Daniels test in California

2016(See People v. James (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 446 , 454 & fn. 5 (James).) As originally enunciated by our Supreme Court, the second prong of the Daniels test required the increase in risk to the victim must be substantial. ( Daniels, supra, at p. 1140 .) The 1997 amendments to section 209 eliminated the requirement of a 6 supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 871 [same]; § 209, subd. (b)(2).) “ ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play[ed] no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it [was] . . . more or less [a] “ ‘trivial change[ ] of location having no bearing on the evil at h

2016(See People v. James (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 446 , 454 & fn. 5 (James).) As originally enunciated by our Supreme Court, the second prong of the Daniels test required the increase in risk to the victim must be substantial. ( Daniels, supra, at p. 1140 .) The 1997 amendments to section 209 eliminated the requirement of a 6 supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 871 [same]; § 209, subd. (b)(2).) “ ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play[ed] no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it [was] . . . more or less [a] “ ‘trivial change[ ] of location having no bearing on the evil at h

2000Neither Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d 411 , nor Laursen, supra, 8 Cal.3d 192 , addressed the precise question of whether a substantially increased risk of psychological injury, in the absence of a similarly increased risk of physical injury, can satisfy the Daniels test.

2000Neither Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d 411 , nor Laursen, supra, 8 Cal.3d 192 , addressed the precise question of whether a substantially increased risk of psychological injury, in the absence of a similarly increased risk of physical injury, can satisfy the Daniels test.

2016Its comment 9 concerning Daniels was dictum and made before People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d 588 , clarified that the Daniels rule did not apply to simple kidnapping. [¶] Defendant’s fallback position is that felony false imprisonment is more closely related to aggravated kidnapping than to simple kidnapping.

2016Its comment 9 concerning Daniels was dictum and made before People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d 588 , clarified that the Daniels rule did not apply to simple kidnapping. [¶] Defendant’s fallback position is that felony false imprisonment is more closely related to aggravated kidnapping than to simple kidnapping.

1994If such conduct was insufficient to activate section 209, the movement in the present case is also inadequate for that purpose." ( Ibid. ) The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in robbery. ( In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 131 ; People v. Lara (1974) 12 Cal.3d 903, 908, & fn. 4 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 549 , 528 P.2d 365 ].) This includes consideration of such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, a

1994If such conduct was insufficient to activate section 209, the movement in the present case is also inadequate for that purpose." ( Ibid. ) The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in robbery. ( In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 131 ; People v. Lara (1974) 12 Cal.3d 903, 908, & fn. 4 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 549 , 528 P.2d 365 ].) This includes consideration of such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, a

1998After the jury convicted the defendant on that count, we held in another case that such asportation is an element of the crime. ( People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 , 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 .) Thornton nevertheless affirmed the kidnapping conviction after finding that the evidence clearly showed that the asportation met the Daniels standard. ( Thornton, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 767-768, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467 , 523 P.2d 267 .) A concurring and dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority on this point, arguing that the Modesto rule should extend to failure to instruct on an ess

1998After the jury convicted the defendant on that count, we held in another case that such asportation is an element of the crime. ( People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 , 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 .) Thornton nevertheless affirmed the kidnapping conviction after finding that the evidence clearly showed that the asportation met the Daniels standard. ( Thornton, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 767-768, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467 , 523 P.2d 267 .) A concurring and dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority on this point, arguing that the Modesto rule should extend to failure to instruct on an ess

2002(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 858.) That footnote begins, "There is no merit to an assertion ... that `when the robber's intent is solely to facilitate the robbery the movement is merely incidental' thereto within the meaning of Daniels . [C]ases containing] language ... tending to support [this] assertion ... reflect a misconception of the first prong of the Daniels test in that they fail to take into consideration whether the movement was brief...." ( Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 130, fn. 11 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 .) In other words, just because the robber could not have accomplished

2002(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 858.) That footnote begins, "There is no merit to an assertion ... that `when the robber's intent is solely to facilitate the robbery the movement is merely incidental' thereto within the meaning of Daniels . [C]ases containing] language ... tending to support [this] assertion ... reflect a misconception of the first prong of the Daniels test in that they fail to take into consideration whether the movement was brief...." ( Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 130, fn. 11 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 .) In other words, just because the robber could not have accomplished

1999Such factors would be relevant in a Daniels situation of aggravated kidnaping—a kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen.Code, § 209)—but we held in Stanworth that the Daniels test was not applicable to simple kidnaping under Penal Code section 207." ( Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 574 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 , fn. omitted; see also Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464-465 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 .) As more than one Court of Appeal has observed, decisions of this court provide scant assistance in determining simple kidnapping asportation: "The increasing c

