 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2026
2 sentences

2024Third, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] ‘The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the [defendant].’ ” ’ ” (Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 760 .) Generally, we review a trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion “ ‘ “ ‘with great restraint,’ ” ’ ” considering “only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 C

2024(People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 292 ; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386 (Silva).) A trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s Batson/Wheeler claim proceeds in three steps. “ ‘ “First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised a challenge based on impermissible criteria.

1528
People v. Snowgreen
cal · 1987 · cited in 24 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–2021
2 sentences

2021(See, e.g., Johnson, at p. 1105, fn. 3, conc. opn., Werdegar, J. [recognizing numerous appellate court decisions that employed limited remand procedures for Wheeler error, although not deciding the correctness of those decisions]; see also People v. Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 705-706 [noting the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216 , 227 suggested it would order a limited remand for Wheeler error in an appropriate case].) We find a limited remand is appropriate where, as here, the trial court never ruled on whether defendant had met his burden at the third Batso

2019(Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 ; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1314 .) “The exclusion by peremptory challenge of a single juror on the basis of race, gender, or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude requiring reversal. [Citation.] On review, Batson/Wheeler error is reversible per se, and the remedy is a new trial without any inquiry into harmless error.” (People v. Arellano (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1144 ; People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 226 .) C.

1524
People v. Bonillagreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 25 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2026
2 sentences

2023(Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343 .) To the contrary, the prosecutor thoroughly questioned Prospective Juror B. about his own and his 24 As noted above, when joining in the Batson/Wheeler challenge, Young’s counsel noted that there may have been one or two other African-American jurors in the venire. 26 family’s experiences with the criminal justice system and whether those experiences would affect his deliberations.

2022(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 .) African-American women are a cognizable group for purposes of Batson/Wheeler analysis.

1425
People v. Johnsonred
cal · 1989 · cited in 23 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2021
2 sentences

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 ; see People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1285 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].) However, Wheeler error is structural because it is impossible to determine the effect on the trial of a “[juror] who [was not] there” 10 where a trial court sustained a possibly impermissible peremptory. 11 Ordinary Wheeler error also puts the judicial system in the untoward place of countenancing invidious discrimination, even if there were no prejudice to the particular defendant.

2015(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 283 ; see People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1285 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].) However, Wheeler error is structural because it is impossible to determine the effect on the trial of a “[juror] who [was not] there” 10 where a trial court sustained a possibly impermissible peremptory. 11 Ordinary Wheeler error also puts the judicial system in the untoward place of countenancing invidious discrimination, even if there were no prejudice to the particular defendant.

1323
The People v. Maiyellow
cal · 2013 · cited in 21 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2026(See, e.g., Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 664-665 [“Given its natural meaning and viewed in context, the trial court’s ruling that ‘[t]he question is whether or not there are any race neutral grounds, and there appear to be race neutral grounds,’ . . . reasonably reflected a finding that the prosecutor was credible and that her peremptory challenge was not motivated by discriminatory intent.”]; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1047 (Mai) [reaching similar conclusion where the trial court said “ ‘that no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be

2025(See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1053 [rejecting an argument that the trial court’s Batson/Wheeler ruling, articulated as “ ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race neutral,’ ” evinced a misunderstanding of its obligation to assess the sincerity of the prosecutor’s stated reasons (italics omitted)]; id. at p. 1054; Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 76 .)15 As used by the trial court, the word “appear” is indicative of a subjective determination that the reasons provided by the prosecutor were 15 Even though the record in this case does not

1321
People v. Hallgreen
cal · 1983 · cited in 20 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–2017
2 sentences

2013Under Hall, ‗[s]uch abdication is inconsistent with the court‘s obligations under Wheeler . . . .‘ ([Hall, supra,] 35 Cal.3d at p. 169 .)‖ (Id. at p. 226.) Similarly, People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707 (Fuentes) held that the trial court failed to conduct ―a truly ‗reasoned attempt‘ to evaluate the prosecutor‘s explanations‖ because it did not ―address the challenged jurors individually to determine whether any one of them has been improperly excluded.‖ (Id. at p. 720.) Notably, the court in Fuentes ―reemphasize[d] the trial court‘s role in making an adequate record when dealing with a Whe

2013In the wake of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 , our state-law forerunner of Batson, this court in People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161 (Hall) emphasized that a trial court, in considering a Wheeler motion, must make ―a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor‘s explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised challenges.‖ (Id. at pp. 167– 168.) We did not clearly define what a trial court must do in order to

1020
People v. Yeomangreen
cal · 2003 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2023
2 sentences

2023In People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , the defendant raised a People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 objection at trial and was not prevented from raising a Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 objection for the first time on appeal since “Wheeler and Batson articulate the same standard.” ( Yeoman, supra, at p. 117 [no useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one properly preserved by a timely motion].) Therefore, “the same factual issues [were] properly before [the court] a

2023In People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , the defendant raised a People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 objection at trial and was not prevented from raising a Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 objection for the first time on appeal since “Wheeler and Batson articulate the same standard.” ( Yeoman, supra, at p. 117 [no useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one properly preserved by a timely motion].) Therefore, “the same factual issues [were] properly before [the court] a

1016
Snyder v. Louisianagreen
scotus · 2008 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 2008–2021
2 sentences

2021In a typical criminal7 case, “ ‘ “[f]irst, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” ’ ” (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 476-477 (Snyder).) 6 The Legislature recently enacted legislation to address concerns with the Batson/Wheeler framework.

