changed circumstance rule in California

2025In Montenegro, the Supreme Court held that “a stipulated custody order is a final judicial custody determination for purposes of the changed circumstance rule only if there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a result.” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 258 , italics added.) Here, the family court referenced Montenegro without analysis in stating that its order granting Father’s move-away request was final, and that modification would require a “significant change of circumstances” unless agreed to by the parents.

2023(Id. at p. 256.) “Under the so-called changed circumstance rule, a party seeking to modify a permanent custody order can do so only if he or she demonstrates a significant change of circumstances justifying a modification.” (Ibid., italics added.) Once a final custody determination has been made, “the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the 7 primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)

2023(Cf. Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 535 [once initial custody order is in place, court must “preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in the child’s best interest”].) But “the changed circumstance rule does not apply when a parent requests only a change in the parenting or visitation arrangement not amounting to a change 1 For the first time in her reply brief, Mother argues the trial court did not comply with the provisions of Family Code section 3190, which requires us to nullify the ther

2023(See Prouty v. Prouty (1940) 16 Cal.2d 190, 193 (Prouty).) Once a family court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of a child, “ ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 956 ; In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25 , 32–33 (Burge

2023(Id. at p. 256.) “Under the so-called changed circumstance rule, a party seeking to modify a permanent custody order can do so only if he or she demonstrates a significant change of circumstances justifying a modification.” (Ibid., italics added.) Once a final custody determination has been made, “the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the 7 primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)

2023(See Prouty v. Prouty (1940) 16 Cal.2d 190, 193 (Prouty).) Once a family court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of a child, “ ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 956 ; In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25 , 32–33 (Burge

2022The Trial Court Altered the Parenting Schedule But Did Not Change Custody, Thus the Changed Circumstances Rule Did Not Apply It is well established that “[o]nce the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the 9 primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In recognit

2022(See Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379 ; Birnbaum, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1511–1512.) Nor was it “on a par with a request to change physical custody from sole to joint custody, or vice versa.” (Enrique M., at p. 1382; accord In re Marriage of McKean (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1083 , 1088 [changed circumstances finding necessary where court modified previous order granting parents joint legal and physical custody and instead awarded sole legal and physical custody to one parent].) We conclude the changed circumstance rule did not apply to the trial court’s order altering the parent

2025Changed Circumstance Rule “Once the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In recognition of this policy concern, [our Supreme Court has] articulated a variation on the best interest standard, known as the changed cir

2025Changed Circumstance Rule “Once the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In recognition of this policy concern, [our Supreme Court has] articulated a variation on the best interest standard, known as the changed cir

2024The rule thus fosters the dual goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements. [Citations.]’ ” (Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1378–1379.) However, “[t]he California Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed the changed circumstance rule in cases involving requests to modify custody, where granting the request would remove custody from one parent and give it to the other parent. [Citations.]” (Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379 .) Consequently, in Enrique M., an appellate court determined that where the parents had joint legal and physical custody, the

2022The Trial Court Altered the Parenting Schedule But Did Not Change Custody, Thus the Changed Circumstances Rule Did Not Apply It is well established that “[o]nce the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the 9 primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In recognit

1990(In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725, 730-31 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 383 , 598 P.2d 36 , 3 A.L.R.4th 1028 ]; Connolly v. Connolly (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 433, 436 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 616 ].) “The Carney decision, it is clear, did not turn on any difference in result between the changed-circumstance rule and the best-interest standard.

1990(In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725, 730-31 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 383 , 598 P.2d 36 , 3 A.L.R.4th 1028 ]; Connolly v. Connolly (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 433, 436 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 616 ].) “The Carney decision, it is clear, did not turn on any difference in result between the changed-circumstance rule and the best-interest standard.

2006(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1078 ; see also id. at p. 1096; Ragghanti v. Reyes (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 989, 996 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 522 ] [“[t]he changed circumstances test requires a threshold showing of detriment before a court may modify an existing final custody order that was previously based upon the child’s best interest”].) Imposing this burden on the noncustodial parent is consistent with the recognition that “ ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with

2004The Burgess court also “suggested that the changed circumstance rule does not apply when the parents have joint custody.” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 254, fn. 1 ; see also Lamusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1089, fn. 3 [stating that when parents share joint physical custody “if it is shown that the best interests of the children require modification or termination of the order, the court ‘must determine de novo what arrangement for primary custody is in the best interest of the minor children,’ ” citing Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 40, fn. 12 ].) The Burgess court explained: “A diff

2012(See Baker, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 [“However, there can be cases where there [has] been no change of circumstances yet it would be just and equitable to modify an existing order.”]; Montenegro v. Diaz, (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 259 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ] [“we agree that the changed circumstance rule should be flexible . . .”]; Goto v. Goto (1959) 52 Cal.2d 118, 123 [ 338 P.2d 450 ] [“‘We do not wish to be understood as holding that “the change of circumstance” rule is an absolutely iron-clad rule and that there can be no possible exception to it. . . .’ [Citation.]”].) For

