7 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Palmer v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2025See People v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M , ¶ 14 (“Voluntary intoxication may negate specific intent . . . .”); § 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (first degree assault requires an offender to act “[w]ith intent”); Palmer v. People, 964 P.2d 524, 526 (Colo. 1998) (“[A]ll offenses in the criminal code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as 14 ‘intentionally’ or ‘with intent’ are specific intent offenses.”). 2022See § 18-1-804(1), C.R.S. 2021; Palmer v. People, 964 P.2d 524, 526 (Colo. 1998) (“[A]ll offenses in the criminal code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as ‘intentionally’ or ‘with intent’ are 5 specific intent offenses.”); § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2021 (a second degree burglary conviction requires a finding that the defendant acted “with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property”); § 18-4-506, C.R.S. 2021 (tampering requires an offender to act “with intent to cause injury, inconvenience, or annoyance to that person or to another”). ¶ 15 A trial co | 2 | 2 |
People v. Aragongreen1 sentence2025It is “the settled law of [Colorado] that evidence of self-induced intoxication is not admissible to negate the culpability element of ‘knowingly.’” Stone, ¶ 5, 471 P.3d at 1151 (quoting People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo. 1982)). ¶ 52 Drake asserts that the trial court erred by giving the intoxication instruction because such instruction erroneously 23 “create[d] an evidentiary rule that categorically prohibit[ed] [the] jury from considering evidence that [was] both relevant and exculpatory.” He argues that a proper intoxication instruction would have explained section 18-1-804(1) to t | 1 | 1 |
In Re Roosegreen1 sentence2022"A person acts 'intentionally' or 'with intent' when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense," § 18-1-501(5) (emphasis added), or when the person's "purpose [is] to accomplish a particular result," In re Roose , 69 P.3d 43, 48 (Colo. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen1 sentence1998See id. at 975 . 6 Here, however, the culpability requirement for conspiracy and that for the crime of reckless manslaughter conflict. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Foundsgreen1 sentence1982See People v. Founds, supra. Section 18-1-501(6), C.R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. People
green
1 sentence2022See § 18-1-804(1), C.R.S. 2021; Palmer v. People, 964 P.2d 524, 526 (Colo. 1998) (“[A]ll offenses in the criminal code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as ‘intentionally’ or ‘with intent’ are 5 specific intent offenses.”); § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2021 (a second degree burglary conviction requires a finding that the defendant acted “with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property”); § 18-4-506, C.R.S. 2021 (tampering requires an offender to act “with intent to cause injury, inconvenience, or annoyance to that person or to another”). ¶ 15 A trial co | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Mattas
green
1 sentence1983People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254 (Colo.1982); People v. Mason, supra. III. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Mason
green
1 sentence1983People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254 (Colo.1982); People v. Mason, supra. III. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.