2020Because that conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous, the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion “must be sustained.” (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477 .) B.

1016
People v. Avilagreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 20 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2023
2 sentences

2023(See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491 , 543-545 [rejecting Batson/Wheeler challenge to strike where “[t]he prosecutor’s challenge to [the juror] was based on her personal experience that police officers lied, not on a theoretical perception that she, a member of a minority group, might view the police with distrust”].) Moreover, as the prosecutor explained, he would have exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a juror of any race who held this view, going on to give the example of another prospective juror—Ms. B.—who was White but held a court failed to conduct step three at all and th

2022In Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 , the California Supreme Court “ ‘held that the use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group membership violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.’ ” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 116 .) Eight years later in Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79 , “ ‘the United States Supreme Court held that such a practice violates, inter alia, the defendant’s right to equal protection of th

920
People v. Smithgreen
cal · 2018 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2025
913
Miller-El v. Dretkegreen
scotus · 2005 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2022
913
People v. Mottongreen
cal · 1985 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–2021
913
People v. Armstronggreen
cal · 2019 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2025
2 sentences

2025However, under the three-step Baston/Wheeler framework,“ ‘[t]here “is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible discrimination.” ’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 766 .) The first step requires the defendant to “ ‘make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In his opening brief, Walker does not argue that he made a prima facie 28 showing of race discrimination in the prose

2025In analyzing a third-stage Batson/Wheeler claim, “[a] trial court’s conclusions are entitled to deference only when the court made a ‘sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159 ; accord, People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 614 [“ ‘So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ”].) “A ‘reasoned’ effort involves, at a minimum, evaluating whether a proffered justification is support

816
People v. Trevinored
cal · 1985 · cited in 14 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–2023
2 sentences

2023(People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 686 .) “Although the correlation between surname and group membership is not exact, such precision is unnecessary.” (Ibid.) 12 Based on discussions regarding the Batson/Wheeler motion between trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court, we presume seven of the eight jurors excluded were Hispanic or of Hispanic origin.

2014(See People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667 , 684- 686 [Hispanics are cognizable group subject to Batson/Wheeler motion], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221 .) The prosecutor responded to the challenge by addressing each of the three selections.

814
Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen
scotus · 1991 · cited in 14 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2021
2 sentences

2021It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’ ” (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 360 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)11 Nonetheless, the prima facie case is a “ ‘low threshold,’ ” requiring a showing only that “ ‘discrimination may have occurred.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 538 .) 10 An alleged Batson/Wheeler error may be found harmless where (1) it pertains to a prospective juror who would have been an alternate and (2) no alt

2015Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” ’ ” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 916 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769 , 74 P.3d 852 ]; see Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 360 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 395 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 ] [“[a] neutral explanation” at the second step of a Batson/Wheeler analysis “means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror”].) A prosecutor’s reason for the strike need not “ ‘make[] sense’ ” to be considered legitimate for Batson/Wheeler purposes; the reason need only be o

814
People v. Battlegreen
cal · 2021 · cited in 12 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2026
812
People v. Doolingreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2021
88
People v. McDermottgreen
cal · 2002 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2025
2 sentences

2021“A Batson/Wheeler motion is timely if it is made before jury impanelment is completed, which does not occur ‘ “until the alternates are selected and sworn.” ’ (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970 .)” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) As our Supreme Court has explained in McDermott, “discriminatory motive may become sufficiently apparent to establish a prima facie case only during the selection of alternate jurors, and a motion promptly made before the alternates are sworn, and before any remaining unselected prospective jurors are dismissed, is timely not only as to the prospec

2021“A Batson/Wheeler motion is timely if it is made before jury impanelment is completed, which does not occur ‘ “until the alternates are selected and sworn.” ’ (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970 .)” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) As our Supreme Court has explained in McDermott, “discriminatory motive may become sufficiently apparent to establish a prima facie case only during the selection of alternate jurors, and a motion promptly made before the alternates are sworn, and before any remaining unselected prospective jurors are dismissed, is timely not only as to the prospec

716
People v. Farnamgreen
cal · 2002 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2024
713
People v. Jonesgreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2023
713
People v. Goregreen
calctapp · 1993 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–2021
713
People v. Cunninghamgreen
cal · 2015 · cited in 12 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2026
712
People v. Rhoadesgreen
cal · 2019 · cited in 12 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2026
712
People v. Reedgreen
cal · 2018 · cited in 11 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2026
711
People v. O'Malleygreen
cal · 2016 · cited in 10 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2023
710
People v. Cornwellred
cal · 2005 · cited in 9 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2021
79
People v. Williamsgreen
cal · 2013 · cited in 20 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2023
2 sentences

2020(See People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1146-1147 [identifying Batson/Wheeler as a pretrial issue]; People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 649 [same].) In Akopyan I, we remanded for the trial court to reconsider its denial of its sua sponte Batson/Wheeler motion in light of defense counsel’s justifications for his first four peremptory challenges.