2012(See Baker, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 [“However, there can be cases where there [has] been no change of circumstances yet it would be just and equitable to modify an existing order.”]; Montenegro v. Diaz, (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 259 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ] [“we agree that the changed circumstance rule should be flexible . . .”]; Goto v. Goto (1959) 52 Cal.2d 118, 123 [ 338 P.2d 450 ] [“‘We do not wish to be understood as holding that “the change of circumstance” rule is an absolutely iron-clad rule and that there can be no possible exception to it. . . .’ [Citation.]”].) For

2023(See, e.g., id. at pp. 758– 760 [where father had custody “every Thursday evening until Friday morning and every other weekend from Friday evening until Monday morning,” “Mother had what was effectively sole physical custody, and Father had liberal visitation rights”]; In re Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 142 [same].) Thus, notwithstanding the reference to “joint physical custody,” we must review the order as a change in custody awarding father sole physical custody of the children. 2 modification was necessary to serve the children’s best interests.

2006(E.g., In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1088-1089 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 356 , 88 P.3d 81 ] (LaMusga); Osgood v. London (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 432-434 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 379 ]; In re Marriage of Campos (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 839, 843 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 ] (Campos); In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1468-1469 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 ]; In re Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 140-141 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 559 ].) Brown attempts to distinguish Burgess and its progeny on the ground they did not involve a parent with sole legal and sole physical custo

2021(Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 257 [the changed circumstance rule applies after any “final” judicial custody determination]; Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 433 [a party seeking to modify a “permanent” custody order can do so only if he or she demonstrates a significant change of circumstances justifying a modification].) Moreover, the instant matter was proceeding from Theresa’s September 9, 2016 request to modify the existing custody order in the 2011 judgment of dissolution of marriage.

2006(E.g., In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1088-1089 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 356 , 88 P.3d 81 ] (LaMusga); Osgood v. London (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 432-434 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 379 ]; In re Marriage of Campos (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 839, 843 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 ] (Campos); In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1468-1469 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 ]; In re Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 140-141 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 559 ].) Brown attempts to distinguish Burgess and its progeny on the ground they did not involve a parent with sole legal and sole physical custo

2013(In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 219-220 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 , 96 P.3d 141 ].) When a legal parent seeks to modify a visitation schedule set forth in a final custody order, the changed circumstance rule does not apply.

2013(In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 219-220 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 , 96 P.3d 141 ].) When a legal parent seeks to modify a visitation schedule set forth in a final custody order, the changed circumstance rule does not apply.

2001(Id. at pp. 760-761; see also In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1466-1470 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 ] [applying the changed circumstance rule to a request for modification of a stipulated permanent custody order].) Because Burchard and Burgess “did not question the legitimacy of judicial orders entered pursuant to parental agreement” (Biallas, at p. 761), the court concluded that the trial court was not “empowered to make a de novo determination” of the best interest of the child.

2001(Id. at pp. 760-761; see also In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1466-1470 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 ] [applying the changed circumstance rule to a request for modification of a stipulated permanent custody order].) Because Burchard and Burgess “did not question the legitimacy of judicial orders entered pursuant to parental agreement” (Biallas, at p. 761), the court concluded that the trial court was not “empowered to make a de novo determination” of the best interest of the child.

1990(In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725, 730-31 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 383 , 598 P.2d 36 , 3 A.L.R.4th 1028 ]; Connolly v. Connolly (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 433, 436 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 616 ].) “The Carney decision, it is clear, did not turn on any difference in result between the changed-circumstance rule and the best-interest standard.

1990(In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725, 730-31 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 383 , 598 P.2d 36 , 3 A.L.R.4th 1028 ]; Connolly v. Connolly (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 433, 436 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 616 ].) “The Carney decision, it is clear, did not turn on any difference in result between the changed-circumstance rule and the best-interest standard.

2022The Trial Court Altered the Parenting Schedule But Did Not Change Custody, Thus the Changed Circumstances Rule Did Not Apply It is well established that “[o]nce the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the 9 primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In recognit

2020Instead, the trial court considers a request to change the parenting or visitation arrangement under the best interests of the child standard.” (In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1072 .) Thus, where a party requests a modification that would merely involve an adjustment to the parenting or visitation schedule—such as the particular days or times the children would reside with 9. one parent rather than the other each week—and assuming the request would not cause a de facto alteration to the parents’ basic custody arrangement (here, joint legal and joint physical custody), the

2025The rule provides that a parent who is entitled under a final custody determination to sole physical custody of a child has a right to change the child’s residence, subject to a court’s power to preclude a removal that would prejudice the child's rights or welfare.” (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 363 .) “[A]n evidentiary hearing in a move-away situation should be held only if necessary.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 962 .) But this is not a move-away case.

2016(Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 363 (Niko).) “The changed circumstance rule applies to a modification request seeking a change in a final determination of custody.