1999Such factors would be relevant in a Daniels situation of aggravated kidnaping—a kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen.Code, § 209)—but we held in Stanworth that the Daniels test was not applicable to simple kidnaping under Penal Code section 207." ( Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 574 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 , fn. omitted; see also Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 464-465 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 364 P.2d 241 .) As more than one Court of Appeal has observed, decisions of this court provide scant assistance in determining simple kidnapping asportation: "The increasing c

2016(Id. at p. 1139.) The Legislature omitted the word “substantially” when it codified the Daniels test in 1997 (see People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870, fn. 20 (Vines)), and the parties dispute whether the applicable test requires the risk of harm be substantially increased, or just increased by any amount.

2016(Id. at p. 1139.) The Legislature omitted the word “substantially” when it codified the Daniels test in 1997 (see People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870, fn. 20 (Vines)), and the parties dispute whether the applicable test requires the risk of harm be substantially increased, or just increased by any amount.

2016(See Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 170 [by moving victim “to the back room . . . out of public view,” defendant “made it less likely for others to discover the crime and decreased the odds of detection”]; People v. Aguilar (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1049 [“Courts have held that moving a victim to a more isolated open area which is less visible to public view is sufficient.”].) And the manner in which appellant forced Ms. Doe to move to the new location, at the point of a knife, increased the risk that she would be wounded or killed beyond that inherent in rape alone, thus satisfying t

2016(See Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 170 [by moving victim “to the back room . . . out of public view,” defendant “made it less likely for others to discover the crime and decreased the odds of detection”]; People v. Aguilar (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1049 [“Courts have held that moving a victim to a more isolated open area which is less visible to public view is sufficient.”].) And the manner in which appellant forced Ms. Doe to move to the new location, at the point of a knife, increased the risk that she would be wounded or killed beyond that inherent in rape alone, thus satisfying t

2017(Id. at p. 1140.) In People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1 (Rayford), the high court observed that in determining whether the movement was merely incidental to the crime—the first prong of the Daniels analysis—the trier of fact must consider the scope and nature of the movement.

2017(Id. at p. 1140.) In People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1 (Rayford), the high court observed that in determining whether the movement was merely incidental to the crime—the first prong of the Daniels analysis—the trier of fact must consider the scope and nature of the movement.

2017However, . . . there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 297 .) ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it be a more or less “ ‘trivial change[] of location having no bearing on the evil at hand.’ ” ’ (People v. Ellis (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 66, 70 .) ‘ “ ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm a

2017However, . . . there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 297 .) ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it be a more or less “ ‘trivial change[] of location having no bearing on the evil at hand.’ ” ’ (People v. Ellis (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 66, 70 .) ‘ “ ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm a

1985The California Supreme Court has held that the Daniels rule, which sets forth the elements of kidnaping for robbery under section 209 (aggravated kidnaping), does not apply to a conviction of kidnaping under section 207. ( People v. Brown (1974) 11 Cal.3d 784, 787 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 426 , 523 P.2d 226 ]; People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 596 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 250 , 522 P.2d 1058 ].) Appellant also relies on several section 207 kidnaping cases for support. (8) It is true that the victim's movements must be more than slight ( Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 65

1985The California Supreme Court has held that the Daniels rule, which sets forth the elements of kidnaping for robbery under section 209 (aggravated kidnaping), does not apply to a conviction of kidnaping under section 207. ( People v. Brown (1974) 11 Cal.3d 784, 787 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 426 , 523 P.2d 226 ]; People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 596 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 250 , 522 P.2d 1058 ].) Appellant also relies on several section 207 kidnaping cases for support. (8) It is true that the victim's movements must be more than slight ( Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 65

2022Notably, the Legislature later amended the aggravated kidnapping to commit robbery statute to “adopt[] and codif[y] the Daniels rule.” (People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 878 ; see § 209, subd. (b)(2) [explicitly requiring that “the movement of the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying [enumerated] offense”].) Significantly, the Legislature has not amended the aggravated kidnapping for extortion statute to include Daniels’s (or, by extension, Martinez’s)

2022Notably, the Legislature later amended the aggravated kidnapping to commit robbery statute to “adopt[] and codif[y] the Daniels rule.” (People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 878 ; see § 209, subd. (b)(2) [explicitly requiring that “the movement of the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying [enumerated] offense”].) Significantly, the Legislature has not amended the aggravated kidnapping for extortion statute to include Daniels’s (or, by extension, Martinez’s)