2020(See People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1146-1147 [identifying Batson/Wheeler as a pretrial issue]; People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 649 [same].) In Akopyan I, we remanded for the trial court to reconsider its denial of its sua sponte Batson/Wheeler motion in light of defense counsel’s justifications for his first four peremptory challenges.

620
People v. Burgenergreen
cal · 2003 · cited in 18 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2023
2 sentences

2023(Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 416 ; accord, People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1212 ; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 863 .) With respect to jury selection, “‘[t]here “is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing 3. party to demonstrate impermissible discrimination.”’ [Citations.] Under a now familiar three-step process, a defendant [bringing a Batson/Wheeler motion] must first ‘make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminato

2022Third, the court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 612 .) “The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” (Id. at pp. 612-613.) Our review of the trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion is deferential, and we examine “only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 .) “We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial cou

618
People v. Chismgreen
cal · 2014 · cited in 17 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2026We have also held that where a trial court finds “that defendant did not make a prima facie showing of group bias and 57 PEOPLE v. SHOVE Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. also . . . passes judgment on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination, the case is described as a first stage/third stage Batson/Wheeler hybrid, and the question whether a defendant established a prima facie case of group bias is rendered moot.” (Chism, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1314 ; see also Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 786 ; People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158 , 173– 174 (Mills).) That appears to be what

2024Third, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] ‘The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the [defendant].’ ” ’ ” (Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 760 .) “ ‘ “The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry, of course, is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reaso

617
People v. Lewisyellow
cal · 2008 · cited in 10 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2023
610

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (3)

CaseNegativeCited
People v. Scottgreen
cal · 2015 · cited in 52 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2026(Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 387, fn. 1 .) The majority reasons that the trial court’s purported third stage ruling “could not have addressed reasons related to Prospective Juror No. 206” and therefore decides to “review the court’s denial of Shove’s Batson/Wheeler motion as to Prospective Juror No. 206 as a first-stage denial” while 4 As in Snow, there are significant reasons to doubt, after the passage of nearly 20 years, that the judge could accurately assess the prosecutor’s reasons for any juror.

2016(Id. at p. 393 (maj. opn.); but see id. at pp. 409-414 (dis. opn. of Liu, J. [disagreeing with majority’s analysis of Hernandez and finding third-stage review is proper when prosecutor states reasons and trial court issues a ruling].) We begin our analysis by noting that California authority on this issue, in the words of Scott, is “not . . . entirely consistent.” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 386 .) On one hand, the predicate in Scott was an express ruling by the trial court on both the prima facie and ultimate issues of discrimination.

152
People v. Turneryellow
cal · 1994 · cited in 26 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–2022
2 sentences

1996(People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 18-23 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [so holding as to a Wheeler motion]; People v. Tapia (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 984, 1014 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 ] [following Jackson]; cf. Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 364-369 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 408-412] (plur. opn. by Kennedy, J.) [concluding that tiie federal “clearly erroneous” standard—which is practically the same as the California substantial evidence test—is applicable on direct review of a state court decision involving a Batson motion]; id. at p. 372 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 414] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J

1996(People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 18-23 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [so holding as to a Wheeler motion]; People v. Tapia (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 984, 1014 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 ] [following Jackson]; cf. Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 364-369 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 408-412] (plur. opn. by Kennedy, J.) [concluding that tiie federal “clearly erroneous” standard—which is practically the same as the California substantial evidence test—is applicable on direct review of a state court decision involving a Batson motion]; id. at p. 372 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 414] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J

126
People v. Rhoadesgreen
cal · 2019 · cited in 12 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2026
112

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (143) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 352 (81) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1101 (46) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 353 (38) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 210 (30) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1200 (27) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 211 (23) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 1239 (20) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 350 (18) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 801 (17) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (17) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1250 (15)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 438 (1982–2026) TX 27 (2010–2025) IL 8 (1982–2021) FL 7 (1995–2018) PA 6 (1981–2024) HI 6 (2009–2017) WA 5 (2010–2015) MS 5 (1999–2015) CO 3 (1987–2015) AL 2 (2005–2016) AR 2 (2009–2014) GA 2 (1989–2015) NY 2 (2001–2018) DC 2 (1992–2009) OR 2 (2006–2022) NH 2 (1983–1988) KS 2 (2020–2022) DE 2 (2015–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check