particularized standard in Washington

2021Under the Bracker balancing test, courts conduct “a particularized inquiry,” weighing “the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake,” to determine “whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.” Id. at 145 . 27 No. 54514-4-II The taxpayers urge us to determine that the REET is preempted by federal law under Bracker because, they contend, the federal interests are strong while the state interests are minimal.

2018To determine whether the exercise of state authority violates federal law, a court makes “a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.” Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145 .

2016Harper did not object during the trial and therefore, we will not consider the issue. 8 47123-0-II “Unpreserved LFO errors do not command review as a matter of right.” State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 833 , 344 P.3d 680 (2015).

2016Harper did not object during the trial and therefore, we will not consider the issue. 8 47123-0-II “Unpreserved LFO errors do not command review as a matter of right.” State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 833 , 344 P.3d 680 (2015).

2013See People v. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d 1126 , 755 P.2d 1049 , 248 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1988) (approving a condensed Telfaire type instruction and requiring that such an instruction be given when requested in a case in which identification is a central issue and there is little corroborative evidence); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385 , 635 P.2d 1236 (1981) (holding that where eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution’s case and there is serious doubt about the reliability of the identification, a cautionary instruction should be given); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 , 27 A.3d 872 (2

2013See People v. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d 1126 , 755 P.2d 1049 , 248 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1988) (approving a condensed Telfaire type instruction and requiring that such an instruction be given when requested in a case in which identification is a central issue and there is little corroborative evidence); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385 , 635 P.2d 1236 (1981) (holding that where eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution’s case and there is serious doubt about the reliability of the identification, a cautionary instruction should be given); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 , 27 A.3d 872 (2

2013See People v. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d 1126 , 755 P.2d 1049 , 248 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1988) (approving a condensed Telfaire type instruction and requiring that such an instruction be given when requested in a case in which identification is a central issue and there is little corroborative evidence); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385 , 635 P.2d 1236 (1981) (holding that where eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution’s case and there is serious doubt about the reliability of the identification, a cautionary instruction should be given); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 , 27 A.3d 872 (2

2013See People v. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d 1126 , 755 P.2d 1049 , 248 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1988) (approving a condensed Telfaire type instruction and requiring that such an instruction be given when requested in a case in which identification is a central issue and there is little corroborative evidence); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385 , 635 P.2d 1236 (1981) (holding that where eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution’s case and there is serious doubt about the reliability of the identification, a cautionary instruction should be given); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 , 27 A.3d 872 (2

2011A county's action is not "clearly erroneous" merely because an unelected hearings board has a "`firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed'"; [8] rather, "`[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash.2d 255, 259-60 , 461 P.2d 531 (1969) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 , 68 S.Ct. 525 , 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); [9] see also United States v. Or.

2011A county's action is not "clearly erroneous" merely because an unelected hearings board has a "`firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed'"; [8] rather, "`[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash.2d 255, 259-60 , 461 P.2d 531 (1969) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 , 68 S.Ct. 525 , 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); [9] see also United States v. Or.

2011A county's action is not "clearly erroneous" merely because an unelected hearings board has a "`firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed'"; [8] rather, "`[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash.2d 255, 259-60 , 461 P.2d 531 (1969) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 , 68 S.Ct. 525 , 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); [9] see also United States v. Or.

2011A county's action is not "clearly erroneous" merely because an unelected hearings board has a "`firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed'"; [8] rather, "`[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash.2d 255, 259-60 , 461 P.2d 531 (1969) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 , 68 S.Ct. 525 , 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); [9] see also United States v. Or.