8 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 2016–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Roedergreen2 sentences2026See State v. Roeder, 300 Kan. 901, 923-24 , 336 P.3d 831 (2014). 2026See State v. Roeder, 300 Kan. 901, 923-24 , 336 P.3d 831 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Plummergreen1 sentence2021See State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715 , 721, 449 P.3d 429 (2019) (holding involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder); Plummer, 295 Kan. at 161 (holding lesser included offense instruction is legally appropriate). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gentrygreen1 sentence2021See State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715 , 721, 449 P.3d 429 (2019) (holding involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder); Plummer, 295 Kan. at 161 (holding lesser included offense instruction is legally appropriate). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Makthepharakgreen2 sentences2016See PIK Crim. 4th 52.010 (2015 Supp.) (incorporating this statutory language); State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 572 , 78 P.3d 412 (2003) ("Aggravated burglary is a specific intent crime . . . ."). 2016See PIK Crim. 4th 52.010 (2015 Supp.) (incorporating this statutory language); State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 572 , 78 P.3d 412 (2003) ("Aggravated burglary is a specific intent crime . . . ."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re D.A.
green
2 sentences2022All crimes defined in this code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as 'knowingly,' 'known,' or 'with knowledge' are general intent crimes." This court clarified the mens rea element of the criminal damage to property statute in In re D.A., 40 Kan. 2021On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed D.A.'s juvenile adjudication for the offenses, finding his actions were not accidental or involuntary. 40 Kan. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
In Re Da
neutral
1 sentence2022App. 2d 878, 892 , 197 P.3d 849 (2008). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Murrin
green
2 sentences2022One is said . . . to act "knowingly" as to the nature of his conduct if "he is aware that his conduct is of that nature." As to the attendant circumstances . . . . one acts "knowingly" when "he is aware . . . that such circumstances exist."'" State v. Murrin, 309 Kan. 385, 394 , 435 P.3d 1126 (2019) (quoting 1 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2[b] [3d ed. 2018]). 2022One is said . . . to act "knowingly" as to the nature of his conduct if "he is aware that his conduct is of that nature." As to the attendant circumstances . . . . one acts "knowingly" when "he is aware . . . that such circumstances exist."'" State v. Murrin, 309 Kan. 385, 394 , 435 P.3d 1126 (2019) (quoting 1 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2[b] [3d ed. 2018]). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Lile
green
2 sentences2021Prior to that enactment, K.S.A. 21-3201 governed the mental culpability requirement of crimes and explained "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime . . . ." This court had interpreted that statute to mean that a defendant must always have "a general intent to commit the prohibited act." State v. Lile, 237 Kan. 210, 212 , 699 P.2d 456 (1985) (citing State v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426 , 673 P.2d 1147 [1983]). 2021Prior to that enactment, K.S.A. 21-3201 governed the mental culpability requirement of crimes and explained "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime . . . ." This court had interpreted that statute to mean that a defendant must always have "a general intent to commit the prohibited act." State v. Lile, 237 Kan. 210, 212 , 699 P.2d 456 (1985) (citing State v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426 , 673 P.2d 1147 [1983]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Cantrell
green
2 sentences2021Prior to that enactment, K.S.A. 21-3201 governed the mental culpability requirement of crimes and explained "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime . . . ." This court had interpreted that statute to mean that a defendant must always have "a general intent to commit the prohibited act." State v. Lile, 237 Kan. 210, 212 , 699 P.2d 456 (1985) (citing State v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426 , 673 P.2d 1147 [1983]). 2021Prior to that enactment, K.S.A. 21-3201 governed the mental culpability requirement of crimes and explained "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime . . . ." This court had interpreted that statute to mean that a defendant must always have "a general intent to commit the prohibited act." State v. Lile, 237 Kan. 210, 212 , 699 P.2d 456 (1985) (citing State v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426 , 673 P.2d 1147 [1983]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Kershaw
green
2 sentences2016This court recently held that "the legislature's designation of a general 33 intent mental culpability requirement where a crime is defined by the term 'knowingly' continues to express a legislative intent that a voluntary intoxication defense is unavailable for that crime." State v. Kershaw, 302 Kan. 772, 782 , 359 P.3d 52 (2015). 2016This court recently held that "the legislature's designation of a general 33 intent mental culpability requirement where a crime is defined by the term 'knowingly' continues to express a legislative intent that a voluntary intoxication defense is unavailable for that crime." State v. Kershaw, 302 Kan. 772, 782 , 359 P.3d 52 (2015). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.