2023(F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 19-20 (F.T.); Keith R. v. Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1054 .) Instead, the court must evaluate de novo what physical custody arrangement would be in the child ren’s best interest, in light of the proposed move.

2014(F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App. 4th 1, 19 .) Here, Mother contends the stipulated judgment constitutes the final judicial custody determination, thereby triggering her presumptive right to change Daughter’s residence from California to Texas because section 9(c)(1) of the stipulated judgment provides that Daughter, upon reaching the age of 7, “shall then relocate with Mother to Texas and shall live with Mother there, or any other location Mother should be living at. 5 Mother shall then have primary physical custody of [Daughter].” (Italics added.) Mother calls the move-away provision “unambi

2024The rule thus fosters the dual goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements. [Citations.]’ ” (Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1378–1379.) However, “[t]he California Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed the changed circumstance rule in cases involving requests to modify custody, where granting the request would remove custody from one parent and give it to the other parent. [Citations.]” (Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379 .) Consequently, in Enrique M., an appellate court determined that where the parents had joint legal and physical custody, the

2023(In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077 ; accord, In re Marriage of Furie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816, 827 [the appropriate standard for ordering a modification in parenting authority that does not rise to the level of a change in custody is the best interests test].) Relevant factors for the court to consider in determining the best interest of the child include the health, safety and welfare of the child, any history of physical or substance abuse by either parent, and the nature and amount of contact with each parent.

2023In determining whether the changed circumstance rule applies, we must look “at the existing de facto arrangement between the parties to decide whether physical custody is truly joint or whether one parent has sole physical custody with visitation rights accorded the other parent.” (In re Marriage of Biallas (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 755 , 759–760.) Here, the physical custody arrangement under the judgment, and the modified arrangement under the order, both reflect what reviewing courts have characterized as sole physical custody with generous visitation rights for the other parent.

2001Concluding that the September 30, 1996 and June 24, 1997 orders were final judgments as to custody, the court held that the trial court should have applied the changed circumstance rule described in Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 534, 538 , footnote 4 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 724 P.2d 486 , 62 A.L.R.4th 237 ] (Burchard) and In re Marriage of Biallas (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 755, 761 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 717 ] (Biallas), rather than the best interest standard. 1 After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the Court of Appeal determined that there was no evidence of a significant change of c

2019Our high court has stated that " 'when a *1031 defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at the time of his or her prior testimony, that testimony is deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation requirement [citation], regardless whether subsequent circumstances bring into question the accuracy or the completeness of the earlier testimony.' " ( Wilson, supra , 36 Cal.4th at p. 343 , 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 , 114 P.3d 758 , italics added, quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795 , 851-852, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ( Samayoa ).) This changed circumstance p

2019Our high court has stated that " 'when a *1031 defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at the time of his or her prior testimony, that testimony is deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation requirement [citation], regardless whether subsequent circumstances bring into question the accuracy or the completeness of the earlier testimony.' " ( Wilson, supra , 36 Cal.4th at p. 343 , 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 , 114 P.3d 758 , italics added, quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795 , 851-852, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ( Samayoa ).) This changed circumstance p

2023The court can then inquire whether alleged new circumstances represent a significant change from preexisting circumstances, requiring a reevaluation of the child’s custody.” (Burchard, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 534 .) “[I]n view of the child’s interest in stable custodial and emotional ties, custody lawfully acquired and maintained for a significant period will have the effect of compelling the noncustodial parent to assume the burden of persuading the trier of fact that a change [in custody] is in the child’s best interest.” (Id. at p. 536.) Notwithstanding the child’s interest in stability, “in

2023(Cf. In re Marriage of Williams (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 808, 813 [record was “silent on the adverse effect” custody order would “necessarily have from the point of view of the children” where family court ordered two siblings to move to Santa Barbara with father and other two siblings to move to Utah with mother, while “record contain[ed] no psychological evaluations, no school or medical records and no input from the children,” and court had received “no evidence concerning the extent to which the siblings are bonded to one another”].) The family court reasonably exercised its discretion to mod

2023(See Prouty v. Prouty (1940) 16 Cal.2d 190, 193 (Prouty).) Once a family court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of a child, “ ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 956 ; In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25 , 32–33 (Burge

2022If either parent opposes the modification or termination order, the court shall state in its decision the reasons for modification or termination of the joint custody order.” However, the California Supreme Court has found, “Once the trial court has entered a final or 11 permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in f

2014Because such a modification does not change ‘custody,’ the trial court considers a visitation modification solely under the child’s best interests standard. [([In re] Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 [Cal.App.]4th 1068, 1077–1080 (citing text) (collecting cases)—noncustodial parent who had supervised visitation not required to show changed circumstances in support of request for unmonitored visits and additional visitation time not amounting to ‘de facto joint custody’].” (Hogoboom and King, Family Law, supra, at ¶17:302.3, p.17-74; see also, Chalmers v. Hirschkop, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 305