2007(Id. at p. 1138; People v. Stathos (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 33, 37-38 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 482 ].) Therefore, the court concluded that Penal Code section 209 not only excluded “standstill” robberies from its scope, “but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of *454 robbery itself.” 5 (Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139 .) In other words, Daniels “construed [the aggravated kidnapping statute] to preclude convictions based on movement of

2007(Id. at p. 1138; People v. Stathos (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 33, 37-38 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 482 ].) Therefore, the court concluded that Penal Code section 209 not only excluded “standstill” robberies from its scope, “but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of *454 robbery itself.” 5 (Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139 .) In other words, Daniels “construed [the aggravated kidnapping statute] to preclude convictions based on movement of

2016(See Daly, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 [“Daly was convicted of simple kidnapping, a violation of Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a).”]; Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 952–953 [in capital case simple kidnapping conviction in Nevada that involved asportation “too minor to constitute kidnapping” under California law deemed improper to submit to the jury as a penalty phase aggravating circumstance under section 190.3, subdivision (b)].) The Daniels test was not implicated in either case. 9 A “ ‘rape . . . does not necessarily require movement to complete the crime.’ ” (Shadden, supra, 93 C

2016(See Daly, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 [“Daly was convicted of simple kidnapping, a violation of Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a).”]; Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 952–953 [in capital case simple kidnapping conviction in Nevada that involved asportation “too minor to constitute kidnapping” under California law deemed improper to submit to the jury as a penalty phase aggravating circumstance under section 190.3, subdivision (b)].) The Daniels test was not implicated in either case. 9 A “ ‘rape . . . does not necessarily require movement to complete the crime.’ ” (Shadden, supra, 93 C

2007(Id. at p. 1138; People v. Stathos (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 33, 37-38 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 482 ].) Therefore, the court concluded that Penal Code section 209 not only excluded “standstill” robberies from its scope, “but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of *454 robbery itself.” 5 (Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139 .) In other words, Daniels “construed [the aggravated kidnapping statute] to preclude convictions based on movement of

2007(Id. at p. 1138; People v. Stathos (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 33, 37-38 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 482 ].) Therefore, the court concluded that Penal Code section 209 not only excluded “standstill” robberies from its scope, “but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of *454 robbery itself.” 5 (Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139 .) In other words, Daniels “construed [the aggravated kidnapping statute] to preclude convictions based on movement of

2020This movement must increase the victim’s risk of harm beyond the risk necessarily present in the robbery. (§ 209, subd. (b)(2); see Nguyen, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 877–878; Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1150 .) The Daniels test aimed to restrict the definition of kidnapping and thereby to reinstate its distinctive character as an extremely serious crime different from robbery or rape.

2020This movement must increase the victim’s risk of harm beyond the risk necessarily present in the robbery. (§ 209, subd. (b)(2); see Nguyen, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 877–878; Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1150 .) The Daniels test aimed to restrict the definition of kidnapping and thereby to reinstate its distinctive character as an extremely serious crime different from robbery or rape.

2017However, . . . there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 297 .) ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it be a more or less “ ‘trivial change[] of location having no bearing on the evil at hand.’ ” ’ (People v. Ellis (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 66, 70 .) ‘ “ ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm a

2017However, . . . there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 297 .) ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it be a more or less “ ‘trivial change[] of location having no bearing on the evil at hand.’ ” ’ (People v. Ellis (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 66, 70 .) ‘ “ ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm a

2015However, we have observed that there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ (Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 12; People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1128 [‘to define the phrase “another part of the same county,” in 13 terms of a specific number of inches or feet or miles would be open to a charge of arbitrariness’].) [¶] ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in [the underlying crime]. [Citations.] This inclu

2015However, we have observed that there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ (Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 12; People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1128 [‘to define the phrase “another part of the same county,” in 13 terms of a specific number of inches or feet or miles would be open to a charge of arbitrariness’].) [¶] ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in [the underlying crime]. [Citations.] This inclu

2017However, . . . there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 297 .) ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it be a more or less “ ‘trivial change[] of location having no bearing on the evil at hand.’ ” ’ (People v. Ellis (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 66, 70 .) ‘ “ ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm a

2017However, . . . there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Washington (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 290, 297 .) ‘Incidental’ means ‘that the asportation play no significant or substantial part in the planned [offense], or that it be a more or less “ ‘trivial change[] of location having no bearing on the evil at hand.’ ” ’ (People v. Ellis (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 66, 70 .) ‘ “ ‘The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm a

1994If such conduct was insufficient to activate section 209, the movement in the present case is also inadequate for that purpose." ( Ibid. ) The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in robbery. ( In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 131 ; People v. Lara (1974) 12 Cal.3d 903, 908, & fn. 4 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 549 , 528 P.2d 365 ].) This includes consideration of such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, a

1994If such conduct was insufficient to activate section 209, the movement in the present case is also inadequate for that purpose." ( Ibid. ) The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in robbery. ( In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 131 ; People v. Lara (1974) 12 Cal.3d 903, 908, & fn. 4 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 549 , 528 P.2d 365 ].) This includes consideration of such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, a

1975Although the ratio decidendi of Daniels was that “when the statute [i.e., § 209] is properly construed the evidence there introduced was insufficient to support the judgments” (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 395 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ]), that act of statutory construction served the important purpose of saving the offense of aggravated kidnaping from a charge of unconstitutional disproportionality.

1975Although the ratio decidendi of Daniels was that “when the statute [i.e., § 209] is properly construed the evidence there introduced was insufficient to support the judgments” (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 395 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ]), that act of statutory construction served the important purpose of saving the offense of aggravated kidnaping from a charge of unconstitutional disproportionality.

1971Of these, 11 were reversals of convictions based on movements within buildings; these cases merely apply the Daniels rule to Daniels facts. [1] Of the remaining 19, several are of doubtful value as arguably having been superseded by the Timmons decision which postdated them. [2] Analysis of the "substantial danger" part of the Daniels test has received less attention, but two conceptual problems have emerged: (1) the definition of a substantial increase in danger; and (2) the extent to which the determination of substantial increase in danger presents a question of fact. *104 We have seen that

1971Of these, 11 were reversals of convictions based on movements within buildings; these cases merely apply the Daniels rule to Daniels facts. [1] Of the remaining 19, several are of doubtful value as arguably having been superseded by the Timmons decision which postdated them. [2] Analysis of the "substantial danger" part of the Daniels test has received less attention, but two conceptual problems have emerged: (1) the definition of a substantial increase in danger; and (2) the extent to which the determination of substantial increase in danger presents a question of fact. *104 We have seen that

2016(See Daly, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 [“Daly was convicted of simple kidnapping, a violation of Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a).”]; Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 952–953 [in capital case simple kidnapping conviction in Nevada that involved asportation “too minor to constitute kidnapping” under California law deemed improper to submit to the jury as a penalty phase aggravating circumstance under section 190.3, subdivision (b)].) The Daniels test was not implicated in either case. 9 A “ ‘rape . . . does not necessarily require movement to complete the crime.’ ” (Shadden, supra, 93 C

2016(See Daly, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 [“Daly was convicted of simple kidnapping, a violation of Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a).”]; Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 952–953 [in capital case simple kidnapping conviction in Nevada that involved asportation “too minor to constitute kidnapping” under California law deemed improper to submit to the jury as a penalty phase aggravating circumstance under section 190.3, subdivision (b)].) The Daniels test was not implicated in either case. 9 A “ ‘rape . . . does not necessarily require movement to complete the crime.’ ” (Shadden, supra, 93 C

2011(People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 767 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 467 , 523 P.2d 267 ] [rape victim forced from front to rear of laundromat; “[b]ecause the sexual assault there took place wholly within the confines of a single room in a laundromat, any asportation involved was not ' “into another part of the same county” ’ ”]; People v. Brown (1974) 11 Cal.3d 784 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 426 , 523 P.2d 226 ] [victim forced through own house and 75 feet outside house]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [90 feet]; People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 242

2011(People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 767 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 467 , 523 P.2d 267 ] [rape victim forced from front to rear of laundromat; “[b]ecause the sexual assault there took place wholly within the confines of a single room in a laundromat, any asportation involved was not ' “into another part of the same county” ’ ”]; People v. Brown (1974) 11 Cal.3d 784 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 426 , 523 P.2d 226 ] [victim forced through own house and 75 feet outside house]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ] [90 feet]; People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 242

1993(People v. Stender, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at p. 421 .) To convert this concern for the crossing of *1154 boundaries into a risk analysis, simply reinstates the Daniels test for simple kidnapping.

1993(People v. Stender, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at p. 421 .) To convert this concern for the crossing of *1154 boundaries into a risk analysis, simply reinstates the Daniels test for simple kidnapping.