particularized test in Kansas

2026But this court uses "a more particularized test when, as here, a defendant challenges a district court's failure to give a unanimity instruction in a case potentially involving multiple acts." State v. Garcia-Martinez, 318 Kan. 681 , 693-94, 546 P.3d 750 (2024).

2024"When a case involves multiple acts, the jury must unanimously agree on which specific act constitutes the crime." State v. Garcia-Martinez, 318 Kan. 681 , 693, 546 P.3d 750 (2024). "[There is] a more particularized test when . . . a defendant challenges a district court's failure to give a unanimity instruction in a case potentially involving multiple acts.

2022If the State did not inform the jury which act to rely upon during its deliberations and the trial court did not instruct the jury that it must be unanimous about the particular criminal act that supported the conviction, there was error. . . . "'The final step [is] to determine whether the error was reversible.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 979 , 305 P.3d 641 (2013).

2022If the State did not inform the jury which act to rely upon during its deliberations and the trial court did not instruct the jury that it must be unanimous about the particular criminal act that supported the conviction, there was error. . . . "'The final step [is] to determine whether the error was reversible.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 979 , 305 P.3d 641 (2013).

2016Nonetheless, the Tosh court continued to believe that the particularized test it had devised was—at the end of the day—still intended simply to determine whether the error was prejudicial and reversible under both the Chapman and the statutory harmlessness tests: "[T]he second step of the analysis is essentially directed to whether the misconduct is so prejudicial that it denies the defendant a fair trial." Tosh, 278 Kan. at 93 .

2016And because the constitutional harmlessness test of Chapman is both mandated by the dictates of due process and more stringent than our statutory standard, we have routinely put our focus on the Chapman standard because "'the State necessarily meets the lower statutory standard under K.S.A. 60-261 if it meets the higher constitutional standard.'" State v. Crawford, 300 Kan. 740, 746 , 334 P.3d 311 (2014). 24 After 12 years of application, we can now identify the "punitive" aspect of Tosh— extended from the concerns about gross and flagrant conduct and prosecutorial ill will recited in Thompson

2013State v. Jacques, 225 Kan. 38, 42 , 587 P.2d 861 (1978); see also United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding nature of criminal activity, length of activity, and nature of property to be seized determinative of whether dated information remains probative).

2013State v. Jacques, 225 Kan. 38, 42 , 587 P.2d 861 (1978); see also United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding nature of criminal activity, length of activity, and nature of property to be seized determinative of whether dated information remains